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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the relationship between military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth in BRICS countries from 1970 to 2017. The increase in 
military expenditure by BRICS and the worsening inclusive growth indices such as 
unemployment, inequality, poverty, among others, necessitated the assessment of the 
relationship between military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth in 
the BRICS countries. The study was carried out under three modular themes, which also 
form the objectives of the study, namely; the determinants of military expenditure, 
computation of inclusive growth index for the BRICS and the effects of military 
expenditure and institutional quality on the inclusive growth index of the BRICS 
countries. Panel data analysis was applied for the first objective, the Z-score technique 
was used for the second objective, which involved the computation of inclusive growth 
index for BRICS. The third objective was analysed using the Auto-Regressive 
Distributed Lags ARDL for BRICS countries by using times series data. The results 
obtained on the first objective revealed that BRICS military expenditure was 
significantly and majorly determined by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), trade 
balance, security web and inflation rate for the period under analysis. The results on 
Objective 2 revealed that the average inclusive growth index for Russia was the highest 
among the five BRICS countries, followed by China and Brazil. However, South Africa 
and India fell  below the average inclusive growth index computed for BRICS. The 
results on Objective 3 showed that the impacts of military expenditure and institutional 
quality on inclusive growth varied among the BRICS countries. From the literature, the 
most effective way of assessment is to focus on the impact of the interactive form of 
military expenditure and institutional quality. Findings revealed that the interactive form 
of military expenditure and institutional quality (MCP) only have significant impact on 
inclusive growth of Russia because the coefficient is positive and significant. The 
coefficient is negative and significant for China and South Africa while the same 
coefficient is not significant at all in Brazil and India. This implies that Russia is the 
only country in the BRICS where the interaction of military expenditure and institutional 
quality supports inclusive growth. Notwithstanding, other control variables such as 
viii 
 
education and population have statistically significant effects on inclusive growth in 
Brazil, China and South Africa.  Results on India emerged as a complete outlier among 
the five as none of the variables, including the control variables was found to have a 
statistically significant relationship with inclusive growth. Again, the efforts in this study 
included a comparison of the inclusive growth results with those of economic growth 
and per capita income which have been used by previous studies to investigate the effect 
of military expenditure on the BRICS economy. The results showed that findings under 
the Inclusive Growth Model were the same for that of economic growth and per capita 
income for Russia, China and South Africa. However, there are some differences firstly; 
the negative effect of the interaction of military expenditure and institutional quality in 
Brazil which is significant on inclusive growth is not significant on economic growth 
and per capita income. This shows that the adverse effect of this variable was more felt 
on inclusive growth than economic growth in Brazil. Again, military expenditure and 
institutional quality showed a positive significant impact on India’s economic growth 
and per capita income, but the effect on inclusive growth was not significant. Finally, 
levels of investment in all the countries have shown significant positive impacts on 
economic growth and per capita income, but the current levels of investments in the 
BRICS fail to drive inclusive growth significantly except in Russia. These results further 
confirmed that assessment of the impacts of military expenditure and institutional 
quality using economic growth and not inclusive growth might be misleading. Based on 
the findings from this study, the following recommendations are made: First, there is the 
need for improvement of synergy between military expenditures and institutional quality 
before the challenge of inclusive growth in the BRICS can be tackled effectively. 
Second, prioritising inclusive growth more than economic growth is more germane to 
the assessment of the effectiveness of military expenditure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the study 
The effectiveness of military expenditure in stimulating economic growth has been a subject of 
debate among economic development researchers.  For instance, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) countries have assigned an enormous budget for the purchase of arms, ammunition 
and developing military related industries. According to the WorldBank (2009) and Jaarboek (2018), 
the amount assigned to military sector investment in BRICS countries has witnessed a significant 
increase when compared to other regional blocs and groupings. The rationale for investing in the 
military is that it will improve security and guarantee peace that will create an investment-friendly 
enabling environment that will, in turn, engender sustainable economic growth. These hypotheses have 
been supported by various theories of economic development and empirical studies.  
According to the findings of Keynes(2016), Yildirim and Öcal, (2016) and Zhang et al., 
(2017a), among others, military expenditure might not promote economic growth as expected because 
an increase in military expenditures will only attract more external aggression that will hinder the 
growth process. Contrary to these authors’ findings on military expenditure and growth, for instance, 
Acemoglu and Robinson(2013) believed that military expenditure will influence growth positively if 
the funds are effectively and efficiently managed. This assertion brought to the fore the relevance of 
the quality of institutions in the administration of military expenditure. This forms the crux for this 
study which is to investigate the validity for BRICS countries since it is apparent that  regardless of the 
increasing military expenditure, BRICS countries are still ranked high among countries in the world 
with the prevalence of income inequalities. 
On the other hand, many countries globally have witnessed outstanding growth rates over the 
years, yet they are confronted with severe problems of poverty, unemployment, and inequality, among 
others. BRICS countries are not exempted from this trend. For example BRICS countries have 
witnessed an average GDP growth rate of around 5 per cent spanning over two decades, yet they are 
still confronted with a rise in the unemployment rate, income disparity and poverty levels. 
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According to WIDER, (2013), in a report titled, “Growth is not working”, they maintained that, 
basing the assessment of policies or government interventions on economic growth effect has been 
condemned because most of the impressive economic growth witnessed by some countries across the 
globe failed to have a trickling down effect in a way that it can lead to inclusive growth. For instance, 
within the last half decade, India has witnessed the most outstanding growth rates among the BRICS, 
yet as of 2017, it had the largest number of poor people in the world (WorldBank, 2009).  
 
Several government institutions across the globe are, however, adjudged to be weak and 
infested with corruption which has hampered the growth process of various countries. BRICS is not an 
exemption in this ugly trend, as shown by the worsening corruption index of the BRICS countries in 
recent times (TMG, 2017). However, the interaction of military expenditure and institutional quality 
might provide a better platform for the assessment of the effect of military expenditure on growth. In 
addition, countries across the globe appear not to be cognizant of these as military expenditure data 
show that military spending has been on the rise globally including the BRICS, but little attention is 
paid to its effect on economic growth. This is why an assessment of the relationship between military 
expenditure and economic growth will remain a crucial research topic in years to come. 
In conclusion, based on the preceding paragraphs, what is clear is that there are grey areas on 
the linkages between military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth in the BRICS 
countries. For instance, what is the influence of military expenditure on BRICS inclusive growth? 
Does the quality of the institutions in BRICS countries affect inclusive growth? Will the interaction 
between the two have more effects on inclusive growth than their individual effect? Finally, is the 
inclusive growth a better way of assessing the effects of military expenditure? All these burning 
questions, among others, are important to this study.   
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The issue of the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth was 
popularised by the work of Benoit (1973), Benoit(1978)  who emphasised the expected link between 
the two to be a symbiotic one. According to the study, it is expected that a safe country, guaranteed by 
sophisticated military apparatus, is important for peaceful co-existence that will create an enabling 
environment for economic activities to thrive, and in the long-run promote economic growth. On the 
other hand, the study further identified a thriving economy as a prerequisite for an efficient and 
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effective military formation. However, going by the contradictory school of thought on the military 
expenditure impact on growth as shown under the background to the study, it appears that this 
symbiotic relationship is not evident in the BRICS where the unemployment and poverty rates have 
continued to grow unabatedly. Hence,  this calls to question the assertions from the study as to whether 
the peaceful environment that the increased military expenditure is supposed to create has engendered 
the required peace that will improve inclusive growth in the BRICS countries. Literature has shown 
that BRICS countries have made a series of efforts to ensure that unemployment, inequality and 
poverty, which are symptoms of poor inclusive growth, are reduced through the creation of an 
enabling environment and promotion of ease of doing business in their regions (UNEP, 2017). An 
important aspect of the MDG which the BRICS also keyed into is the improvement in the ease of 
doing business among countries. This aspect of the MDG primarily rests on guaranteeing the security 
of investments in both property and humans. Consequently, as part of the commitments of the BRICS 
countries to this course, military expenditure has increased tremendously in recent years in their bid to 
fortify their security architectures in order to ensure peaceful environments that will drive growth. 
However, these efforts appear not to be yielding the expected results as income inequality 
stood at 56.88 % in Brazil, 40.20 % in Russia, 33.63 % in India, 40 % in China and 61.71% in South 
Africa as reported in the statistics provided in the World Bank Development Online Database (2019). 
One of the reasons suggested in literature that might be responsible for this is the quality of the 
institutions in the BRICS countries. According to Asongu (2016), Méon and Sekkat(2005), 
institutional quality, which is required to manage and administer the funds meant for the military, is 
crucial for the assessment of the effects of military expenditure on inclusive growth.  
The role of institutional quality has become an important question in research because it is 
believed that it is one of the factors causing international differences in inclusive growth.  Gramlich 
(1994) and Bellos (2017) affirmed that in the mid-1990s, institutional quality had become a major 
component in the policy advice of international financial institutions (IFIs), wrapped into so-called 
good governance conditionality. Therefore, to actualise inclusive growth, an institutional role in 
managing the increasing public expenditure on the military is important. Wagner (1883), North (1990), 
North, (2006) and Acemoglu et al.(2005) assert that the pace of economic growth and development 
across countries can be attributed fundamentally to institutional quality as natural resource-endowed 
countries with better institutional quality are not affected by a resource curse. From all these 
submissions, it is clear that the role of institutional quality in achieving inclusive growth, and more 
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importantly, in ensuring efficient utilisation of the rising military expenditure, so that it can drive 
inclusive growth, cannot be overemphasised. 
The institutional quality in the BRICS countries has remained questionable over time. For 
instance, the corruption index in the BRICS countries has been on the rise recently, and this speaks 
volumes about the quality of the institutions in these countries. According to Transparency 
International (2009), mismanagement and misplacement of priorities, as far as military expenditure is 
concerned, exist in BRICS countries. But if this has been responsible for the seemingly unimpressive 
relationship between military expenditure and inclusive growth in BRICS,  it remains a pertinent 
question to be answered. Another reason why the efforts of the BRICS countries in achieving inclusive 
growth seems not to be working is attributed to the fact that economic growth has been given more 
priority over inclusive growth in the past (Collier 2008). This is why most of the studies on military 
expenditure have investigated its impact on economic growth and not inclusive growth (McKay and 
Sumner, 2008). Economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to ensure better living standards for 
all citizens (Collier, 2008). The challenge is that the current growth in Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS) countries is neither sustainable nor inclusive  (Mckay and Sumner, 2008). 
However, inclusive growth has been identified as the type of growth that can engender reductions in 
poverty rate, inequality and unemployment, which are perennial problems of the BRICS countries. 
Therefore, it is obvious that an assessment of the impact of military expenditure on inclusive growth 
rather than economic growth would have been a better way of assessing the effectiveness of military 
expenditure. Hence computation of inclusive growth index for the BRICS, which is not in existence 
before, will provide an avenue to achieve this.  
 
In conclusion, Alexander (2015) asserts that military expenditure alone can still be short of 
what can engender inclusive growth; hence, the incessant advocacy for an increase in military 
expenditure. However, the ability to reduce or increase military expenditure primarily rests on its 
determinants, which vary from region to region and economic bloc to economic bloc. Therefore, could 
the identification of these factors in BRICS countries affect military expenditure and enhance its effect 
on inclusive growth? This, and other questions raised previously, will be answered empirically in this 
study. 
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1.3 Research questions 
The questions raised during the discussions on the statement of the problem, which the study will 
attempt to provide answers to are as follows: 
1. What factors drive BRICS countries military expenditure? 
2. What is the inclusive growth index for BRICS countries for the period of 1970 to 2017? 
3. What is the role of military expenditure and institutional quality in achieving inclusive 
growth in BRICS countries? 
 
1.4. Objectives of the study  
The following are the objectives the research intends to achieve. These objectives are interdependent 
and are as follows: 
1. to  identify the factors that drive BRICS countries military expenditure; 
2. to compute a better measurement of the inclusive growth index in BRICS countries; and 
3. to explore the impact of military expenditure and  institutional  quality on inclusive growth 
in BRICS countries.  
 
1.5 Justification for the study 
Given the advocacy for an increase in military expenditure as explained under the statement of the 
problem, it is important to examine those shift factors that can either be responsible for the rise or fall 
in the military expenditure since they vary from country to country and economic bloc to economic 
bloc (Alexander, 2015). These research questions seek to unravel the factors that determine military 
expenditure in BRICS countries from 1970 to 2017.According to the existing literature on both 
developing and developed countries, the following noticeable factors have been identified are political, 
economic and security-related driven factors. More explicitly, these factors include economic factors 
(such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, population growth rate and arms trade; external 
and internal security threats and the political structure (such as democratic or authoritarian regime). 
Many studies in the past have focused mostly on macroeconomic and demographic features only  
while neglecting the security features.  This study includes security indicators such as security web, 
external and internal security threats as part of  the causative factors of military expenditure. 
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The need for the reduction in the emphasis on economic growth as a basis for assessing 
government policies and interventions is also very important. This is due to the fact that many 
countries that have achieved promising economic growth in recent times are still grappling with 
problems of poverty, unemployment and inequality necessitate shifting of attention to inclusive growth 
(WIDER, 2013). Inclusive growth precludes minimum levels of poverty, unemployment and 
inequality; therefore, it serves as a better assessment of the effectiveness of both military expenditure 
and institutional quality in the BRICS countries. Therefore, computation of inclusive growth index 
provides a platform that incorporates the socio-economic variables omitted in economic growth rate 
and in human development index computation. Notwithstanding, getting an appropriate inclusive 
growth index has witnessed some research activities over the years. Anand et al. (2013) and Anand 
and Sen (1994) used three indicators to compute inclusive growth for the International Monetary Fund 
for accessing the development of countries. Again, OECD (2013) in their own empirical work included 
some indicators that are different from Anand et al., (2013), Anand and Sen, (1994), yet, only three 
indicators were also used. More so, it has been emphasised that poverty rates, investment and 
employment to population are also important indicators of inclusive growth, but they are not included 
in the previous studies (Anand and Sen, (1994).  Consequently, this study will develop an inclusive 
growth index, which is a composition of five economic indicators and five social indicators for BRICS 
countries from 1970 to 2017. This will give a broader perspective of computing inclusive growth index 
unlike the narrow approach embraced by previous studies. 
In conclusion, there has been persistent rise in military expenditure in the BRICS countries, yet 
poverty, unemployment and inequality persist. These call to question the role of military expenditure 
in promoting inclusive growth in the BRICS since poverty, unemployment and inequality are all 
inclusive growth indicators. The scenario has also called to question the relevance of institutional 
quality in the BRICS since the institutions are required to manage the funds released for military 
purposes. From literature, military expenditure could have both positive and negative impacts on 
inclusive growth in developing countries. These impacts could be direct and indirect, depending on the 
prevailing institutional environment. For instance, military expenditure might drive BRICS countries’ 
inclusive growth if there is a strong institutional quality that encourages channelling of military 
expenditure into productive military industries, which in return, generates income through the sales of 
arms. Military expenditure might also retard inclusive growth due to weak institutions, which 
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encourage rent-seeking and corrupt activities. Consequently, assessing the effect of the interactions of 
military expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth in the BRICS is germane to this 
study. 
 
1.6 Scope of the study 
The research explores the impact of military expenditure, institutional quality on the inclusive 
growth of BRICS countries from 1970 to 2017. The starting year 1970 was selected based on data 
availability for key variables used in the study while 2018, 2019 and 2020 were excluded based on 
unavailability of data for key variables of the study as at the time of writing this thesis. Also, BRICS 
countries were selected for this study because of their peculiar nature as one of the economic blocs 
where the relationship among military expenditure, intuitional quality and inclusive growth requires 
investigation especially due to the fact that military expenditure has been on the rise in the BRICS and 
yet unemployment rate, poverty rate and income inequalities have all been rising unabatedly in these 
countries as well. 
 
1.7 Significance of the study 
The findings of this study will provide some significant contributions to the fields of knowledge in 
development economics, political science and peace and conflict studies. These contributions include 
the followings 
1. The computation of BRICS inclusive growth Index (IGI) will be the first of its kind in 
development economics for BRICS countries. This is because global attention of development 
economics researchers has shifted to the concept of inclusive growth since economic growth is 
not working. 
2. For the BRICS countries to unravel the pull and push factors of military expenditure which is 
very important for controlling the expenditure on the military, assessment of the determinants 
of military expenditure becomes expedient to the study. 
3.  For the BRICS countries to be able to assess the progress made so far on their quest for 
inclusive growth the computation of the inclusive growth index is done in the study and it will 
give a clearer picture of where the BRICS countries stand currently on the scale of the inclusive 
growth index. 
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4. For assessment of the BRICS by international communities and BRICS themselves on the level 
of synergy currently existing between their institutional quality and military expenditures, it is 
necessary to assess the interactive impacts of military expenditure and institutional quality. 
However, it has been emphasized that military expenditure can better lead to inclusive growth 
with good institutional quality. 
 
1.8 List of key terminologies used in this thesis 
This section presents the key terminologies used during the course of writing this thesis. 
1. Military expenditure –is the total monies a central government spent on its military sector 
which covers its personnel salaries, funds for the purchase of arms, building of military 
infrastructures such as barracks and offices and related industries. For this study, military 
expenditure as a percentage share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used for measuring 
military expenditure for all the BRICS countries.  
2. Institutional Quality- is a measure which indicates the quality of governance and institutions 
in a country. For this study, institutional quality is measured using corruption to determine the 
quality of governance and institutions in each of the BRICS countries. For example, high 
corruption denotes weak governance and institution while low corruption denotes strong 
governance and institution. 
3. Inclusive growth– Refers to economic growth that creates opportunity for all segments of the 
population and distributes the dividends of increased prosperity, both in monetary and non – 
monetary terms, fairly across society. For this study to measure inclusive growth in BRICS 
countries, an index will be computed for each of the BRICS countries. 
4. BRICS countries-BRICS is the acronym coined for an association of five major emerging 
national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Originally the first four 
were grouped as BRIC (or the BRICs”), before the induction of South Africa in 2010. 
 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis  
The structure of the thesis is outlined as follows: Chapter 1 presents the background of the study, 
problem statement, research objectives and questions, justification of study and structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides detailed background information on BRICS military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth trends from 1970 to 2017. Chapter 3 critically reviews the theoretical and 
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relevant empirical literature relating to the determinants of military expenditure. Chapter 4 presents the 
datasets and methodologies used in investigating the determinant of military expenditure in BRICS 
countries; computation of an inclusive growth index for BRICS countries and investigating the effect 
of military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth in BRICS countries.  Chapter 5 
presents the regression estimation output and analysis of all the three objectives outlined in this study. 
Chapter 6 discusses the research findings in detail and possible economic implications to BRICS 
countries. Chapter 7 summarises the thesis, offers possible recommendations, and areas of future 
research. 
 
  
1.9 Limitation of the study 
Like any other research, this study has some limitations. Firstly, the study only covers the periods of 
1970 to 2017 and for BRICS countries only at the time of writing this thesis. In conclusion, this 
restriction will not in any way diminish the content and purpose of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.0. MILITARY EXPENDITURE, INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
IN BRICS COUNTRIES 
This chapter commences with the socio-economic view of BRICS countries, section two 
presents BRICS countries military expenditure, section three presents institutional quality of the 
BRICS countries’, section four presents economic development in BRICS countries while section five 
presents poverty and other socioeconomic problems within the BRICS countries. 
 
2.1 Socio-economic View of BRICS countries 
In 2001, Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs created the term BRIC, and later South Africa was 
included in 2010. The term BRICS denotes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. According 
to (JAARBOEK, 2018, SIPRI, 2019), BRICS countries account for about 26.11 per cent of total world 
military expenditure and have a total military expenditure of US$ 391391 million in constant 2017 
price, which is among the top five in the world and represents over 3.6 billion people, or about 41% of 
the world population. The BRICS economies combined nominal GDP of US$ 16.6 trillion, equivalent 
to approximately 22% of the gross world product, and have a combined GDP (PPP) of around US $ 37 
trillion and an estimated US $ 4 trillion in combined foreign reserves.  
By virtue of their large sizes and markets, the creation of this body was considered important 
for the economic development of the world. Although the five-member states are members of different 
colonies, they have strong historical and cultural relationships. Furthermore, they are geographically 
distant, but strategically located and are either the largest or second-largest sub-regional economic 
powerhouses of their respective geographical locations as presented in Figure 2.1 below.  
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Figure 2.3: Map of BRICS countries 
Source: World Bank 2018 
 
According to (JAARBOEK, 2018, WorldBank, 2009), income classification reveals that 
BRICS countries are a combination of high and middle income per capita, and carry the burden of 
large military expenditure. These countries have different levels of economic growth and resources. 
Table 2.2 gives a snapshot of the selected basic macroeconomic characteristics of these countries. 
Furthermore, the BRICS countries represent 27 per cent of the world’s land area, which covers a 
surface area of about 39,000,000 square kilometres. The population is 41 per cent of the world’s total 
population. The climatic and geographical conditions of these countries range from equatorial rain 
forests to hot desert belt (Jones, 2002).  
 
2.1.1 Economic Potential of BRICS Countries 
The well-known, static and dynamic effects of economic integration can be influenced for 
better or worse by economic peculiarities of geopolitical or geo-cultural environments. In this view, 
this section focuses on the economic potential of BRICS in the long-run.   
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According to Akpan et al. (2014), the following are the economic potential of BRICS 
countries. 
First, is the trade creation potential. BRICS offers a substantial potential for trade creation. The 
wide range of human, mineral, financial and entrepreneurial resources existing in the region has not 
been fully utilised. With a large market of over 3.1 billion inhabitants and a population growth rate of 
about 2.5%, a wide market would be assured for any well-designated and managed industry. For 
example, empirical studies of bilateral industrial integration between China and Russia reveal that their 
welfare gains were 33 and 22% of gross output, respectively. There are indications that a large scale 
integration such as BRICS can even increase such gains for all member countries. 
In addition, the economic potential of BRICS includes the potential for dynamic gains in terms 
of large scale economies and the opportunity for long term planning for growth. In terms of large scale 
economies, the choice of optimal locations for integration projects, based on economic and technical 
considerations and accessibility to inputs in the regional market would ensure a substantial fall in per-
unit cost of outputs. For coordinated industrial development, BRICS would allow ordering priorities 
for the terms of the projects to be exploited. Such coordinated development could avoid uneconomic 
duplication and wastage. 
Furthermore, taking a collective approach is also a potential economic benefit to BRICS in the 
long-run, which is derived from the old principle of “united we stand, divided we fall”. This is a 
collective way of fighting development problems. According to (Akpan et al.,(2014), having collective 
bargaining within the context of the BRICS would, therefore:  
(1) improve export market prospects for member countries’ primary products; 
(2) strengthen the negotiations position for technology transfer from multinational companies and  
developed countries; 
(3) attract meaningful aid and technical assistance programs from multilateral agencies; and 
(4) enable member countries to fight region-wide economic problems such as smuggling and 
dumping, with coordinated efforts. 
The BRICS countries depend largely on mineral and agricultural production, which makes them 
susceptible to commodity and natural shocks such as droughts and international glut. Furthermore, 
agriculture, mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, iron ore, and bauxite can be found in countries 
like South Africa, India, while large deposits of petroleum and bauxite can be found in Russia. The 
industrial manufacturing and processing are being promoted in all BRICS member countries at 
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different levels. However, the export of primary agricultural produce for foreign exchange is still the 
leading sector of the domestic economies (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: BRICS countries   
No. Countries Main Exports 
1 Brazil Iron ore, crude oil, soybeans, sugar and poultry  
2 Russia Oil and petroleum, gas, coal, timber, machinery and 
equipment  
3 India Minerals, machinery, organic chemicals precious 
metals 
4 China Cotton, tea, rice, soybeans, crude oil and iron ore 
 
 
5 South Africa Platinum, coal, cars, gold and iron ore 
Source: Food Agricultural Organisation (F.A.O.), United Nations International Trade 
Statistics online database (2018) 
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Table 2.2: BRICS selected economic indicator 
Source:   World Bank (2019) World Development Indicators Online database in annual figures and in percentages
 
Country 
 
Population 
(millions) 
2016 
GDP 
Growth 
(annual %) 
(2009-
2017) 
Average 
Military 
Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
(2009-2017) 
Average 
Military 
Expenditure 
(% of  central 
government 
expenditure) 
2009-2017 
Military 
Expenditure 
(at Current 
USD 
(2009-2017) 
Average 
Arms 
Export 
US Dollars 
(2009-2017) 
US $ 
Inflation, 
consumer 
prices 
(annual %) 
2009-2017 
Arms 
Import 
US Dollars 
(2009-2017) 
US $ 
Brazil 207 1.20 1.41 3.70 30470586503 59666666.67 6.19 219777777,8 
Russia 144 0.74 4.20 - 70778630551 6625888889 8.09 89777777,78 
India 132 7.40 2.57 9.40 50204195950 28125000 7.98 3423444444 
China 137 8.11 1.91 6.71 1,72858E+11 1521555556 2.24 1224666667 
South Africa 56 1.61 1.11 3.48 3906171615 105333333.3 5,59 89500000 
Total 676  
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2.1.2 Socio-Economic Problems of BRICS Countries  
Despite the great potentials that BRICS has, the problems facing it are enormous and 
similar. A clear identification of these problems is the first step in any search for effective 
solutions. Some of the major economic problems facing BRICS include huge internal and 
external security challenges. For instance, the combined military expenditure of the BRICS 
member states is currently put at 391 trillion in current US dollars, with China the second-highest 
military spender country in the world. Military expenditure is expected to swallow, on average, 
about 15% of the central government expenditure of BRICS countries. This also means that three 
times more resources will be allocated to military expenditure than to education and health1. 
In addition, there are other serious structural problems with multiple dimensions. These 
include problems of low capita income, low or negative rates of savings, investment and GDP 
growth, high population growth rate, chronic balance of payment deficit, high rates of inflation 
and unemployment. Another noticeable problem is planning conflicts. Each member undertakes 
economic planning in terms of its national goals without reference to the BRICS goals. This is 
likely to make the selection of integration projects with trade opportunities difficult. 
Furthermore, members of BRICS are plagued with massive corruption. Political instabilities in 
countries like South Africa and Russia are substantially attributed to corruption. These corrupt 
activities tend to undermine the internal and external balance of members’ economies. In South 
Africa, widespread smuggling and unfriendly government policies (land ownership) have led to 
heavy losses of jobs in industries like textiles and cigarettes. The foreign exchange drains 
experienced in recent years are partially attributed to black-marketers in foreign exchange.  
In conclusion, the population growth is about 2.5 per cent, with a higher proportion under 
the age of 15. The literacy rate is very low among the population, and the infant mortality rate 
ranges from 64 to 163 per thousand live births. Figure 2.2 below shows the share of each BRICS 
country in terms of Gross Domestic Product, with China contributing about 59% of the GDP to 
the BRICS community. 
                                                          
1
BRICS Annual Bulletin (2010). 
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Figure 2.4: GDP share of each BRICS country in 2017 
 
Source: World Bank (2018) World Development Indicators Online database 
 
2.1.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of BRICS 
There are no specially defined strengths and weaknesses of BRICS as a group. However, 
the strengths and weaknesses of each member state may be used to define them for the group. In 
this regard, the following strengths and weaknesses are the suggestions by the author based on 
the observation he has made on the subject. These reports are BRICS joint statistical publications 
of 2013, 2014 and 2015, BRICS report 2012, the Gauteng BRICS Report of 2013 and the Global 
Competitiveness Report of 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
 
 
 
 
BRICS countries at GDP (constant 2010 US$) in 2017 
Brazil
Russia
India
China
South Africa
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Table 2.3: strengths and weaknesses of BRICS 
Country  Strength  Weakness 
 
Brazil 
 Politically stable 
 Model Democracy 
 Relatively low unemployment 
rate 
 Lacking economic infrastructure 
 Poor investment in roads, rail ports 
and energy 
 
Russia 
 Permanent member of UNSC 
 Nuclear power 
 Strong military  
 Relatively stable political 
environment but sometimes faced 
with pockets of sanctions as well 
as heavily linked with 
international war either as an 
arms sponsor or financier.  
 Relatively good foreign 
investment 
 Becoming an authoritarian  state 
 Suspended from the G8 and facing 
sanctions 
 Stagnant economic growth 
 
India  Strong information and 
technology and service sector 
 Has coal, manganese and natural 
gas 
 Huge human capital base 
 Model democracy 
 Politically stable  
 Moderate foreign investment 
 Large market base  
 Large public debts 
 Poor infrastructure 
 High unemployment rate 
China  Permanent member of UNSC 
 Largest economy in BRICS 
 BRICS Bank headquarters in 
Shanghai 
 Very strong manufacturing 
 Strong foreign financial 
investment 
 Most industrialized economy 
 Non-democratic state (one party 
state) 
 Increasing income inequality causing 
social tensions 
 Currency undervaluation 
 Environmental insecurity  
South Africa  Best constitution in the world 
 Unstable political environment. 
For instance, the rate of 
xenophobic attacks on Nigerians 
and other nationals and land 
without compensation with white 
communities.  
 Democratic state 
 High level of unemployment  
 Most unequal society in the world 
 Labour unrest threating the country’s 
backbone of the economy (the mines) 
 Poor education system  
 Smallest economy in BRICS 
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 Fair electoral system 
 Member of the G20, UNSC and 
BRICS 
 Regional leader in Sub-Sahara 
Africa 
         Source: Compilation by Author based on Gauteng BRICS Report 2013, BRICS Joint Statistical 
Publications, 2013-2014, Global Competitive Index 2012/1 
  
2.2 Military Expenditure in BRICS Countries Over the Period 
 Institute (2018), SIPRI (2019) affirm that BRICS countries account for about 26.11 per 
cent of total world military expenditure as well as control 32% of the world’s Gross Domestic 
Product GDP and have experienced a high level of both internal and external security challenges. 
The intra-conflict rivalry among BRICS countries also makes this empirical investigation an 
interesting one to explore. For example, conflicts between India and China have been confirmed 
and as the two countries are perceived as the world’s fast-growing powerhouse countries; their 
relationship synergy plays a significant influence in the political domain. Finally, on a general 
note, the world’s military expenditure has declined due to the peace dividend. However, BRICS 
countries still assign a high percentage of their central government budgetary allocation to the 
military sector and industries despite witnessing harsh socio-economic inclusive growth 
challenges. For instance, BRICS countries are experiencing downturned GDP growth rates 
coupled with high unemployment rates, crime rates, high poverty rates, high-income disparity, 
climate change and a host of other challenges. 
Military expenditure in BRICS countries plays a pivotal role in government expenditure 
which often gulps a huge percentage in budgetary allocation compared to other critical sectors, 
for example, the health and education sectors. It is oftentimes among the first four major sectors 
in budgetary allocation decisions. Many development economists have argued that increased 
military expenditure crowds out both public and private investment, and consequently hampers 
growth. However, this assertion is not valid for all countries as confirmed by some scholars 
Benoit (1973), Yildirim and Öcal (2016), Zhang et al. (2017a) . For example, Benoit (1973) 
confirmed that military expenditure stimulates economic prosperity in emerging countries. On 
the other hand, some scholars have disagreed with Benoit (1973) school of thought. Some of the 
prominent antagonist scholars are Dash et al.,( 2016), Künü et al. (2016),Malizard (2016). 
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On a general note, the world’s military expenditure has decreased after the Cold war 
because of the peace dividend. However, in recent times, military expenditure has increased as 
the BRICS countries still allocate a huge amount from their budgetary allocation to the military 
sector as shown below. 
 
Table 2.4: BRICS’ military expenditure and its central government expenditure 2013 
Countries  Military expenditure of  
GDP  2013 
Military expenditure of Central 
Government Expenditure  2013 
Brazil 1.3 4 
Russia 3.9 15 
India 2.5 14 
China 1.8 15 
South Africa 1.1 3.2 
Source: World Bank (2017) World Development Indicators Online database 
A reduction of investment and expenditure in education, health and other critical sectors, 
BRICS countries' inclusive growth (especially those with double-digit military expenditure 
percentage of its Central Government Expenditure) might be jeopardised by high military 
expenditure. As a result, the impact of military expenditure on inclusive growth in BRICS 
countries needs to be explored and analysed carefully. 
2.2.3 BRICS Military Expenditure Ranking and Pattern 
BRICS countries are one of the largest and most powerful economic blocs with over 500 
billion people and has one of the largest combined military force in the world. The BRICS 
countries have a combined military expenditure of USD 348942 SIPRI (2017) in constant 2016 
prices. The BRICS bloc is ranked the largest in terms of PPP dollar. 
Table 2.5: BRICS Military expenditure ranking and pattern 
 
               2017 
Countries 
World country ranking by 
military expenditure 
Military expenditure by 
constant million USD 
Brazil 11
th
 25751.34 
Russia 4
th
 55327.10 
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India 5
th
 59757.10 
China  2
nd
 228173.00 
South Africa  43
rd
 3110.20 
Total  348942.40 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2017), SIPRI Report Shifting Trend 
in Global Military Expenditures. Available from: http://www.dw.de/sipri-reports. [Last accessed 
on 2017 Oct 03]. 
BRICS countries have demonstrated a sustained increase in military expenditure and 
contributed to growth in World military expenditure in recent years. BRICS countries' real 
military expenditure has been rising from 1946 to 2017. The BRICS combined military 
expenditure has risen from 1.0% in 1984 to 1.8 in 2017, which outweighs the NATO benchmark 
requirement for development. 
 
Figure 2.3 -BRICS Military expenditure (% of GDP) 1970- 2017  
 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2017), SIPRI Report Shifting Trend 
in Global Military Expenditures. Available from: http://www.dw.de/sipri-reports. [Last accessed 
on 2017 Oct 03]. 
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Figure 2.4 - BRICS countries’ military expenditure (military expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP) 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2017), SIPRI Report Shifting Trend 
in Global Military Expenditures. Available from: http://www.dw.de/sipri-reports. [Last accessed 
on 2017 Oct 03]. 
Figure 2.4, above depicts the trends of BRICS countries’ military expenditure (military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP). The range of BRICS military expenditure is 0.0% to 6.0%. 
 
2.2.3 Chronology Of Wars Involving BRICS Countries From 1971 To Present 
This section presents both wars/conflicts as the main determinants for military 
expenditure in BRICS countries. Table 2.6 below provides a chronological start and finish dates, 
names of conflicts and BRICS countries involved consequently stimulating increased military 
expenditure from 1970 to 2017.  
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Table 2.6: Chronology of wars involving BRICS countries from 1971 to present  
Years Name of conflicts Victorious 
side 
Defeated side 
Start Finish    
1971 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars and 
Conflicts 
India and 
Bangladesh  
Pakistan 
1974 1974 Battle of the Parcel Islands  China South Vietnam 
1975 2002 Angolan Civil Wars Russia and 
others 
South Africa 
and others 
1975 On-going* Cabinda war Russia FLEC 
1977 1978 Ethio - Egyptian war Russia Somalia 
1979 1990 Sino-Vietnamese war  China Vietnam 
1979 1989 Soviet- Afghan war Tehran Eight Russia 
1983 2009 Sri-Lankan Civil war India 
(1987-1990) 
Tamil Tigers 
1984 1987 Siachen Conflict India Pakistan 
1989 On-going 
* 
Insurgency in Jammu and 
Kashmir( part of the 
Kashmir conflict) 
India Harket-ul-Jihad 
Isau and others 
1991 2002 Sierra-Leone Civil war South Africa 
mercenaries 
and Nigeria 
ECONOMG 
and others 
Revolutionary 
United Front 
and others 
1991 1993 Georgian  civil Georgian  and 
Russia 
Zviadist 
1992 1992 East Progorodry conflicts Russian  army 
and others 
Ingush militia  
1992 1992 War of Transnistria Russia 
14
th
Army  and 
others 
Moldova and 
others 
1992 1993 War in Abkhazia 
(1992-1993) 
Russia and 
others 
Afghanistan  
1993 On-going 
* 
Ethnic conflict in Nagaland  India and 
others 
Rebel forces 
1993 1993 1993 Russian constitutional 
crisis 
President of 
Russia and 
others  
Supreme Soviet 
of Russia and 
others 
1984 On-going* Armenia-Azerbaijan border 
conflict 
Russia 
supports 
Azerbaijan 
supported by 
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Armenia Turkey 
1984 1996 First Chechen  The Chechen 
Republic of 
Ichkeria and 
others 
Russia 
1996 2006 Nepalese civil war China support 
Communist 
Party of Nepal 
India support 
the Kingdom of 
Nepal 
1996 2001 Civil in Afghanistan  India supports 
the USA and 
others 
Al-Qaeda and 
others 
1999 1999 Kargi War 
(part of Indo Pakistan war) 
India Pakistan 
1999 1999 War of Dagestan Russia IIPB and Shura 
of Dagestan 
1999 2009 Second Chechen War  Russia and 
Republic of 
Chechnya 
Republic of 
Ichker and 
others 
1996 On-going* South Africa farm attacks South Africans Foreign 
nationals and 
South Africans 
2002 2007 First Ivorian civil war Russia support France / UN 
2002 On-going Taliban Insurgency India Coalition 
forces and 
others 
Taliban 
2007 2015 War in Ingushetia  Russia and 
others 
Caucasus 
Emirate and 
others 
2008 2008 Russo-Georgia Russia and 
others 
Georgia 
2009 On-going* Insurgency in the North 
Caucaus 
Russia Caucasus 
Emirate 
2011 On-going* Syrian civil war Russia 
supports Syria 
The USA 
supported the 
Free Syrian 
Army 
2012 2013 M23 rebellion  South Africa 
and others 
March 23 
movement  
Sources: (Posen, 1986), Correlate of Wars (2017) 
2.2.4 Arms Production and BRICS countries 
This section presents the arm production capacity of BRICS countries from 1970 to 2010. 
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2.2.4.1 Arms Production 
A new and interesting development in the defense-related activities of BRICS countries is 
the growing importance attached to domestic arms production. (Wulf and Ball (1983) list about 
fifteen countries with a reasonable volume of armament manufactures within the economy, while 
another seventeen produce some (albeit minor) armament. For countries like India, Israel and 
Brazil, the fabrication of armaments is a major component of the industrialisation programmes, 
and the latter two have also entered significantly into export markets. Even though the total 
volume of such production is still a tiny percentage of world output, it is rising and has important 
implications for the domestic economy of these countries. A careful analysis of the different 
facets of this phenomenon is, therefore, necessary. Table 2.7 below gives information on the 
volume of arms output for specific regions. 
 
Table 2.7: Armament production export (in US $ billion 2010 prices) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
  1255000000   
South Asia   85000000 24000000  
Sub-Sahara Africa 3000000     
Brazil  156000000 96000000  151000000 
Russia    4503000000 6091000000 
India   3000000 21000000 5000000 
China 893000000 949000000 941000000 302000000 1479000000 
South Africa 3000000 39000000  20000000 235000000 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2018) 
This section presents an in-depth study of arms production in BRICS countries. First, the 
section discusses the motives for initiating domestic manufacture of arms. Thereafter, the section 
analyses the links between weapons production and the industrialisation strategy followed by the 
relevant countries. The section specifically distinguishes between countries following inward-
looking import substitution policies and those in outward-looking import substitution policies 
and those involved in outward-looking export promotion strategies. Within this framework, it 
will be seen that there is a close connection between developmental policy and armament 
manufacture. This leads to a discussion of the linkages between the industrial base of the 
economy and defence production sectors. In particular, those industries that constitute the 
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Potential Capacity for Defence (PCD) (Kennedy, 1974), and have close inter-industrial linkages 
with arms need to be analysed with care. These are the industries that are potentially capable of 
contributing to and benefitting from arms manufacturing. As we shall observe, both backward 
and forward linkages can be established. The PCD group of industries forms the basic industrial 
framework, which constitutes the necessary conditions for the establishment and expansion of 
domestic arms production. On the other hand, inter-industrial demand and technological spin-
offs from the defence industries may help in boosting the output of the PCP group. This is one of 
the major reasons given in support of defence production within the economy, and if the spin-off 
effects are significant, it could be a major positive point in favour of the domestic manufacture of 
weapons. 
The final section will concentrate on the resource and allocation costs of military 
industrialisation. In particular, the initial foreign exchange requirements for such activities can be 
quite substantial. In fact, imports may even continue, long after what is warranted by import-
substituting strategies, due to the technological characteristics of modern weapons systems and 
rapid obsolescence. Some overall conclusions will then be drawn on the causes, rationale, 
impact, benefit and cost of arms production in the NICs. 
2.2.4.2. Reasons For Establishing Arms Production 
Many motives lie behind the decision taken by various countries to establish the domestic 
production of arms. The first and most often cited reason is political. As Pierre (2014) notes, 
almost all of the countries that have embarked upon creating an arms-manufacturing industry 
have done this for political and security reasons. They wish to become independent by becoming 
self-sufficient. Clearly, by its nature, arms production is expected to be motivated by political, 
security and military factors. 
Threat perceptions are important in perpetuating arms race in emerging countries (Deger 
and Sen, 1990). These threats - occasionally real, more often potential - can also induce a 
country with access to relevant technology to produce arms within the economy. Independence 
from major suppliers and superpowers, who may have an undue influence on the receipt country 
during a time of tension and hostilities, is a powerful inducement for the domestic manufacture 
of at least basic weapons. The Indian ordinance factory system which was languishing in the late 
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1950s was dramatically revitalised during the Sino-Indian war, and from the mid-1960s became 
highly organised in the manufacture of relatively sophisticated weapons. 
Coupled with perceived threats, it has been claimed that some countries have established 
arms production as a result of their implicit desire for regional dominance (Wulf and Ball, 1983). 
Examples are India in southern Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Since the major suppliers have been known to cut off resupply during a war (witness the 
embargoes imposed on Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq),  a country going for regional 
arms superiority will find it more useful to have domestic sources of supply at hand. In a 
different form, this motive may resurface in the form of “prestige” attached to arms manufacture 
at home and the concomitant power that a dictatorial military government may have. 
Finally, certain countries, such as South Africa, find themselves ostracised by sizeable 
sections of the international community. These countries have often invested large sums of 
resources for the local manufacture of weapons than relying on undependable imports. 
Thus, politico-security considerations play an important role in determining whether nations 
attempt the domestic production of weapons, if technologically feasible. The fifteen largest arms 
producers among emerging countries - Israel, India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, to 
mention a few - can be slotted into one of the groups mentioned above. However, these political 
motives can be overemphasised, and there is always the danger that other causes, which may 
play a very big role in arms production, may be overlooked. 
Important economic considerations are often cited as providing the major motivation 
behind armament production. These can be grouped under three categories. First, there may be 
technological spin-offs from defence industrialisation. These include research and development, 
increased productivity of the labour force, skill formation through learning by doing and 
familiarisation with advanced technology. Second, emerging countries often suffer from excess 
capacity, thus military industries may have backward linkages and create effective demand for 
inputs produced by horizontally integrated civilian industrial systems. Third, as the international 
trade in arms increases and weapons tend to be sold rather than given as grants or aid, the foreign 
exchange costs are becoming prohibitive. Import-substituting domestic weapons manufacture 
may reduce import and gain foreign exchange. The next stage of arms exports has also become 
relevant for countries like Brazil, Israel and South Korea. Thus, foreign exchange earned directly 
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through export or indirectly through import saved, can be a major economic motive for local 
production. 
Even though a few emerging countries produce arms, the technology is usually imported 
and the supplier states (DCs) are also involved in the production process (Carranza, 1983). The 
role of such suppliers in technology transfer and helping to set up plants is rather important and 
often controversial. (Wulf and Ball (1983) believe that developed countries, for political reasons, 
will continue to export arms production technology and thus help developing nations to set-up 
their own weapons manufacturers.  
This is partly due to geopolitical interest and the desire to feed the recent military-
industrial aspirations of clients or friendly regimes. However, the recipients have their own 
political power. Since the market is essentially oligopolistic, recipients have a choice of countries 
from which they can buy the technology inputs for home production of arms. Thus, they can 
bargain intensively, and the seller may finally have to agree to their demands in order not to lose 
substantial economic benefits, trading profits or political control. Thus in principle, given 
resource constraints, it is easy for emerging countries to set up their own factories producing 
weapons. However, Pierre (2014) takes the opposite view.  
Given the prevalence of armed conflict in emerging countries, the attempt of superpowers 
to curb the problem of moral hazard, it is possible that suppliers will be careful not to allow 
indiscriminate use of defence technology by client countries. It is believed that co-production 
and foreign licensing agreements by defence firms in the larger exporting countries (e.g. the U.S, 
the U.K, France, Germany) will be very carefully scrutinised and often stopped by the exporter 
government: ‘the  major suppliers have  begun to examine  requests more critically and are 
becoming  less supportive of the ambitions of emerging  nations to develop their own weapon 
capabilities” (Pierre, 2014).  
Essentially, the debate is inconclusive because case studies can be used to substantiate 
either viewpoint. Overall, we tend to agree that the major constraints on expanding arms 
production lie on the demand side rather than on the supply side (from DCs). The US embargoes 
on military export to India (after the Indo-Pakistan wars) have not prevented India from building 
up a substantial armaments industry with the help of Russia. Therefore, the major issues in arms 
production for emerging countries are the opportunity costs of resources involved, the various 
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types of spin-offs that may occur, and finally the potential capacity of the civilian industrial 
sector to sustain a military-industrial complex. These are the central problems; the behaviour of 
supplier countries in providing technology, know-how and licensing arrangements.  
2.3. Institutional quality of BRICS countries 
“If we do not kill corruption, corruption will kill us “ 
(Anonymously, 2017) 
 
“You thief cent you are in prison; 
You thief 10 million this patriotism. 
You are given chieftaincy and national honour 
You steal even bigger; this is referred to as rumour 
(Wole Soyinka, 1985 literature Nobel Prize winner, Unlimited Liability Company, 1983)  
 
Over the past 40 years, corruption has become the prism through which BRICS countries 
are seen the world over. The most recent report (2017) on how the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) published by Transparency International (TI) ranks BRICS countries is presented below. 
The ranking score criteria are as follows: 100-50 is referred to as less corrupt countries while 49-
0 is referred to as more corrupt countries. 
 
Table 2.8: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Bank Income classification 
2017 
S/N Countries CPI 2017 Ranking 
score 
2017 World Bank income 
Classification 
1 Brazil 40 Upper Middle income 
2 Russia 29 Upper Middle income 
3 India 40 Lower  Middle income 
4 China 40 Upper Middle income 
5 South Africa 45 Upper Middle income 
Source: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking 2017, World Bank 2017 
 
Therefore, based on the above CPI 2017 rankings score, all BRICS countries are regarded as 
corrupt countries. However, according to World Bank countries classification as presented 
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above, four out of BRICS club countries are ranked Upper Middle income countries except for 
India... 
2.3.1 Types Of Corruption In BRICS Countries  
In the development literature, corruption is typically defined roughly as the abuse of 
public office or entrusted power for private gain (Bank, 1997, Transparency International, 2009). 
Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe, or 
when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for 
competitive advantage and profit. Public office can be abused for personal benefit, even if no 
bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state 
revenues (Bank, 1997). Corruption includes bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, 
fraud, the use of “speed money” and embezzlement. 
It should be noted that corruption is not limited to the official domain, and there is no 
suggestion in this paper that official corruption is the only important aspect. The private sector is 
as prone as the public sector to abuse of power or position for private gain. It is also almost 
implicated in government corruption as a motivator of corrupt behaviour and a repository for its 
proceeds. The focus of this paper on official corruption is due merely to the need to keep the 
scope discussion manageable. Several approaches to classifying corruption have been proposed 
(Kpundeh and Hors, 1998, Karklins, 2016, Vargas-Hernández, 2013). The easiest approach 
analytically may be to distinguish between petty, grand and political corruption, depending on 
the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs. 
Petty corruption is a corrupt tendency often perpetuated by low ranking public officials to 
lower the standard and regulation for a “fee”.  It often involves a small amount of money. These 
activities are common in inspection and licensing duties, issuance of driver licenses and other 
documents. It is often small in magnitude, but often present in the form of a threat or delay in 
processing someone’s files. 
Grand corruption, as the name implies, involves a colossal misappropriation of public 
funds by top public and political officials (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). The top public 
and political officials include presidents, deputy presidents, directors of ministries, governors, 
parliamentarians, to mention a few. These activities are executed through inflating prices of 
goods and the costs of projects as well as receiving large kickbacks, just to mention a few. An 
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extreme grand corruption is termed “state capture”. This exists when a top government official 
connives with a private entity (it could be local or foreign) to convert the state into a personal 
“cash cow”. For instance, the alleged state capture between former South African President 
Jacob Zuma and the Gupta family involvement in state capture activities.   
Political corruption involves the gross abuse of the nation’s apparatus. It is done through 
legislative and judicial arms of government, involvement in electoral frauds such as vote-buying 
and related electoral manipulations, illegal conversion/ transfer of government properties for 
personal use, just to mention a few.  
The major types of corruption in the BRICS are highlighted in Table 2.9 below. 
Table 2.9: Types of corruption in BRICS countries 
Type  Main Actors Mode 
Petty Corruption Low and mid-level public 
official 
Small scale embezzlement  and 
misappropriation; bribes to bend 
rules or ignore misdemeanors; 
using licensing and inspection 
powers for extortion; minor 
favoritisms 
Grand corruption High-level public officials; 
political; representatives of 
donor and recipient countries; 
bureaucratic elites; businessmen 
and middlemen 
Large-scale embezzlement and 
misappropriation via public 
procurement; payment for non-
existent goods or services; 
kickbacks; “ghost workers” on 
government payroll; economic 
privileges given to special 
interest 
Political 
corruption 
Top-level executive; legislative 
and judicial officials; 
bureaucratic elites; politicians; 
big business 
Abuse of legislative powers; 
corruption of the judicial 
process; abuse of auditing, 
investigatory, and oversight 
powers; undermining electoral 
processes through vote-buying  
and bribery of accountable 
officials; large-scale assignment 
of public property to privileged 
interests; large contributions 
from public coffers to the private 
cause; large political donations 
and bribes 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Another survey by TI shows a perception of widespread corruption among the country’s 
major institutions of policy, restraint and service delivery (International, 2009). Respondents 
were asked questions: “Percentage of respondents who felt the following institutions in BRICS 
countries were corrupt or extremely corrupt”. 
Table 2.10 Percentage of respondents who felt the following institutions in BRICS countries 
were corrupt or extremely corrupt  
Institutional Brazil 
% 
Russia 
% 
India % China % South 
Africa% 
Political parties 84 77 86 N/A 77 
Police 70 89 75 N/A 83 
Legislature 72 83 65 N/A 70 
Public officials and 
civil servants 
46 92 65 N/A 74 
Judiciary 50 84 45 N/A 50 
Education systems 33 72 61 N/A 32 
Military 30 70 20 N/A 11 
Medical and health 
service 
55 75 56 N/A 55 
Business 35 57 50 N/A 54 
Media 30 59 41 N/A 40 
NGOs 35 45 30 N/A 43 
Religious 
organization 
31 40 44 N/A 24 
Source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 
2013https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=south_afric 
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2.4. Economic Development in BRICS Countries 
The concept of inclusive growth is a subject matter without a universally acceptable 
definition. It has varying meanings for different scholars across the world. For this thesis, the 
researcher will be developing an inclusive growth index to capture the uniqueness of BRICS 
countries. The BRICS countries are a potential world economic powerhouse characterized by 
countries with high GDP growth rates with high unemployment and inflation rate. 
The concept of inclusive growth in literature has not enjoyed a universal definition. 
While some scholars’ definitions of inclusive growth are interchanged with poor growth, others 
incorporate non-income dimensions (non-income factors affecting the poverty elasticity of 
growth). For instance, Ranier and Ramos (2013) conceptualise inclusive growth as an 
improvement in the living standards of large groups of people regardless of tribe, race and 
religion as well as opening up more opportunities for all. 
 In this line of argument, Rauniyar and Kanbur (2010) asserted that inclusive growth 
must be characterised by a reduction in income disparity and the provision of more income for 
lower-income earners. It is about inclusive development: it is growth that opens up income 
growth, reduces discrepancies and involves ‘disadvantaged reducing improvement in non-
dimensions of wellbeing’ (Klasen 2010). Anders and Sperling (2013) describe inclusive growth 
as growth that accommodates more people in terms of wealth creation and sharing; thus, 
everyone benefits from overall economic prosperity. 
Elena and Susana (2010) define inclusive growth as a broad-based growth that leads to 
poverty reduction and creates opportunities for people to participate in the process as well as 
beneficial to the people in the long run. They also highlighted that a sustained growth rate of 5-7 
per cent is required for all sectors in the economy as well as absorb a large proportion of the 
country’s labour force. This definition is consistent with McKinley (2010) and Paramasivan, 
Mani and Utpal (2014), who pointed out that inclusive growth is about achieving income growth 
while reducing inequality, improving social opportunities, ensuring equality of access (to 
services and markets) and protecting the vulnerable. 
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One common objective recognised by the various definitions of Inclusive Growth (I.G.) is 
the goal of sustainable growth that covers a large percentage of the entire country labour force. 
Its characteristics are: 
 It emphasizes a sustained economic growth of about 5% to ensure a reduction in poverty; 
 I.G. adopts a futuristic dimension and the pace of growth that affects a large percentage of 
the country’s workforce. 
Inclusive growth centres on addressing the following questions: What is happening to 
un/employment, education, provision of health services, provision of shelter, food, clothing and 
water, poverty reduction and widening inequality? If the answers to these questions are negative, 
then there is no development no matter the rate of growth of the economy’s GDP.  
Inclusive growth refers to economic growth that trickles down and across all sectors in an 
economy, contributed to and benefitted by a cross-section of people in the economy, including 
the poor (Alao and Olufemi). It focuses on ways to raise the pace of growth by utilising more 
fully parts of the labour force trapped in low productivity or completely excluded from the 
growth process. It is a catalyst for poverty reduction in emerging countries. Inclusive growth is 
becoming a development agenda nationally and internationally and there are several reasons why 
inclusiveness is so important.  
Furthermore, these countries are developing or new industrialised countries located in 
diverse geographical but in strategic locations in the world endowed with a large and young 
labour force. Having this in mind, the researcher thought it wise to develop an inclusive growth 
index that incorporates this uniqueness that was omitted by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), Human Development Index and World Economic Forum (WEF), and 
Inclusive Development Index (IDI) (Desli et al.) (See below for details)2. 
The conceptual analysis of inclusive growth suggested by Ianchovichina and Lundstrom-
Gable (2012) is the same as that in Dutz (2007). Both claimed that their notion of inclusive 
growth was broader than pro-poor growth, which they conceived as poverty-reducing growth. 
Their argument was that pro-poor growth was interested only in the welfare of the poor while 
inclusive growth was concerned with opportunities for a broader group of the disadvantaged: the 
labour force, the poor and the middle class.  
                                                          
2
 See http://reports.weforum.org/the-inclusive-development-index-2017/technical-notes-and-sources/ 
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According to Klasen (2010), inclusive growth is growth that encompasses a wide 
spectrum of individuals via active and labour rewarding jobs, which contribute to growth. A 
labour rewarding job is dire to inclusive growth; it unlocks both social and economic 
opportunities for all. It centres on equal opportunity for all. It encompasses both the 
microeconomics and macroeconomics factors (Papanek, 2002). Inclusive growth centres on the 
rate of growth and how it trickles down to the common man on the street. It is also futuristic in 
that it focuses on labour rewarding jobs. Although income redistribution schemes can temporally 
dispense benefits to all, they are not sufficient to actualise growth. The term inclusive is rather 
termed that way when it creates economic opportunities for all in the economy. Apart from 
resolving the income disparity issues, growth is also term inclusive when poverty levels are 
reduced from high to low levels. In conclusion, growth is term inclusive; it accommodates all 
people irrespective of tribe, culture and religion in the production process. 
 (Suryanarayana, 2008) affirms that growth is not inclusive if there exists exclusion of 
people based on tribes, religion and ethnicity as this propels income disparity across the world. 
The author also affirms that the richest 10% of people control 85% of assets, while the poor 50% 
own 1%. In order to resolve this malady, there is a need for the combined effort of labour, 
education and training to actualise optimum inclusiveness.  
 Ramos et al. (2013) describes inclusive growth as an encompassing process that involves 
joint participation effort in wealth creation and wealth sharing. The author further emphasises the 
need to improve the living conditions of the poor and unlock new opportunities for the poor. 
In the same vein, Lledó and Garcia-Verdu (2011) defined inclusive growth as that which is 
sustainable for longer periods (say 5-10 years) spread across all the economic sectors and 
provides labour rewarding job for the majority of the labour forces (say 80 % of the natural total 
labour force). They opined that the key attribute of inclusive growth is that it must be sustainable 
for long periods capable of promoting structural changes as regards output and export 
diversification.  
The Commission (2010) defined inclusive growth as the “process and outcome where all 
groups of people have participated in the organisation of growth and have benefited equitably 
from it”. It characterises growth as inclusive when it occurs in sectors such as agriculture where 
the poor work, in places where the poor live and employs factors of production that the poor 
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possess - unskilled labour. However, Caldor’s (1966) theory of economic growth suggests that 
the sustainability of economic growth is anchored on high rates of manufacturing growth, vis-à-
vis the overall growth of GDP and those of other sectors. Corroborating Caldor’s assertion, Islam 
noted that high manufacturing growth rates are necessary at the initial stage of development to 
create conditions that are conducive for the transfer of surplus labour from sectors with low 
labour productivity to those with higher productivity. Even so, the success of the transfer process 
largely depends on higher growth rates of labour-intensive manufacturing sub-sectors, 
particularly at the initial stage of development to create conditions that are conducive for the 
transfer of surplus labour from sectors with low labour productivity to those with higher 
production. Even so, the success of the transfer process largely depends on higher growth rates 
of labour-intensive manufacturing sub-sectors, particularly at the initial development stages. 
In development economics, growth is termed total economic activity (ies) characterised by 
full employment. It is often estimated using inflation-adjusted figures. Growth is said to exist, if 
there is a rise in the production of goods and services in a country, usually for a long period. It is 
calculated as the per cent rise of real Gross Domestic Product GDP. Growth is said to exist if the 
following are addressed: 
 Is the unemployment rate decreasing? 
 Is the poverty rate reducing? 
 Is inequality decreasing? 
In conclusion, the growing desire to study inclusive economic growth is a strong indication 
that high growth is inadequate for addressing the ills of poverty, unemployment and inequalities.  
Also, there is no single unanimously agreed measurement of inclusive growth, For instance, (Ali 
and Son (2007) developed the principle of social welfare function to measure inclusive growth. 
They affirmed that economic growth is inclusive if the social opportunity function is enhanced. 
Social opportunity connotes accessibility to healthcare services and education, which translate to 
income distribution to denote whether there is a pro-poor social improvement, or not. By 
implication, if income is distributed fairly that the poor have access to healthcare services and 
education, then growth is inclusive. 
Klasen (2010) developed a wider measure of inclusive growth by adopting income and 
non-indicators of wellbeing such as access to education and health, nutrition and social 
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integration. It was theorised that a decline in inequality in the non-income dimension of 
wellbeing is an indicator of inclusion. The flaw of this measurement is the unavailability of data 
for the computation of non-income indicators, especially emerging countries.  In conclusion, 
there is no universally-accepted definition and measurement of inclusive growth in an economy. 
 
Many proposals earlier presented to develop an index reflecting either human 
development or the level of well-being did not include a measure of income per capita; poverty, 
inequalities. For example, Drewnowski and Scott (1968) developed the level of Living Index and 
the variables employed include nutrition, housing, education and others. Similarly, Morris (1978) 
developed the Physical Quality of Life Index employing infant mortality and longevity. In this 
context of BRICS countries, data variables are ranked maximum core indicators and observe the 
level where we stand in terms of economic development. Publishing (2013) developed an 
inclusive growth measurement using eleven monetary and non-monetary parameters that are 
deemed important for human well-being. Some of the variables include health, institutional and 
environmental quality. 
Other indices often used by scholars include Osberg and Sharpe (2002) Index of 
Economic Well-being, Lawn (2003) Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare and Ullah and 
Kiani (2017) Socio-economic index. These indexes provide the literature and methodological 
platform of new index development.  
 Samans et al. (2015), a group of researchers at the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
developed an Inclusive Development Index for the annual assessment of 103 countries’ 
economic performance that measures how countries perform on eleven dimensions of economic 
progress in addition to GDP. It has three pillars; growth and development, inclusion and, 
intergenerational equity - sustainable stewardship of natural and financial resources. The flaw of 
this index is the averaging technique and unavailability of data for the computation of the index. 
Secondly, there is a difference between inclusive growth and inclusive development which is 
similar to economic growth and economic development. Other social-economic indices are 
tabulated in Table 2.11 below. 
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Table 2.11: Previous Composite Development Indices 
S/N Authors  Index 
1 Bennett 1951 Consumption Level Index 
2 Beckerman and Bacon 1966 Real Index of Consumption 
(RIC) 
3 Drewnowski and Scott 1966 Level of Living Index (LLI) 
4 United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development 1984 
Socioeconomic Development 
Index (SID) 
5 McGranahan et al 1972 General Index of Development  
6 (Morris, 1978) Physical Quality of Life Index 
7 Camp and Speidel 1987 Human Suffering Index (HIS) 
8 UNDP 1990 Human Development Index 
(HDI) 
9 UNDP 1995 Gender-related Development 
Index(GDI) and the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM) 
 
10 Diener 1995 Combined Quality of Life Indices 
(CQCL) 
11 (Noorbakhsh, 1998) Modified Human Development 
Index (MHDI) 
12 UNDP1997 Human Poverty Index (HPI) 
13 Cherchye and Kuosmanen 2004 Constructs a meta index of SD 
(MISD) 
14 Chatterjee 2005 Measurement of Human 
Development  with an alternative 
approach 
15 Bory’s 2005 Sustainable Development 
Indicators (SDI) 
16 Marchante and Ortega 2006  Augmented Version of Human 
Development Indicator 
17 Burd-Sharps, Lewis and Martins 2008 American Human Development 
Index (AHDI) 
18 Engineer, King and Roy 2008 Calculate the modified indices for 
country members of Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (Publishing) 
19 Eurostat 2009 Sustainable Development in the 
European Union (SDIEU) 
20 New Economic Foundation 2009 (Marks, 
2010) 
Happy Planet Index (HPI) 
21 UNDP 2010 The Inequalities-adjusted HDI  
22 Niels 2010 Calibrated  Human Development 
Index 
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23 Veljko et al 2011 Economic Footprint (EF) 
24 Tolga, Bulent and Hakan  2011 Suggest the use of employment 
or unemployment dimensions in 
the HDI 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
These indices constitute part of the theoretical literature and foundational methodology of 
the new index developer. Therefore, key economic growth indicators are used for developing 
BRICS inclusive growth index. 
In conclusion, the researcher identified one of the flaws in the recent WEF IDI Index as regards 
their choice for averaging all their variables to arrive at their index, as all countries are at a 
different stage of development and confronted with diverse socio-economic challenges. Having 
pointed out some of these flaws, the researcher, therefore, embarked on developing an inclusive 
growth index for the BRICS countries based on two pillars - social and economic indicators 
identified in the inclusive growth index literature. 
 
2.5 Poverty And Other Socioeconomic Problems Within The BRICS Countries’ Inclusive 
Growth 
Like most of the emerging countries, BRICS countries have seen significant, but not 
sufficiently pro-poor economic growth. High poverty rates, unemployment and income disparity, 
all encapsulated into Misery index and economic performance index in BRICS countries remain 
high. In spite of average GDP growth rates of around 5percent between 1999 and 2010, 48 per 
cent of the population in BRICS countries lived on less than 1.25 international dollars per day in 
2010. For instance, in South Africa, where growth rates have been high even by African 
standards, leading South Africa to graduate into middle income status, one in two rural habitants 
is still poor (WorldBank, 2009).  
Economic growth creates jobs, and jobs create economic growth. Higher demand for 
goods and services increases opportunities for self-employed workers and boosts demand for 
wage labour. Higher productivity of firms and workers is reflected in higher economic growth. 
Whether economic growth can reduce poverty depends on many factors, but the extent to which 
economic growth reflects positive job-related changes is the most important link. Jobs are the 
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most important transmission mechanism from growth to household welfare, largely because poor 
people have few assets other than their labour on which to rely in making a living, and jobs 
account for the largest source of household income (WorldBank, 2009). Improving labour 
intensive earnings - whether in the form of higher productivity and output on the farm, higher 
productivity and output on the farm, higher profits in a household enterprise, or access to a job 
with a higher wage – is, therefore. central to improving the welfare of poor people. 
Focusing only on growth strategies may not be sufficient to lower poverty. Growth is not 
sufficient to lower poverty. Growth does not automatically trickle down to poor households. For 
example, a resource-rich country like South Africa may see high growth due to natural resources, 
but little effect on aggregate employment numbers if export revenues are not used to diversify 
these economies and create jobs outside the narrow domain of extraction. Similarly, higher 
labour demand in the formal wage sector is not likely to make a large dent in poverty over the 
short run, because these sectors’ absorptive capacity is limited and poor people may not have the 
necessary skills or live in urban areas, where formal wage jobs are likely to emerge. Over the 
medium term, South Africa faces important challenges in fostering the conditions for creating 
better jobs, strengthening human capital, and reducing population growth.  
For instance, South Africa has developed into Africa’s largest economy (using US dollars 
as a benchmark), with a relatively diversified output. In 2014, a statistical reassessment of 
national accounts data showed the overall size of South Africa’s national product to be over 70 
per cent larger, which catapulted South Africa into the upper middle-income country status and 
made it the largest economy in Africa. Traditionally, important sectors like agriculture, oil and 
gas, and trade account for just over half of South Africa’s output while “modern” sectors in 
industries and services such as telecommunication, real estate, manufacturing, construction, and 
entertainment together with public administration, are now shown to account for an 
insignificantly greater share of output than previous estimates had shown. 
In spite of this remarkable economic achievement, BRICS countries are bedevilled by the 
problems of inclusive growth as data show that 70 per cent of the BRICS population is still 
living below the poverty line despite policies of past governments to improve their welfare. Still, 
unemployment, income disparity and poverty levels in BRICS countries remain high as shown in 
Figures 1 and 2. In spite of an average GDP, growth rate of around 5 per cent over two decades, 
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48 per cent of the population in BRICS lived on less than 1.25 international dollars per day in 
2010. This is also true for South Africa, where growth rates have been high even by African 
standards, leading South Africa to graduate into middle-income status, but where one in two 
rural habitants is still poor. This depicts that regardless of the notable growth witnessed and 
UNDP HDI report over the years, problems appear to be lingering. 
 
Figure 2.8: BRICS GDP annual growth rate 
 
Source: World Bank (2018) World Development Indicators Online database 
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Figure 2.9: BRICS Human Development Index for years  
 
Source: UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) online database (2018)  
 
 
Table 2.12: BRICS countries average unemployment rate, poverty rate and income 
Disparity for years 1970 to 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2019) World Development Indicators Online database 
  
         While the poverty rate has not been increasing, the number of BRICS (especially South 
Africa) living in poverty has grown because the population continues to expand rapidly. The 
number of poor people in BRICS (especially South Africa) increased by one million between 
2010 and 2013, to 34 million. This national average masks a striking rural/urban divide: 54 per 
cent of the rural population was poor in 2013, compared to 12 per cent of people in urban areas. 
 Brazil  Russian  India  China  South Africa
Country Unemployment 
rate 
Poverty rate Income inequality  
Brazil 15.71 - 56.88 
Russia 17.21 1.60 40.20 
India 8.71 6.2 33.63 
China - - 40 
South Africa 53.3 35.6 61.71 
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There is also a regional pattern. Poverty is substantially higher within the locals (Black South 
Africans). 
Why has economic growth not brought down poverty levels more significantly? First, 
welfare effects from economic growth are diluted by high population growth. For instance, South 
Africa’s population growth has remained high at around 2.8 per cent since 2000, depressing 
growth in per capita GDP as expanding output must be shared among more and more people. 
While the global population has seen a reduction in young dependents and a swelling in the 
working-age population in the past 20 years, BRICS countries' population pyramid remains 
dominated by children and youth. Children aged fewer than 5 make up 44 per cent of the 
population except for Russia. BRICS countries fertility rate of 6 births per woman remains 
higher than that of sub-Sahara. The result is that adult workers in BRICS still need to provide for 
a high share of dependents, especially children. 
 
High fertility rates in the past manifest themselves as a surge in the number of young 
people entering the working-age population now, and most of them are not finding jobs in high-
growth sectors. Between 2000 and 2010, BRICS working-age population grew by over 600000 
young people (ages 15 to 24) each year. As demonstrated by many Asian countries, such a bulge 
in the working-age population can become a “demographic dividend” with economic benefits 
arising from an increase in working-age adults relative to young dependents. For this 
demographic dividend to take shape as a strong force for development in BRICS countries, two 
conditions must come down so that the dependency ratio decreases and working adults have 
fewer children to maintain - in other words, the population pyramid needs to become less  
“broad-based” (WorldBank, 2009). Second, the growing ranks of working-age adults must find 
more productive jobs, translating into higher GDP growth. Most jobs and workers in BRICS 
countries (especially South Africa) remain in sectors with low levels of labour productivity. 
High average growth in the BRICS countries masks large variations across space and 
income groups, with increasing inequality between rural and urban areas. An increase in spatial 
differences is likely to have undone the effect of growth on overall poverty reduction. Slow 
progress on reducing poverty in rural areas is linked to the slow structural transformation in the 
agricultural sector because that is where most people work. Agricultural growth (averaging just 
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over 2 per cent since 2010) has barely kept up with population growth (at just under 2 per cent in 
rural areas). Stagnating production and productivity in the farm sector, where half of the 
population works, is a key reason for continued high poverty levels.  
Conversely, sectors that have seen economic growth are not likely to generate enough 
jobs. For instance, the small scale trade sector is limited in terms of income opportunities. High 
growth sectors such as telecommunications are not particularly labour-intensive and are too 
small to absorb much demand for non-farm employment, even with high growth rates. 
Access to a job is not a guaranteed escape from poverty, as economic growth does not 
translate into labour earnings for low-income groups. Poor people were as likely as other groups 
to be employed in 2012 and less likely than the non-poor to be unemployed. Accelerating 
poverty reduction in BRICS (especially South Africa) will require more than job creation; the 
existing jobs that BRICS nationals do will need to be translated into more productive work. 
Human capital is at low levels. BRICS countries have made some, albeit slow progress towards 
improving socioeconomic outcomes. 
 
Nonetheless, BRICS countries will fall well short of meeting many of its Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), including for health, education and skills, and remains 
significantly behind other similar African countries. Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live birth) 
and Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) are lower in South Africa than on average in 
Africa, for instance. 
 
Differences in well-being across regions resonate in socio-economic indicators. 
Consistent with consumption patterns, disaggregated data reveal sharp differences in 
socioeconomic indicators across BRICS countries. Population growth is significantly higher in 
South Africa, India and China. 
 
In conclusion, the potential economic benefit includes a reduction in development 
inequalities. The BRICS countries have varying degrees of development inequalities. This is 
reflected in their 2017 GDP per capita income, which ranges from US$1942 for India to about 
US$10743 for Russia. A differential in resource base implies that income gaps within the group 
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and the individual countries would grow wider with time. However, with the provision of BRICS 
funds for cooperation, compensation and development are meant to ensure that distributional 
problems are resolved. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.0 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant empirical and theoretical literature for the three 
objectives of this study. This literature commence with theoretical and empirical literature 
reviews on determinants of Military expenditure; theoretical and empirical literature reviews on 
inclusive growth; theoretical and empirical literature reviews on  impacts of military expenditure, 
institutional quality and inclusive growth within and outside BRICS countries. The chapter goes 
further to present the literature on the military expenditure, institutional quality to achieving 
inclusive growth. 
3.2 Theoretical Models On Determinants For Military Expenditure  
The determinants of military expenditure can be divided into three models- Organizational    
politics models; Arms–race models and neoclassical models. 
3.2.1 Organizational Politics Model 
 Isard et al (1988) developed an organizational politics model. The crux of the model 
centres on the intersectional relationship and struggle existing among bureaucratic, arm industry 
and political office holders for power who optimize their individual goal. Thus, this struggle 
determines the percentage of budgetary allocation to the military sector and arms industries. 
3.2.1.1 Lucier model 
One of the simplest military economics organizational models is Lucier (1979).  The 
military Lucier  model , forecast  budgetary allocation to military sector  on the premise of no 
change / minor  adjustment  of previous  military expenditure  allocation  and represented  
mathematically as  
………………………………………………3.1 
Where - Military expenditure at time T 
 -  Policy making units  
The model focused on the movement of “  ”. A change in “q” is possible if the following 
events occur: 
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a) A global and regional change of arms procurement, policies and standard or restriction on 
certain ammunition will definitely cause a significant change in military expenditure 
composition. Thus, the effect of such global and regional change takes effect from the 
following year and not with immediate effect; 
b) A change in global and regional security environment such as Security web, threat level 
and Doom clock to mention a few, will greatly affect budgetary allocation to the military 
sector and related industries.  
In summary, budgetary allocation to military sector and industries are premised on previous level 
of military expenditure and the degree of changes of parameter “q” in the model. 
Similarly, Majeski (1983) developed a military organizational model by examining the factors that 
determine the U.S military expenditure budgetary allocation. The mathematical modelling identified four 
distinct policy making units responsible for the U.S military expenditure budgetary allocation levels  
1. U.S. military force and other paramilitary agencies, present the U.S. security request. 
They are denoted as 𝑀1  
2.  The Presidency  denoted  as 𝑀2, might be interested if the year is an election year 
3. The congress, which debates  on military expenditure appropriation  and examine  the 
cost and benefit implications is denoted by 𝑀3  
4. The department of defense, which utilizes the funds and may further request if need 
arises denoted by 𝑀4 
5. The level /budgetary allocation assigned to military sector and allied industries depends 
on the outcome of these four policy-making groups. 
  
3.2.1.2 Rattinger model 
 Rattinger (1975) military organizational politics model postulate that military 
expenditure is determined by bureaucratic structure and the prevailing international and 
regional tension/ threats. 
  
3.2.1.3 Ostrom and Marra model 
 Ostrom & Marra (1986) model using U.S. military expenditure as a case-study, 
found out that U.S. military expenditure is driven by its arch-enemy Soviet Union’s 
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(Russia) military expenditure and the U.S. public opinion often expressed via public 
opinion votes. 
3.2.2 Arms Race models 
As the name implies, the model is most suitable for countries in conflict. Arms race model depicts 
that  the level of a rival country’s military expenditure is the major factor that determines another military 
expenditure. The military expenditure decision is based on action-reaction process.  
3.2.3 Neoclassical model 
The military neoclassical model is chiefly centred on (Smith, (1995) and  Smith (1980) work. It 
encompasses how political and economic factors influence military expenditure component. The 
neoclassical model assumes optimization of welfare. The military neoclassical model can be written as: 
…………………………………………….3.2 
W-Welfare of the country; S- Security of lives and property from attacks; C-Consumption and 𝑍𝑤 - Other 
factors. 
Since, S cannot be measured but can be measured by using a proxy of military expenditure and other 
countries (this can be allies and rivals) denoted as 𝑀1, 𝑀2, … . , 𝑀𝑛. Thus, this can be substituted and 
incorporated equation 1 
………………………………………………………………3.3 
N.B. Allies military expenditure raises the country security whereas rivals military expenditure poses a 
threat. 
Mathematically, military budget constraint can be written as  
………………………………………………3.4 
Y-nominal aggregate income; -Prices of military expenditure; -Prices of consumption and M- 
real military expenditure  
……………….3.5 
Welfare function is given as         
  
The above is premised on the country as a rival neighbouring country  and absence of allies. The 
security function is assumed as  
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…………………………………3.6 
Where 
- Military expenditure a country to resist its rival neighbour attack  
-Fixed element not linked to rival military expenditure, it is negative if neighbouring security is 
natural and negative if vice versa. 
-Relative effectiveness of military  
The Lagrange function of above budget constraint  
………………………………3.7 
The First Order Condition (FOCs) is 
…………………..3.8 
  
…………...3.9 
  
…………………………………………..3.10 
This gives  
. ………………………………………………..3.11 
……………………………3.12 
  
  
The Lagrange multiplier can be eliminated by  
  
…………………………………………………….3.13 
  
The two linear equations = M= …………………3.14 
  
                               C =                  …………………………….3.15 
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Some of Smith's, (1995) landmark achievements include but not limited to, one , the model 
distinguish between military force stock and military expenditure levels effects. Two, the impact of 
political regimes and how it affects military expenditure budgetary decisions. Therefore, employing 
neoclassical models for examining the determinant for military expenditure is ideal. The neoclassical 
model has ability to accommodate diverse components spanning economic variables such as income, 
prices and population to mention a few as well as socio-political variables such as strategic factors and 
military expenditure. The neoclassical model has been suggested to be more comprehensive, well detailed 
and presents reasonable economic outcome on determinants for military expenditure in an economy. It is 
also said to provide a clearer and satisfactory results as confirmed and presented in the empirical literature 
review section. 
3.3. Empirical Literature On Determinants For Military Expenditure Across The Globe 
The determinant for military expenditure in countries ranges from economic factors, socio-
political factors to security to mention a few. This section presents the prominent determinants for 
military expenditure following the above categories. 
3.3.1. Security Threats 
Provision of security for lives and properties of their citizens has been affirmed to be one of the 
cardinal functions of the central government military and paramilitary agencies.  The scope of the military 
and paramilitary agencies includes, but not limited to, intervening in communal clashes, inter-state 
boundaries disputes, national and international conflicts; Civil wars, and also participating in both 
regional and international peace-keeping missions and ad-hoc joint task forces operations. 
One of the key determinants for military expenditure identified by security /defence experts such 
as Dunne & Perlo-Freeman,(2003) is external wars threat. Dunne & Perlo-Freeman, (2003) averred that 
external wars is one of the major determinants, if not the major driver, for the rise of military expenditure 
in developing economies. They further explained that the rise in military expenditure is triggered and 
evident during wartime or crisis period via the procurement of arms/ammunition and rise in voluntary 
enrolment / conscription of young youths during such periods. 
Hewitt (1991, 1992 and 1993) employing public-choice framework analysed the association 
between military expenditure and threats for 125 Less Developed Countries (LDCs) over the period 1972-
1990. The empirical result indicates that an international war positively does matter in increased military 
expenditure levels.  
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 Batchelor et al (2000), using South Africa as a case study, explored the determinants for military 
expenditure. They incorporated Angolan war (1977-1993) in their estimation. The empirical result 
indicates a significant and positive effect of war on South Africa’s increased military expenditure for the 
period considered. 
Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003) presented a comparative analysis of a cold war (1981-1989) and post-
cold war period (1990-1997) for developing economies. The result confirmed a positive impact from 
external wars on military expenditure. Tambudzai (2011) examined Zimbabwe’s military expenditure 
determinants from 1998-2008. The external wars variable clearly indicates a positive impact on 
Zimbabwe’s military expenditure on a long run basis. 
Ball (1983) asserted that internal threats (civil wars) is more severe and detrimental than external threats 
for developing economies. Dunne & Mohammed (1995) also examined 13 sub-Saharan countries 
determinants for military expenditure for the period 1967-1985. The empirical result shows a significant 
and positive impact of civil war on military expenditure. (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002) carried out a 
comparative econometric analysis between civil war (internal threats) and international wars (external 
threats) on military expenditure. The result indicates that civil war (internal threats) is significant and has 
positive impact on military expenditure than international threats (external threats). 
Collier (2003) asserts that developing economies allocate 2.8 per cent of its GDP to military expenditure 
during peacetime whereas during wartime their assign about 5 per cent of national Gross Domestic 
Product to military expenditure and allied industries. 
Aziz et al (2017) investigated the milex-growth nexus of seventy countries taking cognizance the 
presence of internal and external threats from 1990 to 2013 using Generalized Moments Methods 
(GMM) as well as fixed / random models. Their result suggests a negative relationship between 
military expenditure and growth for all the models. 
3.3.2. Security Web 
The concept of security web was a product of Rosh (1988). The concept refers to a nation’s X security 
web as all other countries capable of influencing country X’s security both at national and regional levels. 
(Rosh (1988) further explained that country X’s threat levels can be ascertained by average military 
expenditure of Gross Domestic Product of countries in the security web. (Rosh (1988) affirmed that 
security web plays significant role and positively stimulate the increased military expenditure of 63 LDCs 
over the period 1969-1978. Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003)and Dunne et al (2008) further explore the 
security web dynamics, by categorizing  the countries in the security web into three distinct groups of 
Allies, neutral and rivalry/ enemies. Their empirical result was mixed for all the three distinct groups. 
However, Sun & Yu (1999) depicts that China’s military expenditure was significantly and positively 
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influenced by Japanese military expenditure for the period of 1965-1993. Likewise, Tambudzai (2011)  
affirmed that Zimbabwe’s military expenditure was significantly and positively influenced by growth in 
South Africa’s military  arsenal for the period of 1980-2003. 
3.3.3 Economic Factors 
Barro and Sala-i-martin (1992) asserted that determinants of military expenditure are not affected by 
threat only but by a host of economic, political and environmental factors. This section focuses on 
empirically identified economic determinants of military expenditure.  
Looney (1989) highlights that at aggregate level, economic variables such as income inequality disparity 
level, growth rate of GDP, budget size and Milex Industrial Complex (MIC) matter in determining a 
nation’s military expenditure.  
On a general note, GDP has been singled out as an important economic determinant of military 
expenditure. Other empirical studies have also used per capita and GNP to examine income on military 
expenditure  
Other identified internal economic determinants include the presence of arms industries, Central 
Government Expenditure (CGE) and non-military government expenditure. For instance, Hewitt and Van 
Rijckeghem (1995)in their work on military expenditure-growth nexus suggest that GDP level clearly 
depicts real impacts of military expenditure. The empirical result indicates the existence of convex 
relationship. Tambudzai (2011) examined 12 Southern African countries’ determinant for military 
expenditure for the period 1997-2004. The empirical result indicates the significance of GDP per capita 
on military expenditure determinant’s estimation. 
Conversely, in individual country studies, Gross national income variables have been suggested to have 
positive effect as a determinant of military expenditure. For instance,Sun & Yu (1999) examine the 
determinant of military expenditure for China. The result reveals that military expenditure is significantly 
and positively related to its Gross National Product. In examining an African context, Batchelor et al 
(2000) find that South Africa’s military expenditure is related to its income level  . 
Central Government expenditure is the reported final budget details stated in the accounts. (Dommen & 
Maizels' (1988) in their work on military burden on developing economies use central government’s  
GDP as one of the determinants of military expenditure. The empirical result shows that central 
government expenditure is significant and positive. Likewise, (Dommen & Maizels, 1988) result was 
corroborated by that of Hewitt (1991). (Hewitt (1991) further reiterated that central government 
expenditure is significant and positive in determining military expenditure.  
(Yildirim et al, 2005) 
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Yildirim et al (2005) investigated government consumption effect on military expenditure for 92 
countries from 1987 to 1997.The result revealed that central government expenditure is significant and 
positive on military expenditure. In summary, above empirical results affirmed that central government 
expenditure is significant and positive with military expenditure.  
(Deger and Sen (1990) included arms production as a variable to examine military expenditure on the 
Indian economy for the period 1960-1985. However, the result showed that arms production is 
insignificant in the estimation.  
Maizels & Nissanke (1986)in their  empirical work on foreign exchange growth identified foreign 
exchange and major aid as stimulatants for military expenditure. In addition, foreign arms production 
does have positive impacts on military expenditure demand. Arms producing countries can influence non-
arms producing nation to buy military weapons exceeding their request. 
Rosh (1988) also opined that economies infused with international economic politics do have the 
privilege to access funds to procure arms. He also asserted that trade is a key and does have a significant 
and positive effect on military expenditure for emerging economies. 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) and Dunne et al (2008) included trade variables in their demand for 
military expenditure estimation. The empirical result shows that trade does matter with a significant and 
positive impact on  military expenditure whereas (Dunne and Mohammed (1995) in their work indicate 
that trade is not significant in Sub-Saharan Africa This may be due to low intra sub-Saharan trade 
activities. 
3.3.4 Political factors 
In determining the factors that influence military expenditure, it has been suggested by Hou 
(2010) that, the political institution regimes does affect a nation’s quest for military effort. For 
instance, Dommen & Maizels (1988)have affirmed that democratic  regimes tend to spend less 
whereas authoritarian regimes  tend to invest more in military sector and allied industries  to be 
in full control of the nation. However, the above assertion cannot be generalized for all nations. 
Other notable empirical works that have investigated political regimes in the Milex demand 
debates are as follows: Dommen and Maizels (1988) Milex demand work use political regimes ( 
from military to democratic ) for 72 countries for the period of 1978-1980. Their result revealed that 
two fifth of military regimes make use of military force against the public. 
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On the other hand , (Dunne et al (2008), Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003)incorporated democracy index 
from POLITY 1998 in estimating determinant of developing economies covering 1981 to1997. Their 
result indicates that democracy does have  significant and negative impact on military expenditure on 
developing economies.Hou (2010) identified the relevance of political regimes investigating India’s 
demand for military expenditure. Sun & Yu (1999) examined the change of China’s leadership from war 
oriented to economic development after1979. Their result indicates an inverse change on Chinese military 
expenditure level from 1965 to 1993. 
Batchelor et al (2000) in their empirical work on South Africa military demand incorporated a political 
dummy to capture a change of leadership administration. The empirical result indicates an inverse 
relationship with military expenditure. 
(Yu, 2002) use US-China conflict and major political shock as an independent variable for determinant 
for Taiwan’s military expenditure for 1966 to 1992. The empirical result indicates a significant and 
positive impact as a determinant for military expenditure.   
3.3.5 Other factors 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) identified population as a significant determinant of military 
expenditure based on “Public good “theory. They opined that a large population does make military 
expenditure more effective. Also, Hewitt and Van Rijckeghemm (1995)found that population is 
significant and positive for developing economies. However, Dunne et al (2008) found that there exists an 
inverse relationship between population and military expenditure  for countries with large population 
whereas countries with small population invest more on military technologies. They suggest that a 
country with large population tends to focus more on consumption demand than security matters. 
Other notable variables identified by empirical studies on determinant for military expenditure 
includes external threats. Dunne and Mohammed (1995) explored military participation-military 
expenditure nexus for 13 sub-Saharan economies. They use proportion of armed forces. The 
empirical result shows that proportion of armed forces significantly and positively affects 
military expenditure level. Yildirim et al (2005) used  ratio of armed forces per 1000 population to estimate 
determinant of military expenditure for 92 countries for 1987 to 1997. Their panel analysis result indicates that 
higher ratio of armed forces per 1000 population is linked to an increased military expenditure levels. 
Dommen & Maizels (1988) and Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003) identified geographical factor as a 
possible contagion effect especially in Middle East countries embodied in conflicts. Their empirical 
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analyses attest to the presence of regional factor as a significant and positive determinant of military 
expenditure for all Middle East countries. 
3.4 Theoretical Framework on Inclusive Growth 
The concept of inclusive growth is a subject matter without a universally acceptable definition. 
Therefore, the concept has varying meanings for different scholars across the world. For this 
dissertation, the researcher will be developing an inclusive growth index that seems to capture 
the uniqueness of the research countries (BRICS countries). The BRICS countries are a potential 
world economic powerhouse characterized with countries with high GDP growth rates with high 
unemployment and inflation rate. 
The concept of inclusive growth in literature has not enjoyed a universal definition. While some 
scholars definitions of inclusive growth are interchanged with poor growth, other incorporate 
non-income dimensions (non-income factors affecting the poverty elasticity of growth). For 
instance, Ranier and Ramos (2013) conceptualize inclusive growth as an improvement in the 
living standards of large groups of people regardless of tribe, race and religion as well as opening 
up more opportunities for all. 
 In the line of argument, Rauniyar and Kanbur (2010) observed that ‘’inclusive growth must be 
characterized by reduction in income disparity and provision of more income for lower income 
earners. It is about inclusive development; it is growth that opens up income growth, reduces 
discrepancies and involves ‘disadvantaged reducing improvement in non-dimensions of 
wellbeing’ (Klasen 2010). Anders and Sperling (2013) describe inclusive growth as growth that 
accommodates more people in terms of wealth creation and sharing, thus everyone benefits from 
overall economic prosperity. 
Elena and Susana(2010) see inclusive growth as a broad-based growth that leads to poverty 
reduction and create an opportunity for people to participate in the process as well as beneficial 
to the people in the long run. They also opined that sustained growth rate of 5-7 per cent is 
required for all sectors in the economy as well as absorb large proportion of the country’s labour 
force. This definition is consistent with McKinley(2010) and Paramasivan,Mani and Utpal 
(2014),who pointed out that inclusive growth is about  achieving income growth while reducing 
inequality, improving social opportunities, ensuring equality of access(to services and markets) 
and protecting the vulnerable. 
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 One common objective recognized by the various definitions of Inclusive Growth (I.G.) is the 
goal of sustainable growth that covers a large percentage of the entire country’s labour force. Its 
characteristics are: 
 It emphasizes sustained economic growth of about 5% to ensure reduction in poverty; 
 I.G. adopts a futuristic dimension and the pace of growth that affect large percentage of 
the country’s workforce. 
Inclusive growth centres on addressing the following questions: What is happening to 
un/employment, education, provision of health services, provision of shelter, food, clothing and 
water, poverty reduction and widening inequality? If the answers to these questions are negative 
then there is no development no matter the rate of growth of the economy’s GDP.  
  
Inclusive growth refers to economic growth that trickles down and across all sectors in an 
economy, contributes to and benefitted by a cross section of people in the economy, including 
the poor(Alao & Olufemi). It focuses on ways to raise the pace of growth by utilizing more fully 
parts of the labour force trapped in low productivity or completely excluded from growth 
process. It provides background and a catalyst for poverty reduction in emerging countries. 
Inclusive growth is becoming a development agenda nationally and internationally and has 
several reasons why inclusiveness is so important.  
  
Furthermore, these countries are developing or new industrialized countries located in diverse 
geographical but in strategic locations in the World endowed with large and young labour force. 
Having this in mind, the researcher thought it wise to develop an inclusive growth index that 
incorporates this uniqueness that was omitted by United Nation Development Program (UNDP) 
Human Development Index and World Economic Forum (WEF) Inclusive Development Index 
(Desli et al) (See below for details). 
The conceptual analysis of inclusive growth suggested by Ianchovichina & Lundstrom-Gable 
(2012) is the same as that in Dutz (2007).Both claimed that their notion of inclusive growth was 
broader than pro-poor growth, which they conceived as Poverty-reducing growth. Their augment 
was that pro-poor growth was interested only in the welfare of the poor while the inclusive 
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growth was concerned with opportunities for a broader group of the disadvantaged: the labour 
force, the poor and the middle class.  
According to Klasen (2010) inclusive growth is growth that encompasses a wide spectrum of 
individuals via active and labour rewarding jobs which contribute to the growth .A labour 
rewarding  job is dire to inclusive growth, it  opens up both social and  economic opportunities  
for all. It centres on equal opportunity for all. This encompasses both the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors (Papanek, 2002).Inclusive growth centres on the rate of growth and how 
it trickles down to the common man on the street. It is also futuristic in nature that focuses on 
labour rewarding jobs. Though income redistribution schemes can temporarily dispense benefits 
to all it is not sufficient to actualize growth inclusiveness, rather, it is term inclusive when it 
creates create economic opportunities for all in the economy. Apart from resolving the income 
disparity issues, growth is also term-inclusive when poverty levels are reduced from high to low 
levels. In conclusion, growth is term-inclusive it accommodates all people in irrespective of 
tribe, culture and religion in the production process. 
Suryanarayana (2008) affirms that growth is not inclusive if there exists exclusion of people 
based on tribes, religion and ethnicity as this propels the income disparity across the world. The 
author also affirms that the richest 10% people control 85% of assets, while the poor 50% own 
1%. In order to resolve this malady, there is the need for combined effort of labour, education 
and training to actualize optimum inclusiveness.  
Ramos et al (2013) describe inclusive growth as an encompassing process that involves joint 
participation effort in wealth creation and wealth sharing. The authors further emphasized the 
need to improve the living condition of the poor and open up new opportunities to the poor. 
In the same vein  Lledó & Garcia-Verdu (2011) defined inclusive growth as that which is 
sustainable for longer period of years(say 5-10 years) spread across  all the economic sectors and 
provide labour-rewarding job for  majority of the labour forces(say 80 % of natural total labour 
force). They opined that a key attribute of inclusive growth must be that it must be sustainable 
for long periods capable of promoting structural changes as regards output and export 
diversification.  
The Commission (2010) defined inclusive growth as the “ process and outcome where all groups 
of people have  participated in the organization of growth and have benefited equitably from it’. 
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It characteristics growth as inclusive when it occurs in sectors such as agriculture where the poor 
work, in places where the poor live and employs factors of production that the poor possess-
unskilled labour. However, Kaldor’s view of economic growth suggests that the sustainability of 
economic growth is anchored on high rates of manufacturing growth, vis-à-vis the overall growth 
of GDP and those of other sectors (Kaldor, 1966). Corroborating Kaldor’s assertion, Islam 
(2010) noted that high manufacturing growth rates are necessary at the initial stage of 
development to create conditions that are conducive for the transfer of surplus labour from sector 
with low labour productivity to those with higher productivity. Even so, the success of the 
transfer process largely depends on higher growth rates of labour-intensive manufacturing sub-
sectors, particularly at the initial stage of development to create conditions that are conducive for 
the transfer of surplus labour from sectors with low labour productivity to those with higher 
production. Even so, the success of the transfer process largely depends on higher growth rates 
of labour intensive manufacturing sub-sectors, particularly at the initial development stages. 
In development economics, growth is term total economic activity (ies) characterized by full 
employment. It is often estimated using inflation-adjusted. Growth is said to exist, if there is a 
rise in the production of goods and services in a country usually for a long period. It is calculated 
as a per cent rise of real Gross Domestic Product GDP. Growth is said to exist if the following 
are addressed: 
 Is unemployment reducing? 
 Is poverty rate reducing? 
 Is inequality reducing? 
In conclusion, the growing desire to study inclusive economic growth is a strong indication that 
high growths are  in themselves inadequate for addressing the ills of poverty, unemployment and 
inequalities.  
Also, there is no single unanimously agreed measurement of inclusive growth,For instance, (Ali 
& Son (2007) developed the principle of social welfare function to measure inclusive growth. 
They affirmed that economic growth is inclusive if the social opportunity function is enhanced. 
Social opportunity connotes accessibility to healthcare services and education, which translate to 
income distribution to denote whether there is a pro- poor social improvement, or not. By 
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implication, if income is distributed fairly that the poor has access to healthcare services and education 
then growth is inclusive. 
Klasen (2010) developed a wider measure of inclusive growth by adopting income and non-
indicators of wellbeing such as access to education and health, nutrition and social integration. It 
was theorized that a decline inequality in the non-income dimension of wellbeing is an indicator 
of inclusion. The flaw of this measurement is the unavailability of data for the computation of 
non-income indicators especially emerging countries.  In conclusion, there is no universally 
acceptable definition and measurement of inclusive growth in an economy. 
Many proposals earlier presented to develop an index reflected either human development or the 
level of well-being. Some of the proposals did not include a measure of income per capita; 
poverty, inequalities. For example, Drewnowski & Scott (1968) developed the level of Living 
Index and the variables employed include nutrition, housing, education and others. 
Similarly,Morris (1978) developed Physical Quality of Life Index employing infant mortality 
and longevity. In the context of BRICS countries, data variables are rank maximum core 
indicators and observe the level where we stand in terms of economic development. 
OECD Publishing (2013) developed an Inclusive growth measurement using eleven monetary 
and non-monetary parameters which are deemed important for human well-being. Some of the 
variables include health, institutions and environmental quality. 
Other Indexes often used by scholars include (Osberg & Sharpe, 2002) Index of Economic Well-
being; (Lawn, 2003)Index  of sustainable economic welfare and (Ullah & Kiani, 2017) socio-
economic index. These indexes provide the literature and methodological platform of new index 
development.  
Samans et al (2015) a group of researchers at World Economic Forum (WEF) developed an 
Inclusive Development Index for annual assessment of 103 countries’ economic performance 
that measures how countries perform on eleven dimensions of economic progress in addition to 
GDP. It has three pillars; growth and development; inclusion and; intergenerational equity – 
sustainable stewardship of natural and financial resources. The flaw of this index is the averaging 
technique and unavailability of data for the computation of the index. Secondly, there is a 
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difference between inclusive growth and inclusive development which is similar to economic 
growth and economic development. Other social economic indexes are presented as follows  
Table 3.1: Previous Composite Development Indices 
S/N Authors  Index 
1 Bennett 1951 Consumption level Index 
2 Beckerman and Bacon 1966 Real Index of Consumption (RIC) 
3 Drewnowski and Scott 1966 Level of Living Index (LLI) 
4 United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development 1984 
Socioeconomic Development Index (SID) 
5 McGranahan et al 1972 General Index of Development  
6 (Morris, 1978) Physical Quality of Life Index 
7 Camp and Speidel 1987 Human Suffering Index (HIS) 
8 UNDP 1990 Human Development Index (HDI) 
9 UNDP 1995 Gender related Development Index(GDI) and  
the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 
10 Diener 1995 Combined Quality of Life Indices (CQCL) 
11 (Noorbakhsh, 1998) Modified Human Development Index (MHDI) 
12 UNDP1997 Human Poverty Index (HPI) 
13 Cherchye and Kuosmanen 2004 Constructs a meta index of SD (MISD) 
14 Chatterjee 2005 Measurement of Human Development  with 
alternative approach 
15 Bory’s 2005 Sustainable Development Indicators (SDI) 
16 Marchante and Ortega 2006  Augmented Version of Human Development 
Indicator 
17 Burd-Sharps, Lewis and Martins 
2008 
American Human Development Index (AHDI) 
18 Engineer, King and Roy 2008 Calculate the modified indices for country 
members of Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (Publishing) 
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19 Eurostat 2009 Sustainable Development in the European Union 
(SDIEU) 
20 New Economic Foundation 
2009(Marks, 2010) 
Happy Planet Index (HPI) 
21 UNDP 2010 The Inequalities-adjusted HDI  
22 Niels 2010 Calibrated  Human Development Index 
23 Veljko et al 2011 Economic Footprint (EF) 
24 Tolga,Bulent and Hakan  2011 Suggest the use of employment or 
unemployment dimensions in the HDI 
Source: Authors Computation 
These indexes constitute part of theoretical literature and foundational methodology of new 
index developer. Therefore, key economic growth indicators are used for developing BRICS 
inclusive growth index. 
In conclusion, the researcher identified one of the flaws in the recent WEF IDI Index as regards 
their choice for averaging all their variables to arrive at their index, as all countries are on 
different stages of development and confronted with diverse socio-economic challenges. Having 
pointed out some of these flaws, the researcher, therefore, embark on developing an Inclusive 
growth index for the BRICS countries based on two  pillars- social and economic indicators 
identified in Inclusive growth index literature. 
  
3.4.1. Inclusive Growth-Economic Growth Nexus Theories 
 This section reviews theoretical literature on the economic growth theories-inclusive growth 
nexus. 
3.4.1.1 Inclusive growth theories 
Inclusive growth can be defined as the growth of the economy as measured by the increase in the 
GDP in real term over time that leads to a reduction in unemployment, poverty rate and income 
disparity. An increase in the IG means that growth is leading to better welfare in living standard, 
access to quality education and opening up more employment opportunities that reflect the true 
impact of high growth on the common man in the street. Such increases are due to an increase in 
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productivity or increases in the factors of production that contribute by the large labour force, 
and that is evenly shared among all.  
The foundational theories of inclusive growth dates back to classic economic thoughts of Adam 
Smith (1776), Malthus (1798), David Ricardo (1817) and many others. They provide the basic 
ingredients that reflect in the modern theories of economic growth. 
3.4.1.1.1 Classical school of thought 
The prominent scholars in the classical school of thought are Ramsey (1928), Young (1928), 
Schumpeter (1934) and Knight (1944), among others. Their thoughts were not limited to the 
impact of a diminishing rate of return, population growth rate, physical and human capital 
(BARRO and SALA-I-MARTIN, 1992). The classical theory propounds that a rise in economic 
growth developed out of the philosophical question of progress, a basic tenet of enlightenment 
that applied quality to ideas, innovations, social norms and more generally the material bases of 
the society. Sequel to this, the classical thinkers sought a general account of the forces and 
mechanism that influences economic growth. They believed in productive investment and capital 
accumulation as the principal impetus to achieve economic growth. They recognised the impact 
of technological changes on growing the division of labour and introducing changes in 
production methods. 
3.4.1.1.2 Neoclassical school of thought 
According to the neoclassical school of thought, the notion of sustainable growth chiefly centres 
on the rate of population growth and technological advancement (Solow, 1956). They also 
opined that both human and capital might be influenced by the nature of government 
expenditure/ tax, thus affecting the equilibrium factor but not the growth rate. 
On the flip side, Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990) believe that tax and productive 
government expenditure can stimulate sustainable growth in the endogenous model. The 
implications of endogenous growth models for fiscal policy have been particularly examined by 
Barro (1990), Jones et al. (1993) and Mendoza et al. (1997). 
In view of the shortcoming of the neoclassical growth theory which stipulated that the long-run 
growth rate is determined by the rate of technological progress (a factor outside the model). 
Romer (1986) sought to analyse the long-run determinants of the rate of growth by factors within 
the model, hence the name ‘endogenous growth’. The endogenous growth theory holds that 
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investment in human, capital; innovation and knowledge is significant for attaining growth. The 
theory emphasised that positive externalities like capital inflows and spill-over effects of a 
knowledge-based economy to a deficient one and appropriate policy measures like subsidies on 
research and development can culminate in the long-run growth of the economy.  
Bleaney et al. (2001) empirically examined (Barro (1990) proposition in OECD countries for the 
period of 1984-1995. Their result affirms that government expenditure and tax do have both 
temporary and permanent impact of growth. 
Therefore, to achieve inclusive growth implies attacking income disparity, education, health, 
poverty and welfare, which require breaking down the barriers to inclusive growth. Everyone 
should be able to actualise their dreams and derive from the inclusive growth proceeds. 
3.4.1.1.3 Endogenous growth theory 
Endogenous growth models such as Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990) predict that 
distortionary taxation and productive expenditures will affect the long-run growth rate. The 
implications of endogenous growth models for military expenditure have been examined by 
Benoit (1973), Barro (1990), d’Agostino et al. (2012) and Compton and Paterson (2016). 
In view of the shortcomings of the neoclassical growth theory which stipulated that the long-run 
growth rate is determined by the rate of technological progress (a factor outside the model), 
Romer (1986) and Lucas Jr (1988) analysed the long-run determinant of the rate of growth by 
factors within the model, hence the name “endogenous growth”. The endogenous growth theory 
holds that the investment in human capital, innovation and knowledge are significant incentives 
for attaining growth. The theory emphasised that positive externalities like capital inflows and 
spill over effects of a knowledge-based economy to a deficient one and appropriate policy 
measures like subsidies on research and development can culminate in the long-run growth rate 
of the economy. 
Unlike the neoclassical growth model (exogenous growth model), where fiscal effects alter the 
level of the long-run output path, the endogenous growth model permits government expenditure 
to alter the slope of the long run-run output path, as illustrated by the example in Barro (1990). 
Here, Aizenman and Glick (2006) presentation was adopted for Barro and Sala-i-martin (1992) 
model of endogenous growth. This adaption is also used in Kolawole (2016) to examine public 
spending and inclusive growth in Nigeria. According to Compton and Paterson (2016), the 
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endogenous growth model Barro (1990) predicts that military expenditure and institutional 
quality will have both negative or zero effects on growth. They test this prediction using panels 
of period-averaged data for over 100 countries during 1988- 2010, isolating long run and short-
run effects and country-specific dynamics. Their result suggests a negative or zero impact of 
military expenditure on growth, and this migrated by the presence of good economic and 
political institutions. 
Barro (1990) model of endogenous growth implies that economic growth will initially rise with 
the increase in taxes directed toward “productive” expenditure (e.g. provision of security for 
lives and property against internal and external threats), but will subsequently decline. The 
endogenous growth model of  Barro and Sala-i-martin (1992) with the public good, argue that 
public expenditure makes private production more profitable. An endogenous model of 
economic growth theory appears to be the most suitable for the study. The model suggests that 
endogenous factors such as government policies, political stability, market distortions, human 
capital, etc. can significantly affect economic growth. It is a widely used growth model to 
provide a systemic investigation of the military expenditure-economic growth nexus. For 
example, d’Agostino et al. (2017) and  Compton and Paterson (2016) used it to assess the role of 
military expenditure and growth. 
  
3.5 Military Expenditure-Growth Theories 
The literature on theoretical models and existing empirical models can be grouped into seven (7) 
groups: Benoit type regression, supply side (Feder-type) models, Demand side models, Deger 
type (a combination of Demand and Supply side), the Barro models, the Solow models and 
Causality analysis.  
3.5.1 Benoit type regression (Benoit’s (1978) work 
In 1978, Benoit investigated the military expenditure –growth nexus for 44 developing countries. 
The result concluded that countries with high military budgetary allocation experienced speedy 
and sustained economic growth than countries with low military budgetary allocation to the 
military. In conclusion, the author postulated that emerging and developing countries must be 
devoting a huge chunk of their budgetary allocation to the military.  
The equation used is  
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………………….3.16 
Where   is the civilian growth,  is the Military expenditure,  is the 
investment ratio, BA is the bilateral aid and    is the error term for the duration of 1950 to 
1965. The study examined further the causation direction between military expenditure and 
growth. The result affirmed strongly that there exists weak causation from economic growth to 
military expenditure. It, however, affirmed that a strong causation from military expenditure to 
economic growth exists. Therefore, military expenditure is a strong catalyst for economic growth 
and not vice versa. 
Benoit (1973) examined the cost and benefits of military expenditure on economic growth. The 
author confirms that there is a strong spill over impact on civilian sectors via technology transfer 
and enhanced human capacity. Thus, a high military expenditure also ensures optimum 
utilisation of resources, and the benefits can offset the adverse growth effects. 
Conversely, Benoit’s (1978) work was characterised by some weaknesses. For instance, 
Frederiksen and Looney (1983) examined  Benoit’s (1978) work using the same sample, same 
period and the same estimation technique. They mentioned that Benoit’s (1978) sample was 
unsuitable and that military expenditure accounts for a reasonable portion of un-allocable 
explanatory power. They advised that the countries,  be divided into two: Poor countries 
(resource-constrained) and rich countries (abundant resources). Their result affirmed that 
military expenditure contributes positively and influences on rich resource-endowed economic 
growth and vice versa in the resource-constrained countries. Therefore, military expenditure 
retards economic growth in resource-poor countries. 
In conclusion, Biswas and Ram (1986) expanded Benoit’s (1978) work by adding more 
developing countries and grouped into different income groups of low-income and middle-
income countries for the periods 1960-1984 and 1984-1977. They found that military 
expenditure on growth was not statistically insignificant for low-income countries for periods 
examined. 
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3.5.2. Demand-side models (Military Keynesianism) 
Theoretical Models 
The demand side models are based on Keynesian theory which identifies military expenditure as 
an independent component of the national accounting equation as shown below: 
…………………..3.17 
Y = Actual output, Q= potential output, W= difference between the actual and potential output, 
C= aggregate consumption, I= investment, M=military expenditure and (X-M) balance of trade. 
A share of potential output can be rearranged as: 
………………………………..3.18 
The share of consumption can further be broken as 
……………………………………………………3.19 
 = unemployment rate, = growth rate of actual output. A rise in u and g can adversely affect 
the consumption pattern of potential output. 
…………3.20 
 – Balance local demand and potential supply are related to unemployment. 
=  
……………………3.21 
Equation 5 can investigate the possibility of the crowding out effect of military expenditure on 
investment and economic growth. 
3.5.3. Supply-side models (Feder-Ram models) 
Theoretical Models 
The Supply-side models are based on Feder’s (1984) on the effects of export on economic 
growth. Biwas and Ram model used Feder’s (1984) model to examine the military expenditure –
growth nexus. They assumed the existence of two sectors (military and civilian) sectors and 
focused chiefly on externality/spill over effects of the military sector (including military 
industries) and factor productivity between the two sectors. 
The model denotes the two sectors as military (M) and civilian (C) taking cognisance of the 
output of labour and capital. That is, 
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……………………………..3.22 
Taking into account factor endowment constraint  
………………………………………3.23 
The addition of M and C gives output (Y) 
…………………………………………………………………3.24 
Therefore, we can derive the marginal productivity (propensity) for both sectors as  
………………………………………………………………3.25 
The model postulates that military output impacts total output via two channels. 
1.  = externality effect of military output on the civilian output.  
2.  = relative factor productivity difference between the two sectors.  If  
productivity in the military sector (military industries) is greater than the civilian sector 
(public and private industries), then more resources will be devoted to the military sector 
(military industries), therefore aggregate output increase. 
Equation (1) and (3) 
………………………………3.26 
 
………………………….3.27 
The dot overts the variable connote rate of growth and L connotes aggregate investment. 
Let us assume externality parameter as  and represent with , we can rewrite the 
equation as  
……………………………………………………….3.28 
The equation ( ) be rewritten as  
……………………...3.29 
Which differentiates externality effect from factor productivity effect?  
The setback of the model is as follows: 
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 Only applicable for two-sector, (Ram, 1995) as multi-sectorial modeling will pose serious 
problems.  
 It ignores the demand side.  
 It poses interpretation challenges (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003). 
Setbacks of the Feder-model 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) outline some of the setbacks of Feder models as follows: 
1. The regression treats labour and capital asymmetrically of parameters. 
2. The problem of Multicollinearity especially in estimating externality and factor 
productivity effects. 
3. The model is static and without lagged dependent variables. 
In conclusion, Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) strongly advised that based on Feder-Ram’s 
weak theoretical and structurally faulty econometric underpins; Feder-Ram model must not be 
employed. 
3.5.4. Demand and supply-side models (Deger type models) 
Theoretical models  
In order to ascertain the direct impact via externality / spill over effects of military expenditure 
and Keynesian stimulation and adverse impact of military expenditure via reduction in savings 
and crowding out investments, the Demand and Supply side was incorporated into a single model 
called the Demand and Supply model also called Deger Types Simultaneous Equation Model 
(DTSEM). The model was developed by Deger (1986). The regression equation is given as  
………………………..3.30 
………………………3.31 
……………………………………….3.32 
………………………………………………………………3.33 
 – set of parameters, g- growth rate of GDP, S-saving ratio, M- military 
expenditure; B-trade balance of GDP;  set of controlled variables were selected via data 
specification. 
The DTSEM provides the net effects for both the positive effects and negative effects of military 
expenditure on an economy utilising the 3SLS technique. The regression is provided as follows: 
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…………………………………………3.34 
DTSEM has some strengths and weaknesses. Some of the strengths of DTSEM include the 
following it overcomes the problems of endogeneity, causality and simultaneous problem. 
However, some of the setbacks of Deger model: Relied on Ad-hoc theoretical specification (that 
is, not based on strong theoretical underpins); it ignores the human capital component of growth. 
3.5.5. The Aizenman and Glick model 
Aizenman and Glick (2006) developed a theoretical framework to analyse military expenditure-
growth nexus based on (Barro and Sala-i-martin (1992) work. They opined that military 
expenditure asserts a negative or insignificant effect on growth because of its non-linearity and 
omitted variable biases. 
Aizenman and Glick (2006) postulated that threat is a key factor to determine if military 
expenditure will assert a positive impact on growth 
  
  
This can be written mathematically as follows: 
………...3.35 
……………………..3.36 
G= growth rate of real GDP per capita; m= military expenditure; threat-level of country’s 
effective military threat. 
This suggests a basic growth equation written as:  
………3.37 
Where X- set of control variables e.g. Income (GDP), Investment share and population growth 
rates and other socio-economic variables.  
Aizenman and Glick (2006) postulate that the direct impact of military expenditure and external 
threats on growth are assumed to be an inverse relationship while the collaborative impact is 
positive. The Barro style model of military expenditure-growth relationship indicates that 
military expenditure influenced by external threat stimulates output by increasing security, 
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whereas military expenditure influenced by rent-seeking and corruption will retard growth by 
disrupting productive economic activities. 
3.5.6. The Augmented Solow Model 
  
(Mankiw et al., 1992) augmented the Solow (1956) (Solow, 1956) neoclassical model by 
incorporating human capital component. The regression can be written as:  
………………3.38 
…………………………………………………………………3.39 
- Elasticities of income with respect to capital and Labour, Y- output, Pc - 
Physical capital, L- labour 
-effective units of labour that grow at n + g 
……………3.40 
  denote the fraction of income spent on physical capital and human capital. 
The transition equation is written as:  
………………………3.41 
……………………3.42 
The production function and the transition equations are based on the standard neoclassical 
assumptions. When the economy is at a steady-state,  and when the 
stationary of k * and h* is obtained as: 
…………………………………………3.43 
………………………………………………3.44 
The Solow model provides the speed of convergence around the steady-state: 
…………………………………3.45 
Where 
…………………………………..3.46 
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When the variables of K * and h* are incorporated in the steady-state transition equations and 
production function to derive the long-run steady-state per capita income as: 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….3.47 
The augmented Solow model depicts that income growth is a function of the initial level of 
income and determinants of the ultimate steady-state.  
As regards military expenditure –growth nexus, augmented Solow model with a military variable 
is chiefly cantered on (Knight et al., 1996) works which is written as: 
………3.33 
Y - Income per income growth rate; - initial income per capita levels; K-investment; h-
human capital,   - effective labour growth plus depreciation and m- military 
expenditure. 
  
3.5.7 Theoretical model for growth, military expenditure and institutional 
quality 
Aizenman and Glick (2006) developed a theoretical framework to analyse the interaction among 
military expenditure, growth and institutional quality (corruption) by improving on Barro and 
Sala-i-martin (1992) work. They assumed that there was zero population growth. Output per 
worker is affected positively by infrastructure supplied by the public sector, and negatively by 
the magnitude of the external threats. The reduced form of output is:  
…………………………………………….3.34 
Where A denotes an exogenous productivity factor, k is the capital/labour ratio, g is the ratio of 
government (non-military) expenditure on infrastructure relative to labour, and 1-f measures the 
output cost of the threat external unfriendly neighbours. Thus, it assumes that this cost depends 
negatively on domestic military expenditure and positively on an index of the magnitude of the 
threat; this can be presented in the following functional form: 
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………………….3.35 
Where  - military expenditure (locally) and   is the external threat level. 
N.B. This specification indicates that z is measured in units comparable to military expenditure 
(locally) so that    and z may be aggregated. 
Corruption may be incorporated into the model as an activity that taxes fiscal expenditure on 
military and non-military government expenditure at a rate of . Therefore, output with 
corruption is: 
……………………..3.36 
The ratio of military to non-military infrastructure expenditure by , 
…………………………………………………………3.37 
Therefore, the total fiscal outlay on both military and non-military expenditure is
. The rest of the model specification is identical to that of (Barro, 1990). It is assumed 
that capital does not depreciate. The fiscal outlay is financed by a proportional tax : 
…………………………………………………………3.38 
The representative agent’s preference is: 
……………………………………3.39 
In line with (Barro, 1990), it presents the output growth as follows: 
……………………………………………3.40  
The optimal pattern of taxes and expenditure is represented by  that determines the military 
sector size and maximises the growth rate presented by  
…………………………………………………………3.41 
………………………………….3.42 
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Equation equates the tax , and thereby also the government’s expenditure share 
to the output elasticity with respect to the marginal product of non-expenditure,  magnified at 
the rate  (the ratio of military to non-military government expenditure). In a situation of no 
military expenditure, equation (a) reduces to  = , lead to standard production efficiency 
situation.  
Equation b denotes that the military expenditure ratio  has a positive link with an external 
threat (normalised by the domestic stock of capital). The military expenditure ratio  positively 
links the corruption level and negatively with the productivity level. 
………………….3.43 
Correspondingly, from equation (a) it follows: 
………………………………..3.44 
The figure presents the military expenditure-threat level nexus implied by (8b) and (9). In the 
absence of threats, z=0, also =0, the optimal amount of military expenditure is zero. For 
positive threat levels, z>o, however, >0, that is the optimal level of military expenditure is 
positive. As the threat level increases, the optimal amount of military expenditure rises 
monotonically.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Optimal military expenditure and external threat level  
Note  is the optimal ratio of military to non-military expenditure; Z / K connotes the external 
threat level (normalised by the capital stock). The plots are calibrated by assuming A=1. 
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Figure 3.1 depicts the impact of parametrically increasing the corruption rate, . The solid line 
denotes the benchmark relation between  and z (for =0.1); the dashed line represents the 
impact of rising the corruption rate for ( =0.2). Obviously, rising corruption connotes a higher 
optimal of military expenditure for any given threat level. 
An important feature of equilibrium  government expenditure is described as the optimal share of 
military expenditure equal directly to the output cost of external threat,1-f. 
……………………………………………………..3.45 
In the situation of no threats, the optimal level of military expenditure is zero, the output cost of 
threats is zero (f=1), and output is a standard CRS function of k and g. Similarly, the optimum 
tax rate  equals the output proportion of government services ( ), and is independent of scale 
impact as indicated in 8a and 10. The presence of threats and hostile actions, however, shows 
positive military expenditure and output costs (f <1) and adds a non-linear multiplicative term (f) 
to output.  
 This, in turn, adds a scale consideration to the design of optimal tax and expenditure rates, 
summarised as: 
………………………………………3.46 
Where . The optimal ratio of military to non- military government expenditure( ) 
times the output share of non-military expenditure  equals the output cost of external threats (1-
f), which invariably equal the magnitude of the external threats(z) relative the aggregate effective 
expenditure by the domestic country and its unfriendly neighbours , where  
“effective denotes net of corruption tax. Consequently, an exogenous rise in the external threat 
level, z, rises the optimal expenditure and tax rates,  and .  
Therefore, unfriendly external threats affect growth negatively due to two factors: the direct 
negative effects on growth linked to the reduction of marginal product of capital, linked to the 
negative effect with a higher tax rate as a result of lower productivity. Therefore, a rise in 
corruption  and reduced domestic productivity (A) raises military expenditure and, therefore, 
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result in retarded growth. This is presented in the following reduced form for optimal output 
growth: 
……………………………………….3.47 
To determine that:  
……………………………………………3.48 
Therefore, confirming the nonlinear theoretical relationship between growth and military 
expenditure.  
Figure 2 presented the optimal growth levels and military expenditure, while holding constant 
the levels of external threats and corruption. Higher military expenditure retards growth, all 
being equal. A rise in threat level moves the entire locus upwards. 
In conclusion, the theoretical models imply that the relationship between military expenditure 
and growth depend on corruption and rent-seeking behaviour thus, acting as tax fiscal 
expenditures, corruption increases the desired level of military expenditure. They opined that 
military expenditure asserts negative or insignificant effect on growth because of its non-linearity 
and omitted variable biases. 
Aizenman and Glick (2006) postulated that threat is a key factor to determine whether or not 
military expenditure will assert a positive impact on growth  
  
  
This can be written mathematically as follows: 
…………………………3.49 
………………………………….3.50 
G= growth rate of real GDP per capita; m= military expenditure; threat- level of country’s 
effective military threat. 
This suggests a basic growth equation written as: 
……..3.51 
Where X- set of control variables e.g. Income (GDP), investment share and population growth 
rates and other socio-economic variables.  
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(Aizenman and Glick, 2006) postulate that the direct impact of military expenditure and external 
threats on growth are assumed to be an inverse relationship while collaborative impact is 
positive. The Barro style model of military expenditure-growth relationship indicates that 
military expenditure influenced by external threat stimulate output by increasing security 
whereas, military expenditure influenced by rent-seeking and corruption will retard growth 
disrupting productive economic activities. 
  
3.5.1. Theoretical and Empirical literature on Institutional quality  
The two prominent scholars of institutional quality are Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) and often 
regarded as the fathers of institutional theory. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) published a book 
titled “Why nations fail.”. The book was majorly influenced by North’s (1990) argument that a 
good institution is a precondition for sustainable and inclusive growth. North’s (1990) viewpoint 
was often supported by citing historical facts covering Egypt, China, Britain and Latin America. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) theorized that it was essential for a country to develop a certain 
set of institutions which are capable of stimulating incentives for economic activities. Also, they 
pointed out that economic institutional quality alone was not sufficient; rather a combined effort 
of both economic institutional quality and political institutional quality can bring about 
development. Citing that few countries with good economic and political institutions often 
experience rapid and sustainable development than other countries with only either economic or 
political-institutional quality alone. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) criticized some existing institutional assumptions for 
developments. For instance, the geography led growth assumption which emphasized that 
countries in tropical region are often confronted with diseases, this therefore led to less 
agricultural production output. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) gave an example of North and 
South Korea in the same location but at variance in terms of economic development. As regards 
diseases, they attribute this to a deficit in the health care sector. Also, they refute the role the 
cultural factor as an impediment towards development. Rather, deficiency in the political and 
economic structure that is unable to stimulate incentives for economic growth was responsible 
and not culture. 
76 
 
In conclusion, the last theory they dismissed was ignorance in policy selection. They argued that 
oftentimes nations have been advised by both international and renowned academics, but were 
rejected by the political and economic institutions they operate within. 
Good institutional and sound policies create an enabling environment, thus capable of promoting 
business growth and economic development via optimum utilization of resources. More often, 
the conceptualization of institutional quality allows the view that institutions are all rules or 
forms of conduct, which are intentionally devised to reduce the uncertainty that results from 
imperfect information, control the environment and social interaction, as well as lower 
transaction cost (Ménard and Shirley,2005). Also, Ostrom (2015) defined institutional quality as 
the sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some 
arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what 
procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided and what pay-offs 
will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions. 
Using the degree of embeddedness, Williamson (2000) classified an institution into four levels. 
Level 1 consists mostly of informal institutions such as religion, traditions, norms and customs. 
Level 2 includes the formal institutional environment, defined as the formal rules of social 
interaction, such as the polity, property rights, bureaucracy and judiciary. Level 3 incorporates 
the institution of governance. This relates the structure of governance with transactions, 
especially those relating to contracts with their transaction costs. Lastly, institutional quality in 
Level 4 involves the rules that govern employment and resource allocation. 
On the other hand, Beck et al. (2002) classified institutional quality based on the unit of 
analysis. Such a unit could be legal, political, economic and social (Joskow, 2008). While the 
political institution takes care of the political process and party politics, an economic institution 
is concerned with production, distribution and consumption activities in the society. Social 
institutional concepts such as norms, beliefs, trust and civic cooperation, coincide largely with 
informal institutions on the basis of formality classification. Political and economic institutional 
factors are important determinants of differences in growth across economies. 
On the measure of institutional quality, several efforts have resulted in the coining of the term 
“institutional quality”. It is the level attained relative to a standard set, as suitable to represent 
the quality of an institutional environment, by an individual, a body of professionals, 
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organisation, or institution. Generally, institutional quality is measured using a scale of example, 
1 to 6 (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, 2015) or 1 to 100 (O'Driscoll et al., 2001). 
Unlike the Fraser House where a higher score or number implies lower quality, most sources of 
institutional measure use a higher score for higher quality and a lower score for lower quality. In 
this light, some institutional measures and proxies are tabulated below. 
Table 3.2: Measure of institutional quality  
Institutional group Measure  Source 
Legal Institution: 
Index of Economic Freedom Property rights The Heritage 
Foundation 
Freedom of the Press Legal environment  Freedom House 
Freedom in the World (EFW) Civil Liberties Freedom House 
Economic Freedom to World  
(EFW) Index  
Impartial courts Fraser Institute 
EFW Index Protection of property rights Fraser Institute 
Law and order  ICRG 
Religion in politics  ICRG 
Rule of Law  WB WGI 
Political Institution 
Freedom of the press Political Environment  Freedom House 
Freedom in the World  
Institutionalised  
Political Rights Freedom House 
Democracy  Institutional Autocracy Polity  IV 
Checks and balances  WB 
Democratic accountability   ICRG 
Corruption  ICRG 
Bureaucratic quality   ICRG 
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Internal Conflict   ICRG 
Military in politics  ICRG 
Control of corruption  WB WGI  
Corruption perception index  Transparency 
International 
Political terror scale   Political terror scale 
Economic Institution 
Index of Economic Freedom Financial Freedom  The Heritage 
Foundation and WSJ 
Index of Economic Freedom  Business freedom The Heritage 
Foundation and WSJ 
Regulatory Quality   WB and WSJ 
Freedom of the Press Economic  Environment  Freedom  House 
EFW Index  Freedom  to own foreign 
currency  bank accounts 
Fraser Institute 
EFW Index Regulation of credit, labour  
and Business:  
Credit market regulations 
Fraser Institute 
EFW Index Regulation of credit, labour  
and Business:  
Labour market regulations 
Fraser Institute 
EFW Index Regulation of credit, labour  
and Business:  
Business regulations 
Fraser Institute 
EFW Index Foreign ownership / 
Investment restrictions 
Fraser Institute 
EFW Index Capital controls Fraser Institute 
Source: Adapted from Kuncic (2013) 
Nevertheless, irrespective of measures and sources, institutional quality should reflect growth. 
As noted by North (2006), Institutional quality spurs economic growth when the environment 
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encourages voluntary transactions in productive activities. Public spending represents one of the 
important policy instruments for governments. It denotes the expenses which the government 
incurs in the performance of its operations. While acknowledging the fact that economic 
growth’s impact on the poor is complex and contentious in developing countries, Mckay and 
Sumner (2008) stressed the likelihood of growth being unequal. Thus, in order to benefit the 
poor, the researchers suggested a redistributive and transformative public spending that can 
break the intergenerational transmission of poverty, increase the rate at which jobs are created 
from growth, and support a broad-based sectorial growth. Consequently, public spending is 
expected to engender large positive effects on economic growth.  
3.5.1.1. Inclusive and extractive institutional 
Though inclusive and extractive institutions are obtained from theory, they form the theoretical 
framework; Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) ascribe inclusiveness and exclusiveness to the 
specific set of institutions. As regards economic institutional quality, they argue that countries 
differ in economic growth as a result of their different institutions, the rules affecting how the 
economy works, and the incentives that drive people (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). 
In summary, inclusive economic institutions are made up by their inherent incentive structure 
such as equality before the law and public services that present equal chances, which are vital 
features of inclusive economic institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson, (2013) observed that 
extractive economic institutions are the direct opposite of inclusive economic institutions 
characterized by poor public services, to mention a few. Also, under extractive economic 
institutions, there is the possibility of state capture where national resources are shared among a 
certain class of individuals. 
Political institutions control how power is shared within a society. Inclusive political institutions 
cut across and encompass diverse groups of people. To sustain an inclusive economic institution, 
there is a need for a certain degree of centralization. On the other hand, an extractive political 
institution is characterized by the control of the national resources by the elite alone. A unique 
relationship exists among the types of institutions. For instance, inclusive political institutions 
support inclusive economic institutions, just like extractive political institutions that support 
extractive economic institutions. 
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In conclusion, institutional quality concept will be the foundational institutional quality 
theoretical framework of this thesis. The political institution will be proxied by corruption 
because corruption is the direct outcome of either a good or bad institution. For this study, 
corruption will be the proxy for measuring institutional quality in BRICS countries.  
  
3.5.1.2 Theories on corruption proxy for institutional quality- The “grease the wheels” 
hypothesis of corruption (also called the “greasers” school of thought) 
The “grease the wheels” hypothesis of corruption states that graft may act as a trouble saving 
device, thereby raising efficiency. Furthermore, the “greasers” school of thought of corruption 
posits that corruption may enhance growth, investment and development in the short run 
depending on the low quality of governance and bureaucratic rules and regulations. They also 
argue that it could also motivate public officials in a situation where the wage is grossly 
insufficient (Leff, 1964, Leys, 1965, Aidt, 2003, Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, Wang and You, 2012).  
Some of the common consensus among prominent scholars of the “grease the wheels” 
hypothesis of corruption is that corruption may enhance economic growth through various 
channels especially in the presence of ill-functioning of bureaucracy. 
One of the channels of ill-functioning of bureaucracy is slowness. Lui (1985), Aidt (2003), 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) applying a formal economic model to estimate the impact of corruption 
on growth assert that corruption could efficiently reduce the time spent in queues but speed up 
the transaction process.  The rationale behind this is that bribes could serve as a motivation to 
bureaucrats to fast track the process in a sluggish administration. Also, Huntington (1968) 
affirms that corruption could lessen the tedious bureaucratic regulations and enhance growth. 
The author further cited the United States of America railroad utility and Industrial Corporation 
in the 1870s and 1880s where the high-level prevalence of corruption also witnessed rapid 
growth during the same period. 
Secondly, (Hewitt and Van Rijckeghem (1995) and Méon and Weill (2010) argue that another 
channel through which corruption can drive growth in the presence of ill-functioning  
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bureaucracy is focus on the quality of civil/public servant. Also, Leys, (1965), Bayley (1966), 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) and Muttreja et al. (2012) posit that if wages in government 
institutions are low or insufficient, corruption (bribes) could serve as perks/motivation to civil 
servants. As a result, this attracts highly skilled manpower from poorly remunerated private 
organisations to government owned corporations. 
Thirdly, corruption could serve as a means of decision rule by public officials (Beck and Maher, 
1986, Lien, 1986). For instance, in competition auction or bidding for government contracts or 
projects, the authors assert that only firms that pay the highest amount of bribes in such bidding 
process will win such contracts. Therefore, corruption can be said to be a benchmark for granting 
government procurement contracts. 
 Also, Leff, (1964) and Bayley (1966) affirm that corruption could serve as a hedge against 
unfavourable government policies especially if institutions are biased against entrepreneurship 
due,  for example, to an ideological bias. 
Furthermore, Leff (1964) asserts that corruption could enhance the quality of investment 
provided if it is in form of tax avoidance and such investment is channelled in high yielding 
project with Return On Investment (ROI). 
Akai et al. (2005) assert that, in the short run, corruption may “counteract government failure and 
promote economic growth and exogenously determine suboptimal bureaucratic rules and 
regulations.  
Recently, Wang and You (2012) confirmed that corruption may promote the most efficient form 
to bypass strict and rigid laws and regulations in China. Also, Dreher and Gassebner (2013), who 
use an extreme bounds analysis in a panel of 43 countries from 2003 to 2005 share the same 
view. The result indicates that when government regulations are excessive, corruption might be 
beneficial.  
In summary, the aforementioned propositions confirm that corruption may positively drive 
inclusive growth because it greases the adverse defective bureaucracy and bad policies.  
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3.5.1.3 Theories on corruption proxy for institutional quality-The “sand the wheels” 
hypothesis of corruption (also called the “Sanders” school of thought) 
The “Sanders” school of thought of corruption affirms that corruption is inimical to economic 
growth, investment and development (Mauro, 1995, Tanzi, 1998, Al-Sadig, 2009, Méon and 
Weill, 2010, Ibrahim et al., 2015). The “sand the wheels” hypothesis of corruption is of the view 
that corruption is detrimental to economic growth through several distorting channels. 
Kurer (1993) argued that corrupt officials have an incentive to create other distortions in the 
economy to cover up their ill-gotten wealth. Also, that a “civil servant can limit new or other 
civil servants access to key or “juicy” positions to preserve the rent from corruption.  
Rose-Ackerman (1997) counter the assumption that graft can promote the choice of the right 
decision as subjective. The authors argue that a firm willing to pay the highest bribe tends to 
compromise in the quality of goods and services to be produced or to be rendered. 
 In conclusion, the aforementioned argument affirms that corruption may negatively retard 
inclusive growth because of the “sand effect “on investment and good policies.  
3.6. Empirical studies on military expenditure and economic growth 
The objective of this section is to analyze empirical literature related to the military expenditure– 
growth nexus.  
3.6.1. Empirical studies outside BRICS countries 
Benoit (1973) investigated the military-growth nexus for 44 developing countries by correlation 
analysis. The result suggests that military expenditure does have a positive effect on growth. 
Later on, Babin and Society (1989) examined the impact of military expenditure on growth in 88 
developing countries. They found out that military expenditure plays an important role in 
economic growth. 
Also, Atesoglu (2009) explored the military growth relationship using the United States as a case 
study. Their result indicates a positive spill over from military expenditure to the civilian sector. 
Using a group of developing countries Stewart and Change (1991) examined military 
expenditure-growth relationship using the Keynesian demand function. Their result indicates that 
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the non-military sector has a stronger positive effect on growth than military expenditure growth 
positive impact.  
Also, incorporating technology Mueller et al. (1993) employed the Feder model to analyse 
military expenditure impact on the United States’ economic growth. Their result reveals a 
positive impact from military expenditure to growth.  
Sezgin and Economics (2001) explore the military expenditure-growth linkage in Turkey and 
Greece utilizing regression analysis. Their findings suggest that military expenditure has a 
positive impact on growth.  
  
Wijeweera et al. (2009) investigate the effect of military expenditure on Sri Lanka economic 
growth based on the Keynesian theoretical model incorporating real interest and non-military 
expenditure components. Their finding suggests a positive impact on growth. 
Aye et al. (2014) revisited the military expenditure-growth relationship for the United States of 
America employing Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FVAR) model. Their outcome 
indicates a positive effect of military expenditure on aggregate output. 
Feridun et al. (2011) also examined the military expenditure-growth dynamics in North Cyprus. 
He found that military expenditure has a significant positive impact on economic growth. 
In multi-country studies, Bose et al. (2003) examined military expenditure -growth nexus for 
thirty developing countries. Their result indicates a significant positive impact of military 
expenditure on growth. Similarly, Yildirim et al. (2005) looked at the military expenditure-
growth relationship of OECD countries. They discovered that military expenditure spurs 
aggregate output. Narayan et al. (2007) using Fiji  Islands as a case study, examined military 
expenditure-growth by incorporating export in the cob-Douglas function. Their finding reveals 
the positive effect of military expenditure on growth. Also, Ando (2009) explored 109 countries' 
military expenditure-growth linkage. He found that there exists a positive effect on growth from 
the military expenditure. 
  
However,  Huang and Mintz (1991) using the United States of America as a case study, 
investigated the military expenditure-growth relationship. Their finding suggests an adverse 
relationship between military expenditure and growth. Ward and Davis (1992) revisited the 
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military expenditure -growth nexus using the three-sector model. Their result reveals a negative 
impact of military expenditure via productive declining. Also, Atesoglu (2002) investigated the 
military expenditure-growth in the United States of America employing Romer and Taylors 
model. Their result shows an inverse relationship between military expenditure and the United 
States of America's economic growth. 
  
Klein* (2004) using Peru as a case study, explored the impact of military expenditure on growth. 
His result shows a negative impact on growth. In the same vein, Karagol* et al. (2004) revisit the 
military expenditure-growth nexus in Turkey. His result suggests a long-run association between 
military expenditure and growth but affirms a negative military expenditure effect on growth.  
  
Kentor and Kick (2008) investigated military expenditure-growth debate for both developed and 
developing countries. They expanded this debate by introducing military expenditure variable as 
a proxy for capital intensiveness. Their result indicates that an increase in military expenditure 
per soldier leads to a significant reduction in gross domestic product per capita, especially in 
developed countries. Also, Smith et al. (2008)  revisit the United States of America's military 
expenditure-growth debate by employing Atesoglu (2002) model. Their outcome indicates a 
negative military expenditure effect on growth. 
Applying the Keynesian hypothesis, Shahbaz and Shabbir (2012) revisit the military 
expenditure-growth nexus using Pakistan as a case study. Their finding suggests that an increase 
in military expenditure slows down the economic growth rate. 
Wijeweera and Webb (2011) use a panel cointegration approach to examine the relationship 
between military spending and economic growth in the five South Asian countries (namely, 
India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) over the period of 1988-2007. They found 
that a 1% increase in military spending increases real GDP by only 0.04% and hence they 
concluded that the substantial amount of public expenditure that is currently used for military 
purposes in these countries has a negligible impact upon economic growth. 
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Faini et al. (1984) further examined the impact of military expenditure on investment and growth 
of 69 countries from 1950 to 1972, employing the fixed effect model. Their result revealed that 
military expenditure has an adverse impact on economic growth and investment. Thus, military 
expenditure crowds out investment and retards economic growth for the countries understudied. 
  
Deger (1986) examined military expenditure and investment relationship, where military 
expenditure was the independent variable and investment equations as the dependable variable. 
The result revealed that the military expenditure coefficients on investment equations are 
negative and statistically significant. Thus, military expenditure partly crowds out investment in 
emerging countries.  
Knight et al. (1996) investigated the military expenditure–investment nexus for 79 countries 
including control variables such as human capital proxy, war proxy and trade. Their result 
revealed  an inverse relationship between military expenditure and investment, therefore, 
confirming the crowd-out effect.  
  
Feder (1983) re-examined the three sectors model on two groups of countries (8 Asians and 16 
Latin America). The pooled time series, cross-sectional techniques were employed. Their result 
affirmed that  military expenditure and other expenditures have a direct positive impact on 
economic growth in Asian countries whereas military expenditure and non-military expenditure 
have a negative impact on the growth of Latin American countries. 
Yildirim et al. (2005) explore the military expenditure-growth relationship for Middle Eastern 
countries and Turkey by employing the two-sector model, they confirmed the military 
expenditure stimulate economic growth for the period 1989-1999, and that military expenditure 
(industries) were more productive than the civilian sector. 
  
Sezgin (2001) explored the impact of military expenditure, military size on economic growth 
using Turkey as a case study covering 1950-1993 by utilising the two-sector  Feder model. They, 
however, expanded the two-sector model by incorporating human capital. Their result confirmed 
that both military size and size of military budgetary allocation matter and positively impact on 
growth; however, the externality effect from the military sector was negative. 
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Reitschuler and Loening (2005) employed the two-sector Feder model to empirically analyse the 
impact of military expenditure on the economic growth of Guatemala for the period 1951-2001. 
The empirical analyses indicate that a military expenditure threshold of around 0.33% of GDP is 
preferred and has a positive impact on growth whereas above the threshold of 0.33% military 
expenditure will have an adverse effect on growth. As regards the externality effect, they assert 
that the military sector has less productivity and externality effects on the civilian sector. 
Galvin (2003) investigated the military expenditure and economic growth relationship by 
employing a panel data analysis framework based on 2 SLS and 3SLS estimation techniques. 
The result shows that military expenditure has a negative effect on the 64 countries' economic 
growth and affirmed that military expenditure’s adverse impact is greater in middle-income 
countries and less in low-income countries. 
  
The demand and supply model was modelled by Deger (1986) to examine the military 
expenditure on LDC economic growth using 3SLS and 4SLS for the period of 1965-1973. The 
result indicates that military expenditure retards investment, whereas military expenditure has a 
positive impact on economic growth. Thus, military expenditure has a net negative impact on 
economic growth. 
  
Deger (1986) re-examined military expenditure –growth nexus by incorporating a balance of 
trade and utilising the 4 SLS estimation technique. The empirical analyses reveal that military 
expenditure has an inverse relationship with the balance of trade. 
Sezgin (2001) selected a Eurasian economy (Turkey) to examine the military expenditure – 
growth relationship for the period 1956-1984 by employing 2 SLS and 3 SLS methodologies. 
The result shows that military expenditure has a positive effect on economic growth whereas 
there exists no significant adverse effect on saving and investment for the period examined. 
  
Ramos et al. (2013) investigated military expenditure –growth nexus on Mexico for a period of 
1984-2000 by utilising the Demand and Supply model and adopting the 3 SLS estimation 
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technique. The result indicates that military expenditure stimulates Mexican economic growth. 
However, it crowds out savings and investment. 
Klein* (2004)explores military expenditure on Peru's economic growth by employing Deger-
type 3 equation. Their outcome indicates the existence of crowd out effect by military 
expenditure on savings and economic growth. 
  
Aizenman and Glick (2006) use Barro style growth model to explore the impact of military 
expenditure on economic growth, taking cognizance of the threat of 90 countries spanning 1989-
1999. The empirical result revealed that military expenditure and antagonistic threat have a 
negative effect on growth, whereas, military expenditure in the midst of threats stimulates 
growth. This innovative specification indicates that output is influenced by security or military 
expenditure depending on the presence of a hostile threat. 
  
Yakovlev (2007) use the Barro growth model for 28 countries over the period of 1965-2000 to 
examine the impact of military expenditure, arms trade on economic growth. Employing the 
random and fixed effects and GMM techniques, the cross-sectional results revealed that high 
military expenditure coupled with net arms exports separately retard growth whereas, net arms 
exporting countries coupled with high military expenditure do not retard economic growth. 
  
Chowdhury (1991) examined the military-growth nexus of 55 LDCs using the Granger causality 
approach covering the period 1961-1987. The empirical analyses indicate a causal relationship 
from military expenditure to growth for 15 countries, causal relationship from growth to military 
expenditure for seven countries, bi-directional relationship for three countries and no causality 
for 30 countries. This affirms that military expenditure growth causality is mixed and therefore, 
cannot be generalised for all countries. 
Kusi (1994) investigated the causality dynamics between military expenditure and growth for 77 
LDCs by utilising Granger causality for over the period 1971-1989. The result affirms that in 
seven countries military expenditure Granger cause growth, seven countries’ economic growth 
Granger cause military expenditure, one country has bi-directional causality and 62 countries 
show no causality exists.  
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Kollias* et al. (2004) examined military expenditure-growth nexus and found that there exists bi-
directional causality between military spending and economic growth in the case of Cyprus for 
the period 1964 to 1999. 
Karagianni and Pempetzoglu (2009) investigated the military expenditure on economic growth 
using the Granger causality technique. They discovered that there exists a linear and non-
causality between military expenditure and economic growth in Turkey for the period 1949 to 
2004. 
Farzanegan (2014) explored the military expenditure-growth nexus in the case of Iran. The 
scholar employed Granger causality techniques for the period 1959 to 2007. It was found that the 
Granger causality result depicts that there is a unidirectional link from military expenditure to 
growth. 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2014) analysed the military expenditure-growth connection using 
Sri-Lanka as a case study covering the period 1975 to 2013. They confirmed that military 
expenditure causes economic growth. However, there was no causal impact from growth to 
military expenditure despite Sri-Lankan civil wars. 
Furthermore, Gokmenoglu et al. (2015) investigated the military expenditure-growth link using 
Turkey as a case study by employing Johansen co-integration and Granger causality tests for the 
period 1988 to 2013. They affirmed that military expenditure and growth are linked while the 
Granger causality confirms that there is a unidirectional link between growth and military 
expenditure.  
Zhao et al. (2015) examined the military-growth nexus in China for the period 1952 to 2012. 
They used an impulse response function based on the vector error correction model and Granger 
causality technique. Their result revealed that there are two long-run relationships and that there 
exists a negative and unidirectional Granger on growth.  
Anwar (2017) using Pakistan as a case study for the period 1988 to 2011 investigated the 
military expenditure-growth nexus by employing Toda Yamamoto-Modified Standard Granger 
causality. The causality result depicts that there is a unidirectional causality from growth to 
military expenditure.  
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Kovačević and Smiljanić (2017) analysed a potential causality between military expenditure and 
Croatia’s gross domestic product (GDP), as well as between DEFEXP and the number of 
Croatian Armed Forces personnel (AFP). The research is based on the use of the Granger 
causality test followed by procedures proposed by Toda and Yammamoto (1995) and the 
impulse response function with data from 1995 to 2014. Their empirical results affirmed that 
there was neither a short-run nor a long-run link between growth and military expenditure. The 
results obtained show one-way causality from DEFEXP to AFP, with AFP responding to shock 
from DEFEXP after three years. 
Alazim (2017) analysed the military-growth debate by using Algeria as a case study, by 
employing a Granger-causality method for a time series data for growth and military expenditure 
for the period 1995 to 2014. The result denoted that there exists a unidirectional direction from 
government spending to military expenditure and per capita income. 
Kalyoncu and Yucel (2006) examined the military-growth link for Turkey and Greece for the 
period 1956 to 2003 by employing the Engle-Granger cointegration method and Granger 
causality technique. The study revealed that military expenditure and growth are co-integrated 
for both countries and there exists the presence of a unidirectional link running from growth to 
military expenditure for Turkey only. 
Pan et al. (2015) using ten Middle East countries reinvestigated the military-growth nexus using 
the panel causality technique. They found the presence of a unidirectional link from military 
expenditure to growth for Turkey: one-way link from growth to military expenditure for Kuwait, 
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon while no causality for Oman, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and a bi-
directional link for Israel.  In summary, there is no consensus on the causal military-growth 
nexus in these nations. 
Al-Hamdi and Alawin (2016) examined the military-growth connection in Israel and its four 
Arab neighbours spanning the period 1988 to 2010. They used the Granger-causality technique 
and concluded that military expenditure tends not to be active during the war / crisis period; 
however, it is impacted positively by the income levels.  
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Topcu and Aras (2017) investigated the military-growth connections using the Central and 
Eastern European countries by applying panel cointegration and causality techniques spanning 
the period 1993 to 2013. Their result indicates that military expenditure and growth are at 
variance in the long run and the causality direction is from growth to military expenditure.  
Aydemir et al. (2017) investigated the effects of military expenditure on economic growth. 
Based on military Keynesianism theory, the findings revealed that military spending has positive 
effects on the economic growth (reduction in unemployment) in some G20 states while it also 
has negative effects in some and has neutral effects in others. In addition, it is further indicated 
that the positive effects are experienced in relatively advanced countries, the negative effects 
emerge in relatively less developed countries, and the countries with abundant natural resources 
experience neutral effects. 
3.6.2. Empirical Studies Within BRICS Countries 
Stålenheim et al. (2008) stated that Brazil is now the 11
th
 world's biggest military spender. 
Hunter (1997) postulates that the democratic system of government assigns less budgetary 
allocation for military expenditure unlike the military or authoritarian system of government. 
Zaverucha and da Cunha Rezende (2009) further re-examine Hunter (1997) postulation and 
affirm whether it was true or not. However, Zaverucha and da Cunha Rezende (2009) finding 
revealed that the democratic system of government assigns more funds for the military as a result 
of high internal political instability from the opposition groups.  
According to Stålenheim et al. (2008) Brazil is now the 4
th
 world's biggest military spender. In 
2007, Russia's military expenditure rose by 13 percent higher than its economic growth rate of 
11 per cent annual average over the past 10 years. For instance, since 2003, Russia’s military 
outlay has risen by 41 per cent while in 1998 by 160 per cent despite a year of Russia’s financial 
crisis. 
According to Stålenheim et al. (2008), India occupies the 5
th
 position and represents about 80 per 
cent of South Asia total with an increase of three per cent in real terms in 2007. The average 
growth rate over 1998-2007 was 6 per cent. Ward et al. (1991) explored the military expenditure-
growth nexus in India employing three-sector model taking note of the externality and 
productivity effects. Their findings show that military expenditure has a significant positive 
impact on growth. 
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According to Stålenheim et al. (2008) and Furuoka et al. (2016), China's military expenditure has 
risen pari-passu with its economic growth, now making China the 2
nd
 world’s military spender. 
China's military rose by 12 per cent in 2007. Between 2003-2007, China recorded the highest 
rise of 59 per cent. China has raised its budgetary allocation for military over the past decade, in 
some years even more than its economic growth rate during 1998-2006. The major composition 
of the increased China military expenditure since 1997 has been (1) increased in military 
personnel emolument (2) transformation of Chinese to a high technology-driven one (3) mailings 
the military strength for potential war over Taiwan. 
Chang et al. (2001) employed cointegration analysis and a Vector Regressive Model (VAR) to 
explore the military expenditure-growth in China from 1952 to 1995. Their result indicates that 
Granger causality runs from economic growth to military expenditure for mainland China.  
Chang et al. (2014) re-examined the effect of military expenditure on growth in China for the 
period 1988 to 2010. Their result found that Granger causality runs from economic growth to 
military expenditure for China.  
  
Dimitraki et al. (2015) re-examined the military expenditure-growth link in China from 1952 to 
2010 based on Barro style growth model. Their finding shows that China’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) determines the rise in military expenditure and not vice versa. 
Zhao et al. (2015) examined the military–growth nexus in China for the period 1952 to 2012. 
They used an impulse response function based on the vector error correction model and Granger 
causality technique. Their result revealed that there are two long-run relationships and that there 
exists a negative and unidirectional Granger on growth.  
Also, Furuoka et al. (2016) explored the impact of military expenditure on the growth in China. 
They confirmed that the increase in military expenditure is mainly driven by Chinese economic 
development expansion for the period 1989 to 2011. 
However, Meng et al. (2015b) finding indicates that an increase in Chinese military expenditure 
has contributed to the expansion of income disparity in China from 1989 to 2012 using the 
Granger approach.   
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Dunne and Vougas (1999) investigated the impact of military expenditure-growth nexus in South 
Africa for the period 1964 to 1996 employing standard Granger causality test within the VAR 
framework. They found a significant adverse impact of military expenditure on growth for the 
period considered.  
  
Birdi and Dunne (2002) examined the military expenditure-growth relationship utilising Feder-
Ram. The result suggests that military expenditure adversely retards growth in the short run. 
  
Aye et al. (2014) explored the military expenditure- growth relationship using bootstrap rolling 
window estimation and revealed that military expenditure had a positive effect during the 
apartheid period but not later.  
  
Zhong et al. (2016) using BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and 
the USA as a case study re-examined the military-growth nexus spanning from 1988 to 2012. 
They employed the Granger causality technique. Their result revealed that military expenditure 
impacts positively on growth in the United States, growth influences military expenditure in 
Brazil and India, while a feedback hypothesis was valid between military expenditure and 
growth for Russia. In conclusion, there exists no causality presence for China and South Africa.  
  
Zhang et al. (2017a) examined whether military expenditure stimulates social welfare in BRICS 
and G7 countries employing panel cointegration and impulse response for two distinct periods 
1998-2011 and 1993- 2007. Their result revealed that military expenditure stimulates social 
welfare expenditure in G7 countries while military expenditure has an adverse impact on social 
welfare on BRICS countries.  
  
Ward and Davis (1992) examined the impact of military expenditure on growth in India by 
employing the three-sector Feder model for the period 1950-1987. Their result revealed no 
externality effect from military expenditure to the civilian sector and that military size affects 
economic growth positively whereas non-military public sector has an adverse effect. 
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Also, Batchelor et al. (2000) investigated the effects of military expenditure on the 
manufacturing sector and economic growth of South Africa by employing the two-sector Feder 
type model for 1964-1995. Their findings revealed that military expenditure has an adverse 
impact on manufacturing output and no significant impact on aggregate growth in South Africa. 
  
Dunne et al. (2000) explored the military expenditure impact on economic growth in South 
Africa for the period 1961-1997 by utilising the Deger type four-equation model. Their result 
concluded that military expenditure overall effect was negative.  
Zhong et al. (2016) using BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and 
the USA as a case study, re-examined the military-growth nexus spanning 1988 to 2012. They 
employed the Granger causality technique. Their result revealed that military expenditure 
impacts positively on growth in the United States, growth influences military expenditure in 
Brazil and India, while a feedback hypothesis was valid between military expenditure and 
growth for Russia. In conclusion, there is no causality presence for China and South Africa. 
Table 3.3: Tabular summary of key literature 
Author (s) Method / 
Techniques 
Countries  Variables 
(proxy(ies) IQ 
Results 
Benoit (1973) OLS technique 44 developing 
countries 
Growth, Military 
expenditure, 
investment and 
bilateral aid  
Strong positive 
causation  from 
military 
expenditure to 
growth  
(Frederiksen an
d Looney, 1983) 
OLS technique 44 developing 
countries BUT 
subdivide the 
countries into 
resource-
constrained        
(regarded as 
poor countries) 
and Resource 
abundance 
(regarded as 
rich countries) 
Growth, Military 
expenditure, 
investment and 
bilateral aid 
 Military 
expenditure 
stimulates growth 
in rich resource 
countries while 
military 
expenditure retards 
growth in resource-
constrained 
countries (poor 
countries).  
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Biwas and 
Ram, 1986 
OLS technique More than 44 
developing 
countries 
Growth, military 
expenditure, 
investment and 
bilateral aid 
Military 
expenditure not 
statistically 
significant on 
growth for low –
income countries. 
Aizenman and 
Glick (2006) 
OLS technique Over 90 
countries 
Growth rates, 
military expenditure, 
threat, investment, 
education and 
population  
High Military 
expenditure and 
high threats lead to 
growth while high 
military 
expenditure and 
low threats retard 
growth  
Deger, S. & 
Sen., S. 1990 
Deger Types 
Simultaneous 
Equation Model 
(DTSEM) 
Regression 
analysis and 
causality 
50 countries GDP growth rates, 
saving ratio, military 
expenditure, trade 
balance 
Military 
expenditure does 
have a positive spin 
over effect and 
significant. If 
feedback is 
considered military 
expenditure has a 
negative feedback 
on saving rate. 
Zhang, Liu, 
&Wang 
(2016)  
 
Panel integration 
and impulse 
response 
function 
 
  
(BRICS and 
G7) 
 
Military spending, 
education, health, 
income, social 
welfare index and 
social welfare 
expenditure 
 
Military spending 
enhances social 
welfare expenditure 
in developed 
countries but 
negative and short 
in BRICS. 
Menla Ali & 
Dimitraki  
(2014) 
 
Markov-
Switching model 
 
  
(China) 
 
Real GDP, 
population, 
non-defense, 
government 
investment  and 
human capital 
Military spending 
changes affect 
economic growth 
negatively during a 
slower-higher 
variance state. 
Meng et al 
(2013) 
 
Engle and 
Granger two-step 
co-integration 
 (China) 
 
Defence 
expenditure(DE), 
population, 
Military 
expenditure and 
income inequality 
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and Granger 
causality test 
 
GINI coefficient 
 
are co integrated. 
Causality from 
military 
expenditure 
changes to those of 
income inequality 
is found. 
Acemoglu H.S. 
(2013) 
 
Military 
spending model 
 
 (China)  
 
Military expenditure 
and Gross domestic 
product 
 
Positive 
relationship 
between defence 
spending  and 
economic growth 
Yiwen & 
Zhonghou 
(2014) 
 
Military 
Keynesian model 
 
 (China) 
 
Real GDP, Military 
spending and 
aggregate  non-
defence spending 
and interest rate 
A rise of defence 
spending should 
grow the Chinese 
economy. 
(Compton and P
aterson, 2016) 
Aizenman and 
Glick  
augmented Barro 
model 
Over 100 
countries 
Military 
expenditure, 
populations, 
investment, 
institutional quality 
and growth 
Military 
expenditure has a 
negative or zero 
impact on growth.  
Source: Author’s compilation 
3.7 Empirical literature on institutional quality and economic growth  
The objective of this section is to analyse empirical literature related to the institutional quality–
growth nexus.  
3.7.1. Studies outside BRICS countries 
A considerable amount of country and cross-country studies has been done on the relationship 
between economic growth and institutional quality. Among the prominent ones is that of 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) which emphasised the fundamental importance of institutional quality in 
causing growth and differences in the levels of development across countries. 
Also, while examining discussions on institutional quality and economic development, Chang 
(2011) suggested that more attentive institutional economists were needed to focus on the real-
world institutional research, rather than retelling fairy-tales. According to the author, it is 
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because of reality and not fiction, that policy-relevant theories of institutional quality could be 
developed.  
Valeriani and Peluso (2011) explore the effect of institutional quality on economic growth over 
sixty years among countries at different stages of development, using the pooled regression fixed 
effects model to test three institutional indicators which included civil liberties, number of veto 
players and quality of government. The result revealed that institutional quality impacted 
positively on economic growth. However, further finding from the study showed that the size of 
the institutional impact on growth varies between developed and developing countries 
considered. Thus, in conclusion, the study claimed that institutions mattered for growth. 
  
Also, Berggren et al. (2013) investigated the impact of institutions on economic growth in the 
EU-27, seven other similar European countries and Israel over the period 1984 to 2009. The 
result of the panel data analysis submitted that then the quality of policy, which included the 
stability of government, favourable socio-economic condition, strong investment environment 
and democratic accountability, was growth-enhancing.  
Bhupatiraju and Verspagen (2013) explained differences in the levels of development across 
countries using a multi-faceted database to measure institutional quality. Findings showed that 
institutional quality ranked above other factors when GDP per capita regressed. However, when 
factors such as investment and growth were included as an independent variable, institutional 
factors were negatively associated with development variables. 
  
3.7.2. Studies Within BRICS Countries 
Goel and Korhonen 2011) examined the role of institutional quality as a determinant of 
economic growth in BRIC (excluding South Africa) for the period 2000-2007 based on a simple 
two-factor production function. Their result revealed that efficiency aspects of corruption (as a 
proxy for institutional quality) subdue the adverse impact, thereby stimulating growth rates. 
  
Mbulawa and Finance (2015) explored the impact of institutional quality on the Southern Africa 
Development Community SADC by employing the Generalised Method of Moment GMM 
spanning from 1996 to 2010. Government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rules and law and 
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corruption were institutional variables used in the study. Their results indicate that institutional 
quality is a key determinant for economic growth to take place in the region. 
  
Asongu (2016) investigated whether institutional quality matters in economic growth 
determinant in BRICS and MINTS for the period 2001 to 2011 by selecting 10 institutional 
quality proxies using panel regression and principal component analysis. The outcome indicates 
that institutional qualities have positive but varying levels of significance for each of the BRICS 
countries.  
  
Sabbagh (2017) also re-examined the impact of institutional quality as a catalyst for the real 
economic growth rate for BRICS countries by employing dynamic panel data. Proxies for 
institutional quality were democracy index, law enforcement index and economic freedom for 
the period of 2000-2012. Their result shows that all three institutional quality proxies have a 
strong impact on BRICS countries' economic growth. 
3.7.2. Tabular summary of literature 
Table 3.3 below presents a summary of the literature on institutional quality and economics.  
Table 3.4: Summary of institutional quality (IQ) and economic growth 
Author (s) Method / 
Techniques 
Countries  
& Year 
Variables 
(proxy(ies) IQ 
Results 
Hadhek Z. 
(2012) 
Dynamic panel 
data 
11 countries in the 
MENA region 
(2000-2009) 
Governance 
Indicators  
Corruption and 
political stability 
negative with GDP 
Jumal B. & 
Djekonde 
N.(2012) 
Generalised 
Method of 
Moment 
(GMM) 
All 27 African 
countries south of the 
Sahara 
(2002-2009) 
Governance 
indicator index 
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
appears insignificant 
Jose A. 
&Gracimartin 
C.(2013) 
Panel data 
analysis 
East Asian countries 
(1998-2006) 
Governance 
indicator index 
Positive on GDP per 
capita 
Cristina J & 
Levievge 
G.(2013) 
Panel Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(PSTR) 
94 developing 
countries 
(1984-2009) 
Governance 
indicator index 
Positive on FDI 
growth 
Chaib & 
Siham (2013) 
Panel data 
analysis 
3 selected Maghreb 
countries 
Governance 
indicator index 
Only Regulatory 
quality and 
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and economic 
freedom index 
government 
effectiveness have a 
positive effect on 
annual GDP growth.  
Godwin & 
Akpan (2012) 
Pooled OLS 
Regression 
21 sub-Saharan 
African 
(1998-2007) 
 
Rule of law, 
regulatory 
quality, absence 
of political 
violence and 
instability 
Positive  
 
 
 
Bichaka 
N.(2010) 
Quantile 
regression 
analysis 
28 sub-Saharan Africa  
(1990-1984) 
IQ Positive  
Richard & 
Marcus 
(2009) 
Panel least 
square method 
OECD 
(2004-2007) 
Economic 
freedom and 
governance-
including 
business freedom, 
monetary 
freedom, 
trade freedom, 
property right, 
political 
instability and 
control of 
corruption 
Positive between IQ 
and economic growth 
Vidmantas 
Jankauskas 
(2009) 
Panel data 
analysis 
41 good institutional 
environment  
(1996-2006) 
 
Worldwide 
indicators and 
Heritage index of 
economic 
freedom 
Positive 
Kim long C. 
(2005) 
White 
heteroscedastici
ty-consistent 
matrix 
50 countries 
(1981-2000) 
Heritage 
foundation index 
of economic 
freedom 
Positive with 
economic growth 
Polteroich, 
Popov& 
Ladimir  
(2007) 
Panel Least 
Square model 
180 countries  Rule of freedom  
and government  
IQ positive on 
economic growth 
Marijana B. 
(2005) 
GLS ( weighted 
Least square 
method) 
14 EU and 11transition 
countries 
(1995-2002) 
Rule of law IQ is positive impact 
more on transition 
countries than 
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developed countries. 
Niyongabo 
G.(2004) 
2 SLS 102 countries 
(1984-2000) 
 
Voice and 
account, 
regulatory  and 
government 
effectiveness 
IQ is positive 
economic growth. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
3.8. Empirical studies on military expenditure, institutional quality and growth 
The objective of this section is to analyse empirical literature related to military expenditure, 
institutional quality and growth. 
3.8.1 Empirical Studies Outside BRICS Countries 
d’Agostino et al. (2012) further examined military expenditure-growth in the presence of 
corruption using an African sample from 2003 to 2007. They found that corruption does 
influence the impact of military expenditure on growth. In a related paper, (d’Agostino et al. 
(2017)  re-examined the military expenditure-–growth using the 1996-2007 period by employing 
a system GMM estimation. The paper confirms that military expenditure and corruption retard 
economic growth. 
Recently, Compton and Paterson (2016) considered how institutional quality can impact military 
expenditure-growth nexus. The research was based on 100 countries of annual data from 1988 to 
2010 by employing Panel Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and system-generalised methods of 
moments (GMM). The researchers found out that military expenditure on growth is negative or 
zero at best and this impact is lessened in the presence of good economic and political 
institutions. 
Table 3.5: Tabular summary of the literature 
Author (s) Method / 
Techniques 
Countries  
& Year 
Variables 
(proxy(ies) IQ 
Results 
d’Agostino et 
al., 2012 
Dynamic panel 
data approach 
(System GMM 
estimation) 
53 African Countries 
(2003-2007) 
Military 
expenditure, 
corruption, 
GDP growth rates 
and investment  
High levels of 
military expenditure 
and corruption have a 
negative impact on 
growth.  
(Compton and P
aterson, 2016) 
Aizenman and 
Glick  
augmented 
Barro model 
Over 100 countries 
 
(1988-2010) 
Military 
expenditure, 
populations, 
investment, 
Military expenditure 
has a negative or zero 
impact on growth  
 
100 
 
Institutional 
quality and 
growth 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
3.9. Gaps in the Literature 
To the best knowledge of the researcher, the gaps that exist are as follows:  
1. There are limited studies that have examined the causes of rising military expenditure but 
not in the context of BRICS countries as well as what nature of BRICS military 
expenditure that is, the pull and push factors responsible; 
2. There exist no inclusive growth index for BRICS countries from 1970 to 2017; 
3. No studies were found exploring the combined impact of  military expenditure and 
institutional quality on BRICS countries inclusive growth from 1984 to 2017 except for 
Compton and Paterson (2016) which focused on 88 countries from 1988 to 2016 without 
taking cognizance of each country’s prevailing growth inclusiveness level as well as not 
taking the political administration in place of the countries examined; and 
4. Previous empirical studies were discovered using inappropriate econometric modeling 
technique as well as using an inappropriate proxy (Bates and Unions) for inclusive 
growth. 
In conclusion, these gaps will make the current thesis worthwhile as well as it would help put in 
perspective the extent to which military expenditure and institutional quality can influence 
inclusive growth using BRICS countries as a case study.   
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 4.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology of the study. The study data source was discussed. 
Variables used in the analysis were presented together with their respective definitions. The 
study expected priori of the each variables are stated. The Chapter concludes with definition of 
key variables in the study and chapter summary. 
The chapter starts off with a discussion of the research design in section 4.2 which is split into 3 
sub-sections in line with the three objectives of the study. Section 4.2.1 present the objective one 
–investigating factors that drive BRICS countries military expenditure, Section 4.2.2 present the 
objective two – measurement of the inclusive growth Index in BRICS countries, Section 4.2.3-
the impacts of military expenditure and institutional quality in achieving inclusive growth and 
the chapter concludes with the summary of the Chapter. 
1.2. Research Design 
This study adopts a quantitative design approach using both time-series and panel data to 
analysis the relationship between military expenditure, institutions and inclusive growth in 
BRICS countries. It used secondary data sourced from International Country Risk Guide (1984-
2017), World Development Indicators Online database 2018, World Bank and Polity IV for the 
period 1970 to 2017.The study EVIEWS and STATA software to estimate the econometric 
models. The next sections discuss the theoretical frameworks, analytical models and data, used to 
answer the three research questions of this study. 
1.3 Research method for objective one  
This section contains the theoretical framework, model specification, definition of variables, data 
sources and the method of analysis for the objective one of the study. 
102 
 
4.3.1. Theoretical framework for objective one  
The first objective of the study was to estimate the determinants of military expenditure of 
military expenditure in BRICS. . 
Recent studies on the determinant of military expenditure have adopted the standard neoclassical 
framework as a theoretical basis Tambudzai (2011). Although other studies have employed 
diverse and less formal approaches Dommen and Maizels(1988), they are all based on historical 
and institutional data in their analysis. Adopting this approach has been affirmed the best 
approach as it allows for easy model specification, developing a testable hypothesis Dunne and 
Mohammed (1995). 
 Military expenditure is classified as a public good, though its determinant is driven by diverse 
factors such as economic, political, threats and social variables. One of the key variables includes 
the threats levels (that is either within (internal threat) or outside (external). The unique feature 
that differentiates public good expenditure from military expenditure is the security function that 
enters the national welfare function. It encompasses how political and economic factors are 
influencing military expenditure components.  
The neoclassical model assumes the optimisation of welfare. The military neoclassical model can 
be written as: 
𝑊1 = 𝑊(𝑆, 𝐶, 𝑁, 𝑍𝑤)…………….4.0 
Where  
W-Welfare of the country;  
S- Security of lives and property from attacks;  
C-Consumption and  
𝑍𝑤 - Other factors. 
The welfare function is optimised subject to the budget constraint and a security function. The 
budget function is given by,  
 𝑌 = 𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝑃𝑚𝑀 …………….4.1 
Where  
Y is nominal aggregate income  
Pm is Prices of real military spending M  
Pc is the price of Consumption  
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According to Smith (1980), Smith (1995) assert that  a nation security (S) is determined by a 
country’s military expenditure, that of immediate neighbouring countries or those that fall within 
a nation security web (this can be allies and rivals) denoted as   and other strategic 
variables T, which affect the security situation.  
  
)...…………….4.2 
  
For allies military expenditure raises the country's security whereas rivals military expenditure 
poses a threat. The maximisation problem is then solved to find a derived demand for the level of 
military spending.  
 
𝑀1 = 𝑀 (
𝑃𝑚
𝑃𝑐
⁄ , 𝑌, 𝑁, 𝑀1, … . , 𝑀𝑛 , 𝑍, 𝑇)...…………….4.3 
  
Where 
M- Level of military spending  
Pm –Price of real military expenditure  
Pc-Price of Consumption 
Y- Real GDP 
T-Other variables (e.g. the politics of the ruling party and strategic  
𝑀1 = 𝑀 (
𝑃𝑚
𝑃𝑐
⁄ , 𝑌, 𝑁, 𝑀1, … . , 𝑀𝑛, 𝑍, 𝑇)…………….4.4 
For estimation purposes, equation 4.3 is often written as shares of output or income Y instead of 
levels. The demand equation had to be modified to suit the country’s characteristics and data 
availability.  Dunne and Mohammed (1995) and Dunne and Perlo Freeman (2003a) argue that 
when studying developing countries it is important to take the nature of the country into account. 
The dependent variable military expenditure will be measured by the military expenditure 
(percentage of GDP). The income constraint(Y) will be measured by GDP growth rates. As GDP 
rises, a country has more resources for production and greater means and need for protection. To 
capture the economic integration on military expenditure, the author use the trade balance. 
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BRICS countries Trade Balance (TB) is defined as the difference between exports and imports 
(X-M). This sign of openness of the economy and the growth of foreign currency. Its impact of 
military expenditure is ambiguous, but for BRICS the author expects a positive sign for India 
since it imports the greater part of  its weaponry while vice versa for Russia, China, Brazil and 
South Africa.  
The security web (SW) is measured by the average military expenditure of countries able to 
affect the security of BRICS countries. Other variables included are internal threats such as civil 
conflict (war or political unrest) and External threats such as external war, international war, 
World War II. A positive sign is expected. 
4.3.2 Model specification for objective one  
Taking into account the most important country conditions (geo-strategic and economic) such as 
Internal and External threats, GDP, and Population  the model used to investigate the factors that 
drive BRICS countries military expenditure is defined by equation 4.5 below. 
)……………..4.5 
Where  
Me is military expenditure as percentage of GDP 
Y is Gross Domestic Product 
Pop is Population 
SW is the security web which is the military expenditure by other countries 
TB is the Trade balance  
I.T. is Internal Threats 
E.T. is External Threats 
D.I. is Democratic Index 
Exch. is the Exchange Rate 
Inf. is the Inflation rate 
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4.3.3 Definition of variables for objective one  
All the variables stated in Equation 4.5 are defined and described in Table 4.1 below. The 
sources of data are also stated. 
Table 4.1: Definition of variables for objective one 
   S/N Proxy  Definition of variables  
Military  
factors 
 
a. External threats 
 
The external conflict measure is an assessment both 
of the risk to the incumbent government from 
foreign action, ranging from non-violent external 
pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, 
trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, 
etc.) to violent external pressure (cross-border 
conflicts to all-out war). 
External conflicts can adversely affect foreign 
business in many ways, ranging from restrictions 
on operations to trade and investment sanctions, to 
distortions in the allocation of economic resources, 
to violent change in the structure of society. 
The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A 
score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a 
score of 0 points to Very High Risk. 
The subcomponents* are: 
 War 
 Cross-Border Conflict 
 Foreign Pressures 
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b. Internal threats This is an assessment of political violence in the 
country and its actual or potential impact on 
governance. The highest rating is given to those 
countries where there is no armed or civil 
opposition to the government and the government 
does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or 
indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating 
is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil 
war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A 
score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a 
score of 0 points to Very High Risk. 
The subcomponents* are: 
 Civil War/Coup Threat 
 Terrorism/Political Violence 
 Civil Disorder 
c. Security web  The Security web is measured by the averages of 
military expenditure (% of Gross Domestic 
Product) of countries able to affect the security of 
BRICS countries. A rise in Security web for 
country X could be positive or negative depending 
if these countries are friendly or hostile to country 
X. For instance, South Africa security web will 
includes countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, 
Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Malawi. 
Economic 
Factors 
a. Gross 
Domestic 
Product  
Gross Domestic Product is the total economic 
activities within a country.  
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b. Trade 
Balance 
 
Trade balance is defined as the difference between 
exports and imports(X-M) percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) that is, (X-M); it could be 
positive or negative. This is a sign of openness of 
the economy and the growth of foreign currency. 
Its impacts on military expenditure is ambiguous, 
but for BRICS countries we expect a positive sign 
since it exports the greater part of arms production. 
c. Exchange rate 
 
Exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange 
rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a 
weighted average of several foreign currencies) 
divided by a price deflator. 
d. Inflation 
 
Inflation is the general increase in price levels of 
goods and services. The estimated annual inflation 
rate (the unweighted average of the Consumer Price 
Index) is calculated as a percentage change. 
Political 
Factors 
a. Democratic Index Democratic index is the measurement of state of 
democracy in 167 sovereign states and 64 are UN 
member states 
Other 
 
a. Population 
growth rate 
Annual population growth for year t is the 
exponential rate of growth of midyear population 
from year t-1 expressed as a percentage. Population 
is based on the defacto definition of population , 
which counts all residence regardless of legal status 
or citizenship 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Determinants for Military expenditure  
Military factors 
External wars (+/−) 
Internal wars (+/-) 
Security web (+/-) 
Economic Factors 
Gross Domestic 
Product GDP (+) 
Exchange rate (+/-) 
Inflation (+/-) 
trade (+/-) 
Political factors 
Democratic index 
(+/−) 
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4.3.4. Apriori expectation for objective one  
Table 4.2 present the expected direction of result from the variables to be employed in the 
analysis of determinants of BRICS military expenditure for the period covered for this study.   
Table 4.2: Apriori expectation for objective one 
S/N Variable Expected Signs 
 a. External threats + / - 
b. Internal threats + / - 
c. Security web (denoted the percentage of 
military expenditure to GDP by 
neighbouring countries for each BRICS 
countries) 
+ / - 
2 Economic factors  
a.  Gross Domestic Product  + / - 
 b.  Inflation + / - 
 c. Trade Balance + / - 
 d.  Exchange rate + / - 
3 Political factor   
a. Democratic index  +/ - 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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4.3.5. Sources of data for objective one  
All the variables stated in Equation 4.5 are defined and described in Table 4.3 below. The 
sources of data are also stated. 
Table 4.3:  sources of data for objective one 
   S/N Proxy Data 
measurement 
Sources 
Military expenditure by 
other countries 
Threats 
a. External threats 
b. Internal threats 
Annually International Country 
Risk Guide 1984-
2017 
c. Security web  Annually World Bank Indicator 
online database 
Economic a. Gross 
Domestic 
Product  
(GDP) 
 
 
 
Annually 
 
World Bank Indicator 
online database 
b. Trade 
Balance 
c. Exchange rate 
d. Inflation 
Political 
 
a. Democratic Index  
Annually 
 
Polity IV 
Source: Author’s compilation 
4.3.6. Estimating techniques for objective one  
Equation 4.5 was estimated in a Panel data regression analysis.Gujarati (2009)lists the following 
arguments as advantages of panel data analysis: 
1. Panel Data give “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity and greater 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency”. 
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2. Panel data are more appropriate for investigating the dynamics of change. 
3. Panel data can better detect and measure effects that cannot be observed in pure time 
series or pure cross-section data. 
4. Panel data allow us to study behavioural models that are more complicated. 
5. Panel data minimize bias. 
Yaffee (2003) discusses a number of panel data analytical models, particularly constant-
coefficient, fixed effects and random effect models. In the midst of these types of models are 
dynamic panel, robust and covariance structure models. 
1. The panel least squares regression estimation 
Also known as the constant coefficient model, pooled regression models use constant coefficient 
(both intercepts and slopes) and is relevant when there is neither significant country nor 
significant temporal effects. We pool all the data and run an OLS regression model. 
…………………………4.6 
For N cross-section units- i= 1, 2, 
 Periods T=1, 2, T  
K is the number of the explanatory variables- k = 2, 
 are the slope coefficients and are assumed to be constant over countries and time. 
is the random error term for the  country and   year.  
Y is a dependent variable and X an independent variable; 
is an observation on the  explanatory variable for the  country and the   
time period.  
This model has the drawback that it assumes that all parameters are the same for each country, 
thus ignoring country-specific factors.  
In addition, the cross-section variation will drown the time-series effects. 
2. Fixed effect models 
Fixed effect model allows the intercept to change across groups (countries in our class) but the 
model will have constant coefficients (slopes). There will be no importance sequential impact, 
but important countries' differences. The intercepts are cross-section specific and differ from 
Country to country, but they may not differ over time. 
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…………………………………………4.7 
Where,  represents the country-specific effects. The intercepts are assumed different for 
individual countries but constant over time. This type of fixed effects model is called the Least 
Squares Dummy Variable model. 
There are four other types of fixed effects models. One type of fixed effects model could have 
constant slopes, but intercepts that vary according to time. A third type could have a coefficient 
that is constant, but the intercept varies over the country and time. A fourth kind has differential 
intercepts and slopes varying according to the country. The last type is a fixed-effect model in 
which both the intercepts and the slopes might over time cross the countries. 
3. The random effect models 
It is a regression model with a random constant term. The constant in this model is not fixed, but 
is an independent random variable. The model can be presented as follows, 
…………………………………… 4.8 
Where   is an independent random variable with mean,   and ………4.9 
While  
Equation (3) becomes  
………………………………..4.10 
In order to permit analysis to be carried out at aggregate military expenditure, the above 
regression model was estimated as a panel data model- random effects and fixed-effect models. 
(Gujarati, 2009) provides an extensive list of advantages of panel data: 
1. The problem of heterogeneity in panel data units is solved by estimation techniques that 
allow for individual-specific variables. 
2. Data gives “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity and greater degrees 
of freedom and more efficiency”. 
3. Panel data are more appropriate for investigating the dynamics of change. 
4. Panel data can better detect and measure effects that cannot be observed in pure time 
series or pure cross-section data. 
5. Panel data allow us to study behavioral models that are more complicated. 
6. Panel data minimizes bias caused by aggregation of micro-units’ data. 
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4. General diagnostic tests 
To ensure that the estimation model was appropriate so as to ensure consistency of the 
coefficient estimate diagnostic test were undertaken. 
a) Jarque Bera test: The test is a goodness of fit measure of departure from normality 
based on the sample kurtosis and skew. In other words, Jarque Bera test determines 
whether the data, skew and kurtosis are matching a normal distribution. The study 
employed Jarque-Berra static for normality tests to test for serial autocorrelation. 
b) Breuch-Godfrey langrage multiplier test:  is used to assess the validity of some of the 
modeling assumptions inherent in applying regression-like models to observed data. To 
use to test for the presence of serial correlation. If found, to be the presence of serial 
correlation would mean that a spurious conclusion would be drawn from other tests. 
c) Cross-Sectional Dependence Test: is used to assess if the n individuals in a sample are 
no longer independently drawn observations but affect each other’s outcome. For 
example, this is can result from the fact that we look at a set of neighbouring countries, 
which are usually highly interconnected.  
d) Langrage multiplier (LM) test: To ascertain the assumptions on the residual of the 
ordinary least squares, a langrage multiplier test for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) was performed. 
  
4.4 Research method for objective two  
The objective two of the study is focused on computing inclusive growth index for the BRICS 
therefore, this section of the study highlights the methods and step by step approach to 
developing this index for the BRICS 
4.4.1 Theoretical framework of objective two  
The theoretical framework for calculation of a measurement of inclusive growth is embedded in 
diverse models and methodologies for estimation of composite index of development indicators.  
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The Inclusive Growth Index (IGI) is a summary measure of social and economic indicators that 
measures the average achievements of social economic indicators. The evaluation focuses upon 
five principal economic indicators and five principal of social indicators.  
These approaches among others are the Factor Analysis (FA), Grade Point Average (GPA) and 
the Z-sum score technique, which are among the famous approach to measuring each indicator’s 
performance. 
  
The Z-sum score is a standardised score, which has a different mean and different variance for 
each indicator. According to Kothari, (2004) and Ullah and Kiani (2017) the normalised Z value 
is calculated as follows: 
  
…………………………4.11  
Z - Standard variate or number of standard deviations from X to the mean of the Distribution 
X - Value that will be wants to normalize 
- mean of the distribution. 
- Standard deviation (S.D) of the distribution 
  
The mark of standardize values must be changed for indicators  that are inversely related to 
development , so that negative  values  become positive  and positive  values  becomes negative 
.This  is accomplished by multiplying the Standardized value  by negative one (-1). For example, 
countries with a low inflation are better than those with a high inflation rate, because inflation 
indicators are inversely related to development .If cash income and the rate of inflation increase 
at the same rate income will remain constant and will not indicate an improvement in standard of 
living of the individual. Whereas if the cash income increases at a rate lower than the rate of 
inflation, real per income decline alongside the standard of living. Hereinafter, for this study the 
following indicators are considered to relate inversely with Inclusive growth. For example, 
1. The Number of Homicides  
2. GINI index  
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After finding the Z-sum score, we will evaluate the average of the area under the curves already 
normalised. These values are considered as inclusive growth index by the following: 
  
IGI= average of Z score is divided by number of observation 
  
 
  
0<IGI<1 
  
The values of the IGI index vary between 0 and 1. The Decision rule is that, if Values close to 0 
indicates a very low level of inclusive economic growth. On the other hand, values close to 1 
indicates a very high level of inclusive economic growth. Each indicator has assigned equivalent 
weight age in the index. 
4.4.2 Step and step description of the procedure of the index computation  
The Inclusive growth index was calculated using the following steps 
Step 1 - Determine (goalposts) values  
Step 2 - Calculate the standardised values (X, mean, standard dev.) for each indicator in BRICS.  
Step 3 - Find the area under the standard normal curve (using Z table) 
The standard normal distribution is a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard deviation 
1. Fifty per cent of the total area under the curve is to the left of 0 and 50% of the total area under 
the curve is to the right of 0. The total area under a standard normal curve is exactly 1.0. 
Step 4 - Calculate the average of the values area under the standard curve for the indicators in 
each index. 
Step 5 - Aggregate the sub-indices to produce the Inclusive growth index. 
  
Decision rule: Values close to 0 indicates that BRICS countries have a very low level of 
inclusive growth. On the other hand, values close to 1 indicate that the BRICS countries have a 
very high level of inclusive growth. 
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4.4.3 Definition of variables for objective two  
A single economic, social or environment development indicator was not affirmed as sufficient 
to explain the term “Inclusive growth” WIDER (2013). Thus, necessitating the need to develop a 
composite index. Table 4.4 presents the socio-economic variables used to construct the Inclusive 
Growth Index for the period 1970 to 2017. Variables under the computation of the inclusive 
growth are mainly those social and economic indicators that are prominent in the BRICS. They 
are presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Definition of IGI index variables for objective two 
S/N  Inclusive Growth Index  Variables Definition  
1 GDP per capita, PPP, (Constant 2010 
international $) 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same purchasing 
power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the 
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United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
constant 2011 international dollars. 
2 Employment to population, 15+, total 
(%) 
Employment to population ratio is the 
proportion of a country's population that is 
employed. Employment is defined as persons 
of working age who, during a short reference 
period, were engaged in any activity to 
produce goods or provide services for pay or 
profit, whether at work during the reference 
period (i.e. who worked in a job for at least 
one hour) or not at work due to temporary 
absence from a job, or to working-time 
arrangements. Ages 15 and older are generally 
considered the working-age population. 
3 GINI Index (captures Inequality) Gini index measures the extent to which the 
distribution of income (or, in some cases, 
consumption expenditure) among individuals 
or households within an economy deviates 
from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz 
curve plots the cumulative percentages of total 
income received against the cumulative 
number of recipients, starting with the poorest 
individual or household. The Gini index 
measures the area between the Lorenz curve 
and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum 
area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 
represents perfect equality, while an index of 
100 implies perfect inequality. 
4 Poverty  Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is the 
mean shortfall in income or consumption from 
the poverty line $1.90 a day (counting the 
nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed 
as a percentage of the poverty line. This 
measure reflects the depth of poverty as well 
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as its incidence. As a result of revisions in 
PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for 
individual countries cannot be compared with 
poverty rates reported in earlier editions. 
 
5 Total reserves (includes gold, current 
US$) 
Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary 
gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF 
members held by the IMF, and holdings of 
foreign exchange under the control of 
monetary authorities. The gold component of 
these reserves is valued at year-end 
(December 31) London prices. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
6 Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years) Life expectancy at birth indicates the number 
of years a new-born infant would live if 
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of 
its birth were to stay the same throughout its 
life. 
7 Education expenditure (% of GDP) General government expenditure on education 
(current, capital, and transfers) is expressed as 
a percentage of GDP. It includes expenditure 
funded by transfers from international sources 
to government. General government usually 
refers to local, regional and central 
governments. 
8 Mean years of schooling Average number of completed years of 
education of a country’s population aged 25 
years and older, excluding years spent 
repeating individual grades in formal 
education. 
9 Number of homicides Intentional homicides are estimates of 
unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a 
result of domestic disputes, interpersonal 
violence, and violent conflicts over land 
resources, intergang violence over turf or 
control, and predatory violence and killing by 
armed groups. Intentional homicide does not 
include all intentional killing; the difference is 
usually in the organization of the killing. 
Individuals or small groups usually commit 
homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is 
usually committed by fairly cohesive groups 
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of up to several hundred members and is thus 
usually excluded. 
10 Investment (proxy by Gross fixed 
formation) 
Gross fixed capital formation is essentially net 
investment. It is a component of the 
expenditure method of calculating GDP. To 
be precise formation measure the net increase 
in fixed capital.  Gross fixed capital formation 
includes spending on land improvements 
(fences, ditches, drains and so on); plants, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; the 
construction of roads, railways, private 
residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings. Disposal of fixed assets is 
taken away from the total.  
Source: Author’s compilation 
  
4.4.4 Sources of data for objective two 
Table 4.5 presents the sources of data socio-economic variables used to construct the Inclusive 
Growth Index for the period 1970 to 2017. Variables under the computation of the inclusive 
growth are mainly those social and economic indicators that are prominent in the BRICS. They 
are presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Sources of data for objective two 
S/N  Inclusive Growth Index  Variables Data measurement Sources 
1 GDP per capita, PPP, (Constant 2010 
international $) 
Annual World Bank 
2 Employment to population, 15+, total (%) Annual World Bank 
3 GINI Index (captures Inequality) Annual World Bank 
4 Poverty  Annual World Bank 
5 Health expenditure(% of GDP) Annual World Bank 
6 Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years) Annual World Bank 
7 Education expenditure (% of GDP) Annual World Bank 
8 Mean years of schooling Annual UNDP 
9 Number of homicides Annual UNODC 
10 Investment Annual World Bank 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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4.5 Research  method  for objective three  
The third objective of the study analyses the impacts of military expenditure, institutional quality 
on inclusive growth in the BRICS. This section contains the theoretical framework, model 
specification, definition of variables, data sources and the estimating techniques for the 
objective. 
4.5.1 Theoretical Framework for objective three 
Aizenman and Glick (2006) developed a theoretical framework to analyse the interaction 
military expenditure, growth and institution quality (corruption) by improving on Barro and 
Sala-i-martin (1992) work. The assumptions of the relationship are that:  
(1) There is zero population growth.  
(2) Output per worker is affected positively by infrastructure supplied by the public sector, 
and negatively by the magnitude of the external threats.  
The reduced form of output is then given as: 
………………………………………………….4.13 
Where  
Y is output (Inclusive growth Index) 
A denotes an exogenous productivity factor 
k-is the capital/labour ratio 
g - is the ratio of government (non-military) expenditure on infrastructure relative to 
labour 
1-f- measures the output cost of the threat external unfriendly neighbours. Thus it 
assumes that this cost depends negatively on domestic military expenditure and positively 
on an index of the magnitude of the threat; this can be presented in the following 
functional form 
………4.14 
Where - military expenditure (locally) and  is the external threats level. N.B. this 
specification indicates that z is measured in units comparable to military expenditure (locally) so 
that  and z may be aggregated. 
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The model abstracts from a number of possible considerations. First. It is assumed that the 
economy is always in a long-run full employment steady state. Hence, there is no need to address 
transitional dynamics, according to which, fiscal spending on military expenditure may reduce 
excess capacity and unemployment during the transition to the steady state. Second, since the 
model consists of a single sector, it was abstracted from possible technological spillovers from 
military goods output to the production of goods in a distinct civilian sector.   
Corruption (a proxy for Institutional quality) may be incorporated into the model as an activity 
that taxes fiscal expenditure on military and non-military government expenditure at a rate of
. Therefore, output with corruption is as follows: 
………..4.15 
The ratio of military to non-military infrastructure expenditure by , 
…………………4.16 
Therefore, the total fiscal outlay on both military and non-military expenditure is
. The rest of the model specification is identical to that of (Barro, 1990). It is assumed 
that capital does not depreciate. The fiscal outlay is financed by a proportional tax : 
………………………………4.17 
The representative agent’s preference is as follows: 
…………4.18 
In line with (Barro, 1990), it presents the output growth as follows: 
…………4.19 
The optimal pattern of taxes and expenditure represented by  that determines the military 
sector size and maximises the growth rate is presented by  
……………4.20 
……….4.21 
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Equation a equates the tax  , and thereby also the 
government’s expenditure share to the output elasticity with respect to the marginal product of 
non-expenditure,  magnified at the rate  ( the ratio of military to non-military government 
expenditure). In a situation of no military expenditure, equation (a) reduces to  = , lead to 
standard production efficiency situation. 
Equation b denote that military expenditure ratio ϕ has a positive link with the external threat 
(normalised by the domestic stock of capital), positively on the corruption level and negatively 
on the productivity level. 
……………………………….4.22 
Correspondingly, from equation (a) it follows that 
………..4.23 
The figure presents the military expenditure-threat level nexus implied by (8b) and (9). In the 
absence of threats, z=0, also =0, the optimal amount of military expenditure is zero. For 
positive threat levels, z>o, however, >0, that is the optimal level of military expenditure is 
positive. As the threat level increases, the optimal amount of military expenditure rises 
monotonically. 
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Figure 4.1:  Optimal military expenditure and external threat level 
Note  is the optimal ratio of military and to non-military expenditure; Z / K connotes the 
external threat level (normalised by the capital stock). The plots are calibrated by assuming 
A=1, 
Figure 4.2 depicts the impact of parametrically increasing the corruption rate, . The solid line 
denotes the benchmark relation between  and z (for =0.1); the dashed line represents the 
impact of rising the corruption rate for ( =0.2). Obviously, rising corruption connotes a higher 
optimal of military expenditure for any given threat level. 
An important feature of equilibrium  government expenditure is described as the optimal share of 
military expenditure equal directly to the output cost of external threat,1-f 
………………………………..4.24 
In the situation of no threats, the optimal level of military expenditure is zero, the output cost of 
threats is zero (f=1), and output is a standard CRS function of k and g. Similarly, the optimum 
tax rate  equals the output proportion of government services ( ), and is independent of 
scale impact as indicated in 8a and 10. The presence of threats and hostile actions, however, 
shows positive military expenditure and output costs (f <1) and adds a non-linear multiplicative 
term (f) to output.  
 This, in turn, adds a scale consideration to the design of optimal t x and expenditure rates, 
summarised as follows: 
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……………4.25 
Where . The optimal ratio of military to non-military government 
expenditure( ) times the output share of non-military expenditure  equals the output cost of 
external threats (1-f), which invariably equal the magnitude of the external threats(z) relative the 
aggregate effective expenditure by the domestic country and its unfriendly neighbours 
 , where  “effective denotes net of corruption tax. Consequently, an 
exogenous rise in the external threat level, z, rises the optimal expenditure and tax rates, 
and .  
Therefore, unfriendly external threats affect growth negatively due to two factors: the direct 
negative on growth linked to the reduction of marginal product of capital, linked to the negative 
effect with a higher tax rate as a result of lower productivity. Therefore, a rise in corruption  
and reduce domestic productivity (A) rise military expenditure and therefore retard growth. This 
is presented in the following reduced form for optimal output growth: 
…………….4.26 
To determine that 
……………4.27 
Therefore confirming the nonlinear theoretical relationship between growth and military 
expenditure.  
Figure 2 presented the optimal growth levels and military expenditure while holding constant the 
levels of external threats and corruption. Higher military expenditure retards growth, all being 
equal. A rise in threat level moves the entire locus upwards. 
In conclusion, the theoretical models imply that the relationship between military expenditure 
and growth depends on corruption and rent-seeking behaviour thus; acting as fiscal tax 
expenditures, corruption increases the desired level of military expenditure. They opined that 
military expenditure asserts a negative or insignificant effect on growth because of its non-
linearity and omitted variable biases. 
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4.5.2 Model specification for objective three  
The current study centres on works by Aizenman and Glick (2006), Compton and Paterson, 
(2016) as the foundational theoretical framework pillars that suit the nomenclature of this 
research. This study however uses an inclusive growth index (IGI) as the dependent variable and 
corruption as a proxy for institutional quality. The model for estimation is then expressed as: 
…………………………4.30 
Where  
IGI is the Inclusive growth Index  
- is the military expenditure (percentage of Gross Domestic Product)  
- is the institutional quality (proxy by Corruption) 
- is the interaction of military expenditure with institution (which shows the degree 
of effect as well as level of significance one variable on the other), 
– Is the set of control variables – education, population and Investment variables.  is 
the error term for the period 1970 to 2017. 
The decision rule for    which is interactive variable in this thesis is as follows- 
 If the interactive form result is positive and significant. Then, it stimulates inclusive 
growth. 
 If the interactive form result is negative and significant. Then, it retards inclusive 
growth. 
 If the interactive form result is positive and not significant. Then, it is regarded as 
“Jobless growth or Non inclusive growth”. 
 If the interactive form result is negative and not significant. Then, it is regarded as no 
growth. 
See, Aizenman and Glick (2006) and Compton and Paterson (2016), where the interactive form 
have been used.  
However, this study differs from Compton and Paterson (2016) as the author first computes an 
inclusive growth index (IGI) as the dependent variable; the institutional quality is proxied by 
corruption since corruption is often a symptom of bad institution; the duration covered in this 
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study (that is, 1970 to 2017) exceed the time frame covered by Compton and Paterson (2016) as 
well as a comparison of the inclusive growth index with other development indicators (that is 
GDP annual growth and Per capita income) will be examined in the context of BRICS countries. 
The model specification for this study is as follows: 
……………4.31 
In conclusion, the theoretical model implies that the impact of military expenditure on growth is 
a non-linear function of the level of the institutional quality environment (that is, corruption and 
rent-seeking behaviour). Thus, acting as tax fiscal expenditures, corruption increases the desired 
level of military expenditure. Military expenditure in the presence of corruption reduces growth. 
4.5.3 Definition of variables for objective three  
Table 4.6 present the description of variables to be employed in the analysis of impacts of 
military expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth in BRICS countries on country 
specific.  
  
Table 4.6: Definition of variables for objective three  
S/N Variables Proxy Definition of variables 
1 Inclusive Growth Index 
(IGI) 
Inclusive  growth Inclusive growth refers to economic 
growth  that creates opportunity for all 
segments of the population  and 
distributes the dividends of increased 
prosperity , both in monetary and non-
monetary terms, fairly across society 
(OECD,2013) 
2 Military Expenditure 
(ME) 
Military  expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
Military expenditures data from SIPRI 
are derived from the NATO definition, 
which includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces, 
including peacekeeping forces; defense 
ministries and other government 
agencies engaged in defense projects; 
paramilitary forces, if these are judged 
to be trained and equipped for military 
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operations; and military space 
activities. Such expenditures include 
military and civil personnel, including 
retirement pensions of military 
personnel and social services for 
personnel; operation and maintenance; 
procurement; military research and 
development; and military aid (in the 
military expenditures of the donor 
country). Excluded are civil defense 
and current expenditures for previous 
military activities, such as for veterans' 
benefits, demobilization, conversion, 
and destruction of weapons.  
3 Corruption  
(proxy of Institutional 
quality (IQ) 
Corruption  
This is an assessment of corruption 
within the political system. Such 
corruption is a threat to foreign 
investment for several reasons: it 
distorts the economic and financial 
environment; it reduces the efficiency 
of government and business by 
enabling people to assume positions of 
power through patronage rather than 
ability; and, last but not least, 
introduces an inherent instability into 
the political process. 
The most common form of corruption 
met directly by business is financial 
corruption in the form of demands for 
special payments and bribes connected 
with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessments, 
police protection, or loans. Such 
corruption can make it difficult to 
conduct business effectively, and in 
some cases may force the withdrawal 
or withholding of an investment. 
Although our measure takes such 
corruption into account, it is more 
concerned with actual or potential 
corruption in the form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 
‘favor-for favors’, secret party funding, 
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and suspiciously close ties between 
politics and business. In our view these 
insidious sorts of corruption are 
potentially of much greater risk to 
foreign business in that they can lead to 
popular discontent, unrealistic and 
inefficient controls on the state 
economy, and encourage the 
development of the black market. 
The greatest risk in such corruption is 
that at some time it will become so 
overweening, or some major scandal 
will be suddenly revealed, as to 
provoke a popular backlash, resulting 
in a fall or overthrow of the 
government, a major reorganizing or 
restructuring of the country’s political 
institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown 
in law and order, rendering the country 
ungovernable. 
 
4 
Military expenditure * 
Institutional Quality 
(MCP) 
Interactive form of 
military expenditure 
and institutional 
quality 
This is the interaction of military 
expenditure and corruption a proxy for 
institutional quality. 
5 Population  
(POP) 
BRICS Population  Total population is based on the de 
facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal 
status or citizenship. The values shown 
are midyear estimates. 
6 Education 
(EDU) 
Education 
expenditure  
(% of GDP) 
General government expenditure on 
education (current, capital, and 
transfers) is expressed as a percentage 
of GDP. It includes expenditure funded 
by transfers from international sources 
to government. General government 
usually refers to local, regional and 
central governments. 
7 Investment 
(INV) 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
(% of GDP) 
Gross fixed capital formation is 
essentially net investment. It is a 
component of the expenditure method 
of calculating GDP. To be precise 
formation measure the net increase in 
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fixed capital.  Gross fixed capital 
formation includes spending on land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains 
and so on); plants, machinery, and 
equipment purchases; the construction 
of roads, railways, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings. Disposal of fixed 
assets is taken away from the total. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
4.5.4 Apriori expectation for objective three 
Table 4.7 present the possible expected result from the variables to be employed in the analysis 
of impacts of military expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth in BRICS 
countries.  
Table 4.7 Apriori expectation for objective three 
S/N Variables Expected 
Signs 
1 Military Expenditure (ME) +/- 
2 Corruption (proxy for Institutional quality (IQ) +/- 
3 Interactive variable of military expenditure and Corruption (proxy for 
Institutional quality  (MCP) 
+/- 
4 Population (POP)-  to reflect the negative growth impact of overpopulation 
pressures on the capita-to labour ratio 
- 
5 Education (EDU)  -as a proxy human capital development + 
6 Investment  (INV)- as a proxy for physical capital + 
Source: Author’s compilation 
4.5.5 Sources of data for objective three 
Table 4.8 presents the sources of data to be employed in the objective three, that is, analysis of 
impacts of military expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth in BRICS countries.  
Table 4.8: Sources of data for objective three 
S/N Variables Proxy Data 
measurement 
Sources 
1 Inclusive Growth Index 
(IGI) 
 
Inclusive  growth 
 
Quarterly  
 
Author computation  
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2 Military Expenditure 
(ME) 
Military  expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
Quarterly World Bank Indicator 
online database 
3 Corruption  
(proxy of Institutional 
quality (IQ) 
Corruption  Quarterly International Country 
Risk Guide  
1984-2017 
 
4 
Military expenditure * 
Institutional Quality 
(MCP) 
Interactive form of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality 
Quarterly  World Bank Indicator 
online database and 
International Country 
Risk Guide1984-
2017 
5 Population  
(POP) 
BRICS Population  Quarterly  
World Bank Indicator 
online database 
 
6 Education 
(EDU) 
Education expenditure  
(% of GDP) 
Quarterly 
7 Investment 
(INV) 
Investment 
(% of GDP) 
Quarterly 
Source: Author’s compilation 
  
4.5.6 Estimating technique for objective three 
The choice of this estimation procedure is primarily informed by the fact that it passes the 
fitness-for-the-purpose-test. For instance, one option available to perform the co-integration test 
is the Engle-Granger approach, but its weakness lies in the fact that it is only able to use two 
variables. A multivariate analysis, such as that considered in this study, leads to the use of the 
Johansen and Joselius co-integration analysis (Johansen and Juselius, 1990) or ARDL model. 
These two models provide the statistical equivalence of the economic theoretical notion of a 
stable long-run equilibrium, but the choice will depend on the characteristics of the data. The 
guide that is followed in this study is that if all variables are stationary, I(0), an ordinary least 
square  (OLS) model is appropriate and for all variables integrated of the same order, say I(1), 
Johansen’s method is very suitable. But when we have fractionally integrated variables, variables 
at different levels of integration (but not at I (2) level) or cointegration amongst I (1) variables, 
then ARDL is the best model. 
This study did not use the Johansen procedure (an option) as all the variables used in this study 
are not completely I (1), that is, integration of order one. This assumption is a pre-condition for 
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the validity of the Johansen procedure. Alternatively, the ARDL model is appropriate to run the 
short-run and long-run relationships (Shin et al., 2014). The choice of ARDL is further informed 
by the advantages it portends. Firstly, it is not as restrictive in terms of the meeting of integration 
of the same order (as in Johansen); it is not sensitive to the size of the data as small sample sizes 
can also be efficiently accommodated subject to non-compromise to the optimal lag-length 
selection affecting estimation efficiency owing to the consumption of the degree of freedom; and 
it also produces unbiased estimates even in the presence of endogenous covariates (Harris and 
Sollis, 2003).  
The study uses ARDL since not all the variables are I (1) and there is no I (2) among them and 
guide that is followed to test for the cointegration is bound test. Under the Bound testing, a set of 
critical values are based on the assumption that variables are I(0) while the other set is based on 
the assumption that variables are I(1) in the model. The selection criterion is then that H0 is 
rejected if the F-statistic is greater than the upper boundary. But we shall fail to reject Ho if the 
F-statistic is lower than the lower boundary. The cointegration test is deemed inconclusive when 
the F-statistic value falls within the two boundaries. (Gujarati, 2009) provides an extensive list of 
advantages of panel data: 
1. The problem of heterogeneity in panel data units is solved by estimation techniques that 
allow for individual-specific variables. 
2. Data gives “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity and greater degrees 
of freedom and more efficiency”. 
3. Panel data are more appropriate for investigating the dynamics of change. 
4. Panel data can better detect and measure effects that cannot be observed in pure time 
series or pure cross-section data. 
5. Panel data allow us to study behavioural models that are more complicated. 
6. Panel data minimize bias caused by aggregation of micro-units’ data. 
  
General diagnostic tests 
To ensure that the estimation model was appropriate so as to ensure consistency of the 
coefficient estimate diagnostic test were undertaken. 
 Jarque Bera test: The test is a goodness of fit measure of departure from normality 
based on the sample kurtosis and skew. In other words, Jarque Bera test determines 
132 
 
whether the data, skew and kurtosis are matching a normal distribution. The study 
employed Jarque-Berra static for normality tests to test for serial autocorrelation. 
 Breuch-Godfrey langrage multiplier test:  is used to assess the validity of some of the 
modeling assumptions inherent in applying regression-like models to observed data. To 
use to test for the presence of serial correlation. If found, to be the presence of serial 
correlation would mean that a spurious conclusion would be drawn from other tests. 
 Cross-Sectional Dependence Test: is used to assess if the n individuals in a sample are 
no longer independently drawn observations but affect each other’s outcome. For 
example, this is can result from the fact that we look at a set of neighbouring countries, 
which are usually highly interconnected.  
 Langrage multiplier (LM) test: To ascertain the assumptions on the residual of the 
ordinary least squares, a langrage multiplier test for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) was performed. 
 Structural Break test-is used to determine when and whether there is a significant 
change in the time series data. For this study, Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint test will be 
used to ascertain the exact breakpoint in the time-series data.  
4.6 Conclusion of the chapter 
This chapter reviewed some of the existing theories, empirical literature and estimating 
techniques that were used to investigate the linkage between military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth. The issue of inclusive growth is of great importance to any nation-
state because growth leads to better welfare in living standard, access to quality education and 
opening up more employment opportunities that reflect the true impact of high growth on the 
common man in the street. The provision of security, as well as the presence of strong 
institutional quality, will lead to the provision of a secure environment. Therefore, investment in 
the military sector coupled with good institutional quality will stimulate inclusive growth.  
In conclusion, from the evidence of the reviewed of the theoretical and estimation technique, the 
researcher concludes that the impact of military expenditure and institutional quality is different 
for different nations and literature shows that there is need for a more comprehensive study on 
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the subject matter using BRICS as a case study. This will enable the study to determine whether 
the hypothesis is valid for BRICS or not.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis and interprets the findings of the study. The 
analyses are done according to the objectives with the application of relevant techniques as 
discussed under the methodology. The results of various diagnostic tests are also presented and 
interpreted in this section 
In conclusion, this chapter is subdivided into four main sections- Section 5.1. - present the 
introduction for analysis of the three objectives of the study Section 5.2 presents empirical 
finding for objective 1- Determinant for BRICS military expenditure 1970 -2017, section 5.2- 
computation of BRICS inclusive growth index 1970-2017 and the chapter concludes by 
presenting the result of objective 3-impact of military expenditure and institutional quality on 
inclusive growth for BRICS countries 1970 to 2017.  
5.1 Introduction 
The empirical findings of this chapter are aimed at answering the three main objectives of this 
study. They are – objective 1- determinant for BRICS military expenditure 1970-2017; objective 
2- computation of BRICS inclusive growth index 1970-2017 and objective 3- impact of military 
expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth for BRICS countries 1970-2017. 
5.2 Objective 1- Determinant for BRICS military expenditure 1970-2017 
To estimate the determinants of military spending in BRICS, the study begins with the 
descriptive analysis. The results of the descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5.1. 
5.2.1. Descriptive statistics for the determinant of military expenditure in BRICS  
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics of the variables engaged in this study. The mean 
distribution of all the variables was presented in the third column of the table. Mean is 
unarguably one important tool for measuring central tendencies. The six columns present the 
maximum, while the fifth column shows the minimum value for all the variables. Row four 
presents the standard deviation result. The ME which is the dependent variable has a maximum 
of only 5.503756, and the minimum is as low as 0.00000 with a mean of 2.111923 which is 
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closer to the minimum than the maximum. This result strongly lays credence to the extant a 
priori expectations that military expenditure (ME) is relatively low in BRICS countries.  
Moreover, the results for all the independent variables, namely, Int, ext., Secweb, GDP, TB, 
demo index, Exch and infl. follow similar maximum and minimum trends with the military 
expenditure (ME). For instance, Secweb shows 9.361947 for the maximum, whereas the 
minimum is as low as 0.0000 and its mean value of 2.768716 which is closer to the minimum 
than the maximum. We can, therefore, infer that Secweb has been very erratic and 
unprecedented, looking at the gap between the minimum and the maximum. 
We recall from the background and computation of the incidence of inclusive growth and the 
trend of military expenditure in Figure 2.3 that there is persistent rise in the incidence of military 
expenditure in BRICS countries despite the increase and growth in the gross domestic Product 
(GDP). Our result validated this claim as both the values of Military expenditure and SECWEB 
are positively related and are increasing. Nevertheless, the information shown in the summary 
statistics can be subjected to further empirical investigation. 
Table 5.1: Summary of descriptive statistics for the determinant of military expenditure in 
BRICS countries 
Variable OBEs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ME 240 2.111923 1.348055 0 5.503756 
INT. 240 5.672019 4.255748 0 11.91667 
EXT. 240 6.521458 4.726551 0 12 
SECWEB 240 2.768716 1.452574 0 9.361947 
GDP 221 7.987818 1.250257 5.430738   9.385589 
TB 240 8.74e+07 2.15e+09 -5.31e+09 8.56e+09 
Demo Index 240 1.491667 10.67276 -88 9 
Exch. 240 8.616337 13.17995   0 58.59785 
Inf. 183 2.359151 1.418705 -1.05611 7.988791 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 5.2 shows the covariance structure of the adopted variables. The variables show different 
associations with one another. Nevertheless, we show particular interest in the association 
between dependent variable ME and other independent variables in the table, since this is our 
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main interest in this section of the study. Military expenditure (ME) is weakly and positively 
correlates with Secweb, TB, demo index, exch. and Inf. with the value rates of 0.1812, 0.2709, 
0.0370, 0.2283 and 0.0998, respectively, but negatively correlates with Int., Ext., and GDP. 
These results show a weak correlation existing between the endogenous and the exogenous 
variables. The implication is that there is no problem of multicollinearity in the model. 
Table 5.2:  Covariance matrix for the determinant of military expenditure in BRICS 
  Me Int. Ext. Secweb GDP TB 
Demo 
Index Exch Inf. 
Me 1.0000                 
int. -0.4740 1.0000               
ext. -0.4273 0.9293 1.0000             
Secweb 0.1812 -0.2647 -0.2598 1.0000           
GDP -0.1749 0.2978 0.3349 -0.0980 1.0000         
TB 0.2709 0.2137 0.1372 -0.0290 0.5324 1.0000       
Demo Index 0.0370 -0.1006 -0.0535 -0.2354 -0.0421 -0.0603 1.0000     
Exch 0.2283 0.0803 0.0847 -0.2737 -0.3978 0.0200 0.1646 1.0000   
Inf. 0.0998 -0.0284 0.0901 0.0501 0.2098 0.1673 0.0634 -0.1614 1.0000 
Source: Author’s computation 
5.2.2 Panel Unit root test for the determinant of BRICS countries military expenditure 
Various studies such as Kutu and Ngalawa, 2016; Omolade and Ngalawa, 2014 among others 
have advised researchers to always use more than one methods of panel unit root test in order to 
be sure of the order of integration of the variables to be included in a particular model... For this 
study, both the IPS, LLC and ADF methods of Panel unit root tests are adopted for consistency. 
Their results are presented in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Panel unit root tests for determinant for BRICS countries military expenditure  
  Levin et al. (2002) Im et al. (2003) 
  Level First Diff Level First Diff 
Variables Stat. P-val Stat. P-val Stat. P-val. Stat P-val 
ME  -1.20247 0.1146 -10.3185 0.0000 -1.10034 0.1356 -10.4873 0.0000 
INT 
-1.02950 0.1516 -15.9196 0.0000 0.17815 0.5707 13.4058 0.0000 
EXT. -1.20438 0.1143 -16.0053 0.0000 0.11704 0.5466 -13.6685 0.0000 
SECWEB -1.39839 0.0810 -12.0931 0.0000 -1.67129 0.0473 -13.3773 0.0000 
GDP 13.3771 1.0000 -1.57036 0.582 9.31774 1.0000 -3.81231 0.0001 
TB -2.67451 0.0037 - - -3.33891 0.0004 - - 
DEMOINDEX -1.876221 0.0303 - - -2.2048 0.0137 - - 
Exch 0.24073 0.5951 -12.9703 0.0000 0.15184 0.5603 -9.17874 0.0000 
INF -6.6041 0.0000 - - -5.80599 0.0000 - - 
  
 ADF  Fisher Chi Square 
  Level First Diff 
Variables Stat. P-val. Stat P-val Status 
ME  14.1463 0.1664 108.814 0.0000 I(1) 
INT 6.14092 0.8033 143.486 0.0000 I(1) 
EXT 6.31176 0.7884 145.900 0.0000 I(1) 
SECWEB 17.5762 0.0625 141.552 0.0000 I(1) 
GDP 4.01389 0.9467 57.9757 0.0000 I(1) 
TB 33.3252 0.0002 - - I(0) 
DEMOINDEX 22.5096 0.0041 - - I(0) 
EXCh. 6.68203 0.7551 6.68203 0.7551 I(1) 
INF 55.4634 0.0000 - - I(0) 
Source: Author’s computation 
It is evident from Table 5.3 that all the variables are either stationary at levels or after the first 
difference. The implication of this is that they are suitable for all the analysis adopted in the 
study. The methods of the panel unit root test give the same levels of integration for each 
variable. This speaks volume of the consistency level of the panel unit root results. Furthermore, 
the results indicate that apart from the trade balance, inflation, Demo index and Inflation that are 
stationary at levels, all other variables in the table are stationary after the first difference that is 
the integration of order one I (1). 
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5.2.3 Panel Least Squares regression analysis for the determinant of military expenditure 
BRICS countries 
The essence of  Panel Least Squares  regression analysis is to verify if there will be need to use 
panel data analysis for the estimation of the equation or not. Panel data application might not be 
necessary if there is no problem of cross-sectional dependence. In other words, if the estimated 
pool regression model does not have a specific effect, then pool regression will suffice for the 
analysis but if otherwise then, panel data analysis is more suitable to be used for the estimation. 
One of the shortcomings of the pool regression is the problems of heterogeneity, which is not 
present in the panel data. 
Table 5.4: Panel Least Squares regression results for determinant for BRICS countries 
military expenditure 
Dependent Variable: Military expenditure(% of GDP)   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 1970-2017   
Periods included: 48   
Cross-sections included: 5   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 239  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
SECWEB 0.434569 0.036863 11.78863 0.0000 
TB 5.13E-11 3.97E-11 1.292722 0.1974 
DEMOINDEX 0.014325 0.007229 1.981492 0.0487 
EXCH 0.049175 0.006123 8.031229 0.0000 
EXT. 0.079268 0.057617 1.375775 0.1702 
GDP 0.000101 2.41E-05 4.209215 0.0000 
INF. 0.000241 0.000253 0.950460 0.3429 
INT.  -0.103914 0.059950 -1.733331 0.0844 
R-squared 0.373526 Mean dependent var 2.110150 
Adjusted R-squared 0.354542 S.D. dependent var 1.350604 
S.E. of regression 1.085081 Akaike info criterion 3.034086 
Sum squared resid 271.9794 Schwarz criterion 3.150453 
Log likelihood -354.5732 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.080978 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.348895    
Source: Author’s computation  
Considering the individual variable in the context of BRICS countries, security web denoted by 
Secweb with coefficient value of 0.434569 indicates a positive and significant determinant of 
BRICS countries military expenditure. The implication is that a unit rise of security web denoted 
by Secweb will lead to about 0.434569 increases in determinant of BRICS military expenditure. 
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Secondly, Trade Balance denoted by TB with coefficient value of 5.13E-11 indicates a positive 
but not significant determining of BRICS countries military expenditure. The implication is that 
a unit rise of trade balance denoted by TB will lead to about 0.434569 increase in determinant of 
BRICS military expenditure but not significant. 
Another variable employed in the model is Democratic Index denoted by Demo-Index with 
coefficient value of 0.014325 and it is statistically significant at 5% level. Democratic Index 
exhibits a positive and significant in determining BRICS military expenditure. The implication is 
that a unit rise of Democratic Index will lead to about 0.014325 increases in determining BRICS 
countries military expenditure. 
In addition, Exchange rate denoted by Exch-Rate with coefficient is 0.049175 and it is 
statistically significant at 5% level. The implication is that a unit rise of exchange rate will lead 
to about 0.0049175 increases in determining BRICS countries military expenditure. The result is 
an indication that exchange rate exhibits a positive but significant long run relationship in 
determining BRICS countries military expenditure, since most of the BRICS countries are either 
in the world’s top arms manufacturing or arms exporting countries in their continents and earn 
foreign revenue from their sales of such arms and security gadgets  .  
Another variable used is the model is external threats denoted by ext. threat with a coefficient 
value of 0.079268. The result shows that the external threat exhibits a positive and significant 
long –run relationship in determining BRICS countries military expenditure. The implication is 
that a unit rise of external threat denoted by ext. threat will lead to about 0.079268 increases in 
determining BRICS countries military expenditure.  
Furthermore, Gross Domestic Product denoted by GDP with a coefficient value of 0.000101 and 
it is significant at 5%. The implication is that a unit rise of Gross Domestic Product denoted by 
GDP will lead to about 0.000101 increases in determining BRICS countries military expenditure. 
This result shows that the Gross Domestic Product exhibits a positive and significant long –run 
relationship in determining BRICS countries military expenditure.  
Also, Inflation denoted by Infl. with a coefficient value of 0.000241 but not significant at 5%. 
The implication is that a unit rise of Inflation denoted by Infl. will lead to about 0.000241 
increases in determining BRICS countries military expenditure. This result shows that the 
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inflation exhibits a positive and not significant long –run relationship in determining BRICS 
countries military expenditure.  
More so, Internal threat denoted by INT. with a coefficient value of -0.103914 but significant at 
10 %. The implication is that a unit rise of Inflation denoted by internal threat will lead to about 
0.103914 decreases in determining BRICS countries military expenditure. This result shows that 
the internal threats exhibits a negative and is not significant impact in determining BRICS 
countries military expenditure. 
In Summary, the results in Table 5.4 are an indication that many of the variables have a 
significant impact on ME as a percentage of GDP. This is shown from the probabilities of the t 
statistics of each of the independent variables in the estimated model, which are significant at 5% 
level. Adoption of the Gross Domestic Product particularly showed a significant impact on 
Military expenditure. Notwithstanding, this approach of pool regression might not be sufficient 
to explain the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable because 
the results are prone to specific effects/heterogeneity influence which might undermine the 
reliability of the parameter estimates in the estimated model. Consequently, cross-sectional 
dependence test is conducted to ascertain if there is the presence of specific effect in the result. 
The result of the cross-sectional dependence test is presented in Table 5.5 
Table 5.5: Cross-sectional dependence test (Pool-ability test) for determinant for BRICS 
countries military expenditure 
Residual Cross-Section Dependence Test 
Null hypothesis: No cross-section dependence (correlation) in residuals 
Test Statistic   d.f.   Prob.   
Breusch-Pagan LM 72.92935 10 0.0000 
Pesaran scaled LM 12.95340   0.0000 
Pesaran CD -0.831331   0.4058 
Source: Author’s computation 
The results from Table 5.5 show that the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis that there is cross-sectional dependence in the estimated panel model is accepted. 
This result implies that it is not appropriate to pool the data. Therefore, the pool regression 
results are not reliable for forecasting and empirical inferences. Consequently, the panel model 
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approach is used to reduce the problem of cross-sectional dependence. The results of panel 
estimation are presented as follows: 
5.2.4 Panel data estimation for the determinant of military expenditure in BRICS countries 
Following the results of the panel Least squares regression, it is obvious that there will be a need 
for panel data estimation in order to reduce the implications of the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence. Both fixed and random effects are used in this study to be able to ascertain the level 
of consistency in the panel results as well as investigating the approach that is more suitable for 
the nature of our data. The results of the fixed and random effects are presented in Tables 5.6 and 
5.7, respectively. 
Table 5.6: Fixed effects panel results for the determinant of military expenditure in BRICS 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Internal -.0845414 .0555871 -1.52   0.130 
External .0626497 .0499752 1.25 0.211 
Security web .3381968 .0463219 7.30 0.000 
GDP .000222 .0000332 6.68 0.000 
TB 2.12e-10 5.07e-11 4.19 0.000   
Demo Index -.0034721 .0066425 -0.52 0.602 
Exchrate .0022599 .0070385 0.32 0.748 
Inflation .0004513 .0002169   2.08 0.039 
Cons  .1566255 .2011105 0.78   0.437 
sigma_u |  1.3324109 
     sigma_e |  .89206655 
         rho |  .69048958   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0: F(4, 226) = 27.00                     Prob > F = 0.0000 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 5.7: Random effects panel results for the determinant of military expenditure in 
BRICS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic (Z) Prob. P>|z|   
Internal -.1307021 .0605125 -2.16 0.031 
External .0973939 .0576178 1.69 0.091 
Security web   .3584819 .0491526 7.29 0.000 
GDP .000075   .0000265 2.83 0.005 
TB 7.39e-11 4.05e-11 1.82 0.068 
Demo Index .0172946 .0072763 2.38 0.017 
Exchrate .0433276 .0065718 6.59 0.000 
Inflation .0002008 .0002517 0.80 0.425 
Cons  .4678524 .2022761   2.31 0.021 
sigma_u |          0 
sigma_e |  .89206655 
rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Source: Author’s computation 
From Tables 5.6 and 5.7, it is clear that there are similarities in the results of the fixed and 
random effects. Firstly, all the variables that are significant under the fixed effects are also 
significant under the random effects. That is security web and GDP are all significant in both 
estimated models. Notwithstanding, the coefficients are different slightly. The overwhelming 
similarity in the two results is evidence of consistency in the results. Notwithstanding, the 
HAUSMAN test is conducted to know which of the two estimated panel models is more suitable 
for this study. The results of the HAUSMAN test are presented in Table 5.8. 
5.2.5 HAUSMAN test for the determinant of military expenditure in BRICS 
As earlier said, the results of the HAUSMAN test are to determine which of the fixed or random 
effect model is more suitable for the analysis. The result of the HAUSMAN test is presented in 
Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8: HAUSMAN test for the determinant of military expenditure in BRICS 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random    
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
 (b)          
(B) 
(b-B) 
Difference  
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
 
Internal -.0845414 -.1307021 .0461607 .0287306 
External .0626497 .0973939 -.0347442 .0175242 
Sec web .3381968 .3584819 -.0202851 .0264584 
GDP .000222 .000075    .0001471 .0000301 
TB 2.12e-10 7.39e-11    1.38e-10 4.57e-11 
Demo Index -.0034721 .0172946 -.0207667 .0033361 
Exch. .0022599 .0433276 -.0410677 .0053624 
Infl. .0004513 .0002008 .0002505 .0000703 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=       74.37 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Source: Author’s computation 
The Hausman test revealed that the chi-square probability is significant at 5% level. This is an 
indication that the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. The 
implication of the results is that the fixed effect is more preferable for this study hence we go 
ahead to interpret the results of the fixed effects. 
In conclusion, from the fixed effects results four variables have significant impacts on Military 
expenditure namely security web, GDP, inflation, and Trade Balance. The Security Web 
represents the variables that captured the possibility of arms race for each BRICS neighbour. The 
coefficient is significant and positive. The implication of this is that there is a positive significant 
relationship between the activities of BRICS countries regarding arms purchase and that of their 
neighbouring countries.  
Again, economic growth is the most significant determinant for military expenditure. The 
coefficient of economic growth, which is proxy by GDP, is positive and significant. This 
indicates that BRICS countries economic growth is majorly responsible for the drive to invest 
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military expenditure. The implication is that the BRICS countries economic prosperity dictates 
the levels of their investment in the military. 
The third variable with a significant effect on ME is the trade balance. From the results of the 
fixed effect, the coefficient of the variable is positive and significant. It shows that there exists a 
favourable trade transaction among the BRICS countries. This might be due to the fact that they 
all have active defence industries. The more positive trade balance, the more effective 
government policies are implemented in the countries.  
The fourth variable with the least significant effect on the determinant of BRICS military 
expenditure is inflation. This indicates that rising BRICS military expenditure is inflation driven, 
especially if military expenditure finance is through debt; this might be inflationary.  
Finally, the overall results from the fixed effect reveal that four out of the eight variables 
considered in this study are significant. The significant variables are TB, security web and GDP. 
They are all significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. While the GDP effect on military 
expenditure under fixed effect is positive and significant, it is worthy of note that all variables 
under fixed effect have a positive effect on military expenditure. While GDP, security web, 
Trade balance are the major determinants of military expenditure under fixed effect, inflation is 
the least determinant.   
5.2.6 Post estimation tests for the determinant of military expenditure in BRICS 
Some diagnostic tests are necessary for the panel data analysis. These tests are required to verify 
the validity of the parameter estimates. To ascertain the appropriateness of panel linear 
regression, the study conducted the normality test on the residual and the results are presented in 
Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Normality test for the determinants of military expenditure in the BRICS 
Source: Author’s computation 
The result of the normality test shows that the probability value of the Jarque-Bera statistics of 
0.246499 is greater than 5%, indicating that the residuals from the estimates are normally 
distributed. Again, the estimated panel result is re-verified for cross-sectional dependence the 
result is shown in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.9: Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence 
Test Statistics Probability 
-1.582 1.8862 
Source: Author’s Computation 
The results from the table confirm the nonexistence of cross-sectional dependence because the 
probability of the Pesaran statistics is not significant. Therefore, we accept the Null hypothesis of 
no cross-sectional dependence unlike what we saw in the pool regression analysis. 
5.3 Objective 2- Computation of BRICS inclusive growth index 1970-2017 
Figure 5.2 presents the graphical representation of the BRICS inclusive index from 1970 to 2017 
while in Appendix page 253 to 255 present BRICS inclusive growth index from 1970 to 2017 for 
each individual BRICS countries.  
Decision rule - Value for IGI close to zero shows low inclusive growth (0.00-0.59), while, a 
value close to one denotes the high inclusive growth (0.60-1.00) for the study period. 
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Figure 5.2:  Graphical representation of BRICS IGI index from 1970 to 2018 
Source: Author’s computation 
The graph above presents the trend line analysis of BRICS countries inclusive growth from 1970 
to 2017.  Value for IGI close to zero show low inclusive growth (0.00-0.49), while, a value close 
to one denotes the high inclusive growth (0.50-1.00) for the study period. The trend indicates that 
inclusive growth in the BRICS shows a downward trend, although, it has not been stable during 
the period under review. Notwithstanding, the most visual movement noticed from the graph for 
the five countries is that of a falling trend. 
5.3.7 Comparison of average inclusive growth index during the period under review across 
member countries 
The average IGI for individual member countries is presented under this section. The value for 
IGI close to zero show low inclusive growth (that is between 0.00 to 0.49), while, a value close 
to one denotes the high inclusive growth (that is between 0.50 to 1.00) for the study period. For 
example, averaging BRICS countries inclusive growth rates for the periods of 1970 to 2017 as 
presented in Table 5.10 
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Table 5.10: BRICS Inclusive growth average for the periods of 1970 to 2017  
S/N Countries Inclusive growth rate average 
for the periods of 1970 to 2017 
Discussion on inclusive growth index 
numbers 
 
 
1 
 
 
Brazil  
 
 
0.56 
This means that Brazil has a relatively 
high inclusive growth trajectory for the 
periods of 1970 to 2017. This means that 
growth experienced in Brazil is trickling 
down to the poor and it is inclusive in 
nature. 
 
 
2 
 
 
Russia 
 
 
0.63 
This means that Russia has a much 
higher inclusive growth trajectory for the 
periods of 1970 to 2017. This means that 
growth experienced in Russia is trickling 
down to the poor and it is inclusive in 
nature. 
 
3 
 
India 
 
0.37 
This means that India has a low inclusive 
growth trajectory for the periods of 1970 
to 2017. This means that growth 
experienced in India is not trickling down 
to the poor and it is not inclusive in 
nature. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
China 
 
 
0.57 
This means that China has a relatively 
high inclusive growth trajectory for the 
periods of 1970 to 2017. This means that 
growth experienced in China is trickling 
down to the poor, and it is inclusive in 
nature. 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
South Africa 
 
 
0.38 
This means that South Africa has a low 
inclusive growth trajectory for the 
periods of 1970 to 2017. This means that 
growth experienced in South Africa is 
not trickling down to the poor and it is 
not inclusive in nature. 
Source: Author’s computation 
Brazil with 0.56 which is slightly above 0.50 denoted that Brazil has a relatively high inclusive 
growth trajectory for the periods of 1970 to 2017. This means that growth experienced in Brazil 
is trickling down to the poor and it is inclusive in nature. 
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Secondly, Russia with 0.63  which is  much more than 0.50 mean  denotes that Russia has a 
much higher inclusive growth trajectory for the periods of 1970 to 2017. This means that growth 
experienced in Russia is trickling down to the poor and it is inclusive in nature. 
Thirdly, India with 0.37 represents that India has a low inclusive growth trajectory for the 
periods of 1970 to 2017. This means that growth experienced in India is not trickling down to the 
poor and it is not inclusive in nature. Thus affirms the World Bank ranking of India as the capital 
of the poorest people on earth as at the time of writing this thesis.  
In addition, China (the second economic world power) denotes that China has a relatively high 
inclusive growth trajectory for the periods of 1970 to 2017. This means that growth experienced 
in China is trickling down to the poor, and it is inclusive in nature. 
Lastly, South Africa (the smallest economy among the BRICS countries) with 0.38 denotes that 
South Africa has a low inclusive growth trajectory for the periods of 1970 to 2017. This means 
that growth experienced in South Africa is not trickling down to the poor and it is not inclusive 
in nature. 
In summary, the index indicates the true growth inclusiveness in the BRICS countries for the 
period covered. The tables show that Russia has the highest average inclusive growth index 
during the periods under review. This is followed by China and Brazil. However, South Africa 
and India are the countries with the lowest inclusive growth index. The index revealed the 
outcome of various government poverty interventions, and levels of inequality and 
unemployment rate, unlike other developmental indicators that have failed to capture all these 
dynamics.   
  
5.4 Objective 3 - Impact of military expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive 
growth for Individual BRICS countries 1970-2017 
Based the heterogeneous results obtained from the Inclusive growth index measurement of 
BRICS countries under Table 5.3 in objective 2. Therefore, objective 3 estimation is done on 
individual countries bases by using time series data from each of the five countries. The analysis 
of the impact of military expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth for individual 
BRICS countries starts with the descriptive analysis.  This will enable comparative analysis 
among the countries. Therefore, this section presents the time-series analysis of the individual 
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country. In other words, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa individual analysis of the 
effect of military expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth is carried out by 
exploring the time series properties of the data first. 
5.4.1 Analysis of impact of military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth 
in Brazil 
This section presents the time series data analysis of the impact of military expenditure and 
institutional quality on Inclusive growth for Brazil. 
5.4.1.1 Descriptive statistics result for Objective 3- Military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth in Brazil 
Table 5.11 presents the summary statistics of the variables engaged in this study. The mean 
distribution of all the variables was presented in the second row of the table. Mean is unarguably 
one important tool for measuring central tendencies. The third row presents the maximum, while 
the fourth row shows the minimum value for all the variables. Row five presents the standard 
deviation result. The IGI which is the dependent variable has a maximum of only 0.910000, and 
the minimum is as low as 0.36000 with a mean of 0.576654 which is closer to the minimum than 
the maximum. This result strongly lays credence to the extant a priori expectations that inclusive 
growth (IGI) is relatively low in Brazil. The implication here is that, during the period under 
review, Inclusive growth in Brazil has never gone below 36 per cent. 
Moreover, the results for all the independent variables, namely, Investment (In), log of 
population, the interactive variable of military expenditure and corruption (MCP), Military 
expenditure (me), Corruption (cor) and Education (edu) follow similar maximum and minimum 
trends with the inclusive growth (IGI). For instance, MCP shows 10.7450 for the maximum, 
whereas the minimum is as low as 2.6969 and its mean value of 5.0816 which is closer to the 
minimum than the maximum. We can, therefore, infer that the interactive variable of military 
expenditure and corruption (MCP) has been very erratic and unprecedented, looking at the gap 
between the minimum and the maximum. 
We recall from the background and computation of the incidence of inclusive growth and the 
trend of military expenditure in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.12 that there is persistent rise in the 
incidence of inclusive growth in Brazil despite the increase and growth in the military 
expenditure. Our result validated this claim as both the values of Inclusive growth and military 
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expenditure are positively related and are increasing. Nevertheless, the information shown in the 
summary statistics can be subjected to further empirical investigation. 
Table 5.11:  Summary of descriptive statistics military expenditure, institutional quality 
and inclusive growth 1984-2017 for Brazil  
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean 0.576654 2.240048 18.96875 5.081614 1.645771 3.022713 2.485229 
 Median 0.572500 2.264751 18.98892 4.881555 1.539016 3.000000 2.378330 
 Maximum 0.910000 5.034129 19.15922 10.74500 2.686250 4.000000 5.948480 
 Minimum 0.360000 0.128665 18.70436 2.696998 1.199541 1.833333 0.000000 
 Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 5.12 shows the covariance structure of the adopted variables. The variables show different 
associations with one another. Nevertheless, we show particular interest in the association 
between dependent variable IGI and other independent variables in the table, since this is our 
main interest in this section of the study. IGI weakly and positively correlates with INV and 
LNPOP with the value rates of 0.321032   and 0.354209, respectively, but negatively correlates 
with the interactive variable of military expenditure and corruption (MCP), Military expenditure 
(ME), Corruption (COR) and Education (EDU). These results show a weak correlation existing 
between the endogenous and the exogenous variables. The implication is that there is no problem 
of multicollinearity in the model. 
Table 5.12:  Covariance Matrix for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth for Brazil 
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI 1.000000       
INV 0.321032 1.000000      
LNPOP 0.354209 0.784617 1.000000     
MCP -0.187743 -0.641635 -0.741853 1.000000    
ME -0.005136 -0.424080 -0.482648 0.868346 1.000000   
COR -0.313031 -0.686036 -0.840603 0.857315 0.502901 1.000000  
EDU -0.067761 0.612212 0.670091 -0.562395 -0.355526 -0.608105 1.000000 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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5.4.1. 2 Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth 
for Brazil 
The study made use of more than one methods of unit root test in order to be sure of the order of 
integration of the variables to be included in a particular model. For this study, both the ADF and 
PP methods of unit root tests are adopted for consistency. Their results are presented in Table 
5.13. 
Table 5.13: Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth for Brazil  
  Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Phillips-Perron (PP) Status 
  Level First Diff Level First Diff  
Variables Statistics P-value Stat. P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics P-value  
IGI 0.5532 0.8344 1.5003 0.0246 0.8052 0.8850 3.4864 0.0098 I(1) 
INV 0.6085 0.4520 3.4574 0.0007 0.2877 0.5805 3.7375 0.0002 
I(1) 
LNPOP 0.5611 0.4723 1.8889 0.0565 12.8686 1.0000 8.2373 0.0000 I(1) 
MCP 0.8576 0.3426 3.1447 0.0019 0.6275 0.4438 3.7452 0.0002 I(1) 
ME 0.5803 0.4642 3.1039 0.0021 0.2746 0.5854 4.0834 0.0001 I(1) 
COR 1.2402 0.1966 3.2149 0.0015 0.8118 0.3626 3.9289 0.0001 I(1) 
EDU 1.2553 0.1981 2.6090 0.0093 1.7545 0.4016 3.8644 0.0002 I(1) 
Source: Author’s computation 
It is evident from Table 5.13 that all the variables are either stationary at levels or after the first 
difference. The implication of this is that they are suitable for all the analysis adopted in the 
study. The methods of the unit root test give the same levels of integration for each variable. This 
speaks volume of the consistency level of the unit root results. Furthermore, the results indicate 
that all variables in the table are stationary after the first difference that is the integration of order 
one I (1). 
5.4.1.3 Test for Structural Breaks  
Bai and Perron (2003) argue that time series data often possess sudden changes either in the 
mean or in the other parameters that bring about the series. The structural break test enables us to 
identify the particular time the changes occur, if any. If this is not identified and corrected, it 
could lead to a misleading result. Therefore, we need to correct for a structural break in the series 
if the break is significant.  
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Table 5.14: Structural Breaks Result 
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
F-statistic 110.6488 Prob. F(2,132) 0.0000 
Log likelihood 
ratio 133.8932 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic 221.2976 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
Source: Author’s Computation 
From Table 5.14, we can identify three (3) breaking points in the chosen variables and the years 
where those breaks occurred. Therefore we proceed to test if the breaking points are significant 
by adding dummy variables to the model and regressing the model. 
5.4.1.4 The ARDL lag Determination 
Table 5.15: The ARDL lag Determination 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME EDU  
Exogenous variables: C      
Included observations: 128     
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -357.9879 NA 1.19e-05 5.687311 5.820999 5.741629 
1 508.2990 1637.824 2.76e-11 -7.285922 -6.350099 -6.905692 
2 518.9373 19.11564 4.12e-11 -6.889645 -5.151689 -6.183504 
3 541.6430 38.67079 5.12e-11 -6.681923 -4.141833 -5.649871 
4 920.9163 610.3929 2.44e-13 -12.04557 -8.703344 -10.68760 
5 1140.824 333.2972 1.42e-14* -14.91912* -10.77476* -13.23525* 
6 1149.557 12.41779 2.27e-14 -14.49308 -9.546590 -12.48330 
7 1165.565 21.26064 3.29e-14 -14.18071 -8.432082 -11.84501 
8 1214.571 60.49148* 2.92e-14 -14.38392 -7.833163 -11.72231 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 5.15 above shows the ARDL optimal lag result. The optimal lag length was obtained for 
the regression estimates of the variables under study. This was done using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn information criterion(HQIC), sequential modified 
LR test statistics (LR), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and final prediction error (FPE) which 
are mostly used in ARDL estimation (see Dritsakis, 2011). Relying on the merit that different 
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variables can be assigned different lags as they enter the ARDL model that (as indicated in Table 
5.9 above). This study tested for various lag lengths selection criteria, and we chose five lag 
lengths since four out of the five criteria were chosen by FPE, AIC, SC and HQ at 5% level each. 
Hence, this forms the optimal lag length, which is used for the regression. 
5.4.1.5 ARDL Bound test result for Objective 3- Military expenditure, institutional quality 
and inclusive growth 1984-2017in Brazil 
The ARDL Bound testing provides the log-likelihood ratio statistics for determining the number 
(r) of the long-run relationship between IG, Me, Corr., Edu. Pop and M*Corr. The calculated 
value of the F statistics must be greater than 95% critical value at both lower and upper bounds 
for the null of r= 0, which indicates no long-run relationship to be rejected. This means that the 
alternative hypothesis of long-run relationship is accepted. Now that we have established that, 
IG, Me, Corr., Edu. Pop and M*Corr. are non-stationary at the level we can test for the presence 
of integration. 
Table 5.16: ARDL Bounds test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth for Brazil 
ARDL Bounds Test 
Included observations: 131 
Test Statistic Value K 
F-statistic 3.694138 6 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound 
10% 2.12 3.23 
5% 2.45 3.61 
2.5% 2.75 3.99 
1%s 3.15 4.43 
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Source:  Author’s Computation 
The ARDL bound test results are reported above. Results indicate that there is a long-run 
relationship between military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth in Brazil. 
The ARDL bound test results for Brazil (3.694138 is greater than 2.45 and 3.61 at 5%) and 
statistically significant at α= 1% and 5%, respectively. This shows that there is a long-run 
relationship among military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth.   
5.4.1.6 ARDL co integrating and long-run result for military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017 in Brazil 
After the confirmation of a cointegration among variables, the next step is to estimate the short-
run and long-run form of the coefficients. The results are presented in Table 5.16 
Table 5.17: ARDL co integrating and long run test result for military expenditure, 
institutional quality and inclusive growth for Brazil  
ARDL Co integrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 5, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1)  
Co integrating Form 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(ME) 0.166123 0.032502 5.111117 0.0000 
D(ME(-1)) -0.000000 0.035851 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(ME(-2)) 0.000000 0.035851 0.000000 1.0000 
D(ME(-3)) 0.189104 0.036576 5.170109 0.0000 
D(ME(-4)) -0.172915 0.028887 -5.986009 0.0000 
D(MCP) -0.003221 0.004457 -0.722754 0.4713 
D(LNPOP) 1.010240 0.509522 1.982719 0.0498 
D(INV) -0.013601 0.008067 -1.685884 0.0946 
D(EDU) -0.004756 0.001910 -2.490275 0.0142 
D(COR) 0.113191 0.031949 3.542905 0.0006 
D(COR(-1)) -0.000000 0.039266 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-2)) 0.000000 0.039266 0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-3)) -0.232517 0.040936 -5.680033 0.0000 
D(IGI) 0.150198 0.090309 1.663154 0.0989 
D(DM1) -0.347533 0.071821 -4.838898 0.0000 
D(DM2) -0.660614 0.072006 -9.174477 0.0000 
D(DM3) -0.347533 0.071821 -4.838898 0.0000 
CointEq(-1) -0.117214 0.047458 -2.469821 0.0150 
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
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ME 0.190274 0.208727 0.911596 0.3639 
MCP -0.027483 0.038615 -0.711704 0.4781 
LNPOP 1.065010 0.660307 1.612903 0.0096 
INV 0.013906 0.032429 -0.428804 0.6689 
EDU -0.040579 0.019199 -2.113571 0.0368 
COR 0.419042 0.426866 0.981672 0.0083 
IGI 3.956620 3.024825 1.308049 0.1934 
DM1 -0.009414 0.745715 -0.012623 0.9899 
DM2 0.204407 0.698012 0.292842 0.7702 
DM3 -0.035748 0.130967 -0.272951 0.7854 
C -19.655779 12.387212 -1.586780 0.1154 
Note- DM1, DM2 and DM3 represent the dummy for the three structural breaks points identified 
within the time series data. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Considering the individual variable in the context of Brazil, military expenditure indicates a 
significant positive long-run relationship on inclusive growth. The long-run coefficient of 
military expenditure is 0.190274 is positive and significant. The implication is that a unit rise of 
military expenditure will lead to about 0.190274 increases in inclusive growth. 
 The long-run relationship and impact of corruption (proxy for institutional quality) exhibits a 
positive long-run relationship with inclusive growth. The long-run coefficient of institutional 
quality (proxy by corruption) is +0.419042 and it is statistically at 5% level. The implication of 
this is that there is the presence of positive additive of institutional quality (proxy by corruption) 
(i.e. greasing the wheels for growth) as it reduces government red tape/ bureaucracies, thereby 
promoting inclusive growth. The implication is that a unit rise of corruption will lead to about 
0.269733 increases in Brazil inclusive growth. 
Another variable employed in the model is education. Education exhibits a positive long-run 
relationship with inclusive growth, which is a proxy for human development. The long-run 
coefficient of education is 0.040579 and it is statistically significant at 5% level. The implication 
is that a unit rise of education will lead to about 0.040579 increases in inclusive growth. 
The investment long-run coefficient is 0.013906. The result is an indication that investment 
exhibits a positive but non-significant long run relationship with inclusive growth. The 
implication of this is that there is a need for more investment to stimulate inclusive growth. The 
implication is that a unit rise of investment will lead to about 0.013906 increases in inclusive 
growth.   
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Another variable used is the interactive form of military expenditure- institutional quality, 
denoted by MCP with coefficient is -0.027483. The implication is that a unit rise of interactive 
form of military expenditure- institutional quality (proxy by corruption) will lead to about 
0.027483 decreases in inclusive growth. This shows that interactive form of military expenditure 
and institutional quality does not stimulate inclusive growth. 
Population long-run coefficient is -1.065010. The result is an indication that the population 
exhibits a negative long-run relationship with inclusive growth and it is statistically significant at 
5%. The implication of this is that the rise in population can significantly affect inclusive growth 
negatively. The implication is that a unit rise of population will lead to about 0.202997 decreases 
in inclusive growth.   
Under the short-run aspect of the cointegration regression, the result shows that the lagged values 
of corruption (proxy for institutional quality), education, investment, military expenditure, and 
military expenditure -institutional quality denoted by MCP all have short-run significant impact 
on inclusive growth in Brazil. However, the error correction term is correctly signed and 
significant which indicates a good adjustment to equilibrium. 
5.4.1.7 Post estimation test: Military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth 
1984-2017 Brazil 
Table 5.18 presents the post estimation diagnostic tests, which include heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlations. The rationale of the post estimation tests is to ascertain the robustness of the 
ARDL results. 
Table 5.18: Heteroscedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test for Brazil 
Null Hypothesis: No Heteroscedasticity  
F-statistic 0.367258     Prob. F(16,15) 0.9724 
Obs*R-squared 9.007232     Prob. Chi-Square(16) 0.9131 
Scaled explained SS 1.647357     Prob. Chi-Square(16) 1.0000 
Source: Author’s Computation 
The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity. Using the F statistics, it is discovered 
that the probability of F shows that the null hypothesis is to be accepted. Therefore, we conclude 
that the model is not having the problem of heteroscedasticity, which may affect the validity of 
the result. 
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Table 5.19: Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test for Brazil 
Null Hypothesis: No Serial-Correlation 
F-statistic 1.336783     Prob. F(2,13) 0.2965  
Obs*R-squared 5.458497     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0653  
Source: Author’s Computation 
The null hypothesis for Brazil indicates that there is no serial correlation. Since the F-statistical 
probability is greater than 5%, it is the null hypothesis is to be accepted while we reject the 
alternative hypothesis that there is no serial correlation. Consequently, the estimates from our 
model are valid and can be used for forecasting. 
Figure 5.3 Stability test for Brazil 
 
Source: Author’s Computation 
In conclusion, the stability test indicates that the model is reliable (that is, the model falls within 
the red lines) and does not suffer from any structural break. This is an indication that the 
estimated exhibit the stability required for a model that will be useful for forecasting. 
  
5.4.2 Analysis of impact of military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth 
1984-2017in Russia 
The second country under consideration in the BRICS is Russia. The analysis is explained as 
follows. 
5.4.2.1 Descriptive statistics result for Objective 3- Military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in Russia 
Table 5.20 below presents the summary statistics of the variables engaged in this study. The 
mean distribution of all the variables was presented in the second row of the table. Mean is 
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unarguably one important tool for measuring central tendencies. The third row presents the 
maximum, while the fourth row shows the minimum value for all the variables. Row five 
presents the standard deviation result. The IGI which is the dependent variable has a maximum 
of only 0.850000, and the minimum is as low as 0.00000 with a mean of 0.528722 which is 
relatively closer to the maximum than the minimum. This result strongly lays credence to the 
extant a priori expectations that inclusive growth (IGI) is relatively high in Russia. The 
implication here is that, during the period under review, Inclusive growth in Russia relatively 
high. 
Moreover, the results for all the independent variables, namely, Inv, log of pop, mcp, me, cor and 
edu follow similar maximum and minimum trends with the inclusive growth (IGI) except for 
Lpop and Me.. For instance, MCP shows 181399 for the maximum, whereas the minimum is as 
low as 0.0000 and its mean value of 5.9279 which is closer to the minimum than the maximum. 
We can, therefore, infer that MCP has been very erratic and unprecedented, looking at the gap 
between the minimum and the maximum. 
We recall from the background and computation of the incidence of inclusive growth and the 
trend of military expenditure in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.12 that there is persistent rise in the 
incidence of inclusive growth in Russia despite the increase and growth in the military 
expenditure. Our result validated this claim as both the values of Inclusive growth and military 
expenditure are positively related and are increasing. Nevertheless, the information shown in the 
summary statistics can be subjected to further empirical investigation. 
Table 5.20:  Summary of descriptive statistics military expenditure, institutional quality 
and inclusive growth 1984-2017in Russia 
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean 0.528722 1.410135 18.79536 5.927907 3.177122 1.491228 0.981682 
 Median 0.470000 1.064660 18.79151 6.469227 3.676790 1.541667 0.000000 
 Maximum 0.850000 4.502704 18.81737 18.13993 5.503756 3.916667 4.101750 
 Minimum 0.000000 0.000000 18.77655 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
 Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 5.21 shows the covariance matrix structure of the adopted variables. The variables show 
different associations with one another. Nevertheless, we show particular interest in the 
association between dependent variable IGI and other independent variables in the table, since 
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this is our main interest in this section of the study. IGI weakly and positively correlates with 
LNPOP with the value rates of 0.061120, respectively, but negatively correlates with  INV., 
MCP, ME, COR and  EDU. These results show a weak correlation existing between the 
endogenous and the exogenous variables. The implication is that there is no problem of 
multicollinearity in the model. 
Table 5.21:  Covariance matrix for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017in Russia 
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI 1.000000       
INV -0.501608 1.000000      
LNPOP 0.061120 -0.718095 1.000000     
MCP -0.606986 0.230366 0.146906 1.000000    
ME -0.763090 0.402040 -0.038557 0.762015 1.000000   
COR -0.696253 0.355910 0.085860 0.974468 0.756198 1.000000  
EDU -0.358124 0.457586 -0.373936 -0.014894 0.223231 0.058479 1.000000 
Source:  Author’s Computation 
5.4.2.2 Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth for 
Russia 
Various studies such as Kutu and Ngalawa, 2016; Omolade and Ngalawa, 2014 among others 
have advised researchers to always use more than one methods of time-series unit root test in 
order to be sure of the order of integration of the variables to be included in a particular model. 
For this study, both the ADF and PP methods of time series unit root tests are adopted for 
consistency. Their results are presented in Table 5.22. 
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Table 5.22: Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth for Russia 
  Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Phillips-Perron (PP) Status 
  Level First Diff Level First Diff  
Variables Statistics P-value Stat. P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics P-value  
IGI 1.7914 0.0697 2.7225 0.0068 1.4687 0.1322 2.6120 0.0092 I(1) 
INV 0.6336 0.4410 2.8738 0.0043 0.6520 0.4331 3.7999 0.0002 I(1) 
LNPOP 0.6351 0.4404 2.1068 0.0342 0.3935 0.7960 2.1855 0.0283 I(1) 
MCP 1.2094 0.2067 2.8887 0.0041 1.0801 0.2525 3.8589 0.0002 I(1) 
ME 0.8089 0.3638 3.1930 0.0016 0.4175 0.5311 3.6895 0.0003 I(1) 
COR 1.0597 0.2601 3.5447 0.0005 0.8100 0.3633 3.8942 0.0001 I(1) 
EDU 1.6999 0.0844 2.2863 0.0221 1.4916 0.1267 4.8077 0.0010 I(1) 
Source: Author’s computation 
It is evident from Table 5.21 that all the variables are either stationary at levels or after the first 
difference. The implication of this is that they are suitable for all the analysis adopted in the 
study. The methods of the unit root test give the same levels of integration for each variable. This 
speaks volume of the consistency level of the unit root results. Furthermore, the results indicate 
all other variables in the table are stationary after the first difference that is the integration of 
order one I (1). 
5.4.2.3 Test for Structural Breaks  
Bai and Perron (2003) argue that time series data often possess sudden changes either in the 
mean or in the other parameters that bring about the series. The structural break test enables us to 
identify the particular time the changes occur, if any. If this is not identified and corrected, it 
could lead to a misleading result. Therefore, we need to correct for a structural break in the series 
if the break is significant. 
Table 5.23:  Test for structural breaks for military expenditure, institutional quality and 
inclusive growth 1984-2017in Russia 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1999Q1 2005Q1 2011Q1   
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4  
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F-statistic 39.44823  Prob. F(9,124) 0.0000 
Log likelihood ratio 183.8027  Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic  355.0341  Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
Source:  Author’s Computation 
From Table 5.23, we can identify three (3) breaking points in the chosen variables and the years 
where those breaks occurred. Therefore we proceed to test if the breaking points are significant 
by adding dummy variables to the model and regressing the model. 
5.4.2.4 The ARDL lag Determinant  
Table 5.24:  The ARDL lag Determinant for military expenditure, institutional quality and 
inclusive growth 1984-2017in Russia 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME EDU COR  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -436.1795 NA   2.40e-06  6.924680  7.080650  6.988051 
1  439.1586  1641.259  5.93e-12 -5.986853  -4.739090* -5.479880 
2  453.1580  24.71774  1.03e-11 -5.439969 -3.100413 -4.489395 
3  481.1258  46.32157  1.46e-11 -5.111340 -1.679991 -3.717165 
4  604.3637  190.6337  4.71e-12 -6.271308 -1.748166 -4.433532 
5  906.0239  433.6366   9.59e-14*  -10.21912* -4.604189  -7.937747* 
6  921.7713  20.91447  1.75e-13 -9.699552 -2.992824 -6.974574 
7  949.8227  34.18762  2.73e-13 -9.372229 -1.573709 -6.203651 
8  1025.619   84.08645*  2.11e-13 -9.790921 -0.900607 -6.178741 
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
Source:  Author’s Computation 
Table 5.24 above shows the ARDL optimal lag result. The optimal lag length was obtained for 
the regression estimates of the variables under study. This was done using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn information criterion(HQIC), sequential modified 
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LR test statistics (LR), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and final prediction error (FPE) which 
are mostly used in ARDL estimation (see Dritsakis, 2011). Relying on the merit that different 
variables can be assigned different lags as they enter the ARDL model that (as indicated in Table 
5.9 above). This study tested for various lag lengths selection criteria, and we chose five lag 
lengths since three out of the five criteria were chosen by FPE, AIC and HQ at 5% level each. 
Hence, this forms the optimal lag length, which is used for the regression. 
5.4.2.5 ARDL Bound test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017 in Russia 
The ARDL Bound testing provides the likelihood ratio statistics for determining the number (r) 
of a long-run relationship between IG, Me, Corr., Edu. Pop and M*Corr. Since the calculated 
value of the F statistics is greater than 95% critical value at both upper and lower bounds, the 
null of r= 0, which indicates no long-run relationship, is rejected against the alternative 
hypothesis.  
Table 5.25:  ARDL Bounds tests for military expenditure, institutional quality and 
inclusive growth 1984-2017in Russia 
ARDL Bounds Test 
Sample: 1984Q3 2017Q1 
Included observations: 131 
Test Statistic Value K 
F-statistic  3.69109 6 
   
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound 
10% 2.12 3.23 
5% 2.45 3.61 
2.5% 2.75 3.99 
1% 3.15 4.43 
       Source: Author’s Computation  
5.4.2.6 ARDL Co integrating and long-run for military expenditure, institutional quality 
and inclusive growth 1984-2017in Russia 
After the cointegration result, the next line of action will be the ARDL cointegration of the long 
and short-run effect. 
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Table 5.26: ARDL Co integrating and long-run form for military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in Russia 
ARDL Co integrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 0, 5)  
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
     
Co integrating Form 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(IGI(-1)) 0.373180 0.119693 3.117818 0.0024 
D(IGI(-2)) 0.373180 0.119693 3.117818 0.0024 
D(IGI(-3)) 0.373180 0.119693 3.117818 0.0024 
D(IGI(-4)) -0.280231 0.204974 -1.367155 0.1748 
D(INV) 0.034985 0.012404 2.820486 0.0058 
D(INV(-1)) -0.000000 0.016192 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(INV(-2)) -0.000000 0.016192 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(INV(-3)) 0.077331 0.016760 4.614020 0.0000 
D(INV(-4)) -0.061977 0.012978 -4.775669 0.0000 
D(LNPOP) 51.919968 11.341330 4.577944 0.0000 
D(LNPOP(-1)) -0.000001 3.161646 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(LNPOP(-2)) -0.000000 3.161646 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(LNPOP(-3)) 54.222369 10.795661 5.022607 0.0000 
D(LNPOP(-4)) -49.983913 10.888990 -4.590317 0.0000 
D(MCP) 0.015089 0.011131 1.355612 0.1784 
D(MCP(-1)) -0.000000 0.013446 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(MCP(-2)) -0.000000 0.013446 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(MCP(-3)) -0.065386 0.014305 -4.570892 0.0000 
D(MCP(-4)) 0.043752 0.010786 4.056340 0.0001 
D(ME) 0.009286 0.010435 0.889838 0.3758 
D(ME(-1)) 0.000000 0.012892 0.000000 1.0000 
D(ME(-2)) 0.000000 0.012892 0.000000 1.0000 
D(ME(-3)) 0.033499 0.013047 2.567591 0.0118 
D(EDU) -0.004032 0.004233 -0.952500 0.3433 
D(COR) -0.072505 0.052201 -1.388968 0.1681 
D(COR(-1)) 0.000000 0.064543 0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-2)) 0.000000 0.064543 0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-3)) 0.310759 0.066639 4.663350 0.0000 
D(COR(-4)) -0.198464 0.048472 -4.094399 0.0001 
D(DM1) -0.025305 0.020074 -1.260617 0.2099 
D(DM3) -0.001348 0.021881 -0.061620 0.9510 
D(DM2) -0.006156 0.021657 -0.284242 0.7767 
CointEq(-1) -0.562617 0.147892 -3.804232 0.0003 
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Long Run Coefficients 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INV 0.013326 0.016310 -0.817070 0.4159 
LNPOP 1.484741 1.370484 -1.083370 0.2814 
MCP 0.046611 0.016168 2.882923 0.0049 
ME 0.075768 0.014771 -5.129629 0.0000 
EDU -0.007166 0.007635 -0.938499 0.06040 
COR -0.183616 0.067333 -2.726995 0.0076 
DM3 -0.028388 0.442514 -0.064152 0.9490 
DM2 -0.129605 0.407196 -0.318287 0.7508 
DM1 -0.532788 0.826167 -0.644892 0.5202 
C 28.693929 25.788013 1.112685 0.2687 
     
Note- DM1, DM2 and DM3 represent the dummy for the three structural breaks points identified 
within the time series data. 
Source:  Author’s Computation 
Considering the individual variable in the context of Russia, military expenditure with a 
coefficient positive coefficient of 0.075768 with 5% statically significance. The long-run 
coefficient of military expenditure is 0.075768. The implication is that a unit rise of military 
expenditure will lead to about 0.076798 increases in inclusive growth. This indicates that 
military expenditure have a positive and significant impact on inclusive growth. 
 Corruption which is a proxy for institutional quality with the coefficient -0.183616 and it is 
statistically significant at 5% level. The implication is that a unit rise of corruption will lead to 
about 0.183616 decreases in inclusive growth. The result is an indication that institutional quality 
(proxy by corruption) exhibits a negative long-run relationship with inclusive growth. 
Another variable employed in the model is education. Education denoted with EDU with 
coefficient of education is 0.007166. The implication is that a unit rise of education will lead to 
about 0.018604 rises in inclusive growth. Though, the coefficient is positive but only significant 
at 10%. The implication of this is that there is a need for a more inclusive education system that 
stimulates inclusive growth. 
The investment long-run coefficient is 0.013326. The result is an indication that investment 
exhibits a direct long-run relationship with inclusive growth. It is significant hence; investment 
in Russia supports inclusive growth significantly. The implication is that a unit rise of investment 
will lead to about 0.013326 rises in inclusive growth. 
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Another variable employed the military expenditure-institutional quality interactive form 
denoted by MCP with coefficient value of 0.046611 and it is statistical significant at 5%. 
Therefore, the implication is that a unit rise of corruption will lead to about 0.046611 rises in 
inclusive growth. The implication of this is that military expenditure joint relationship with 
institutional quality stimulates Russia’s inclusive growth. 
The population long-run coefficient is 1.484741. The result is an indication that the population 
exhibits a positive but not significant long-run relationship with inclusive growth in Russia. The 
implication is that a unit rise of population will lead to about 1.484741 rises in inclusive growth. 
Under the short-run aspect of the cointegration regression, the short-run dynamics produces an 
error correction term that is negative and significant, which is a good adjustment process to 
inclusive growth equilibrium in Russia. 
5.4.2.7 Post estimation tests for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017in Russia 
Below are the post estimation diagnostic tests ranging from heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlations. The rationale of the post estimation tests is to ascertain the robustness of the ARDL 
results for Russia. 
Table 5.27: Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for Russia 
Null Hypothesis: No Heteroscedasticity 
F-statistic 3.358836     Prob. F(18,13) 0.0654 
Obs*R-squared 26.33698     Prob. Chi-Square(18) 0.0923 
Scaled explained SS 4.662358     Prob. Chi-Square(18) 0.9993 
Source: Author’s Computation 
The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity. Using the F statistics, it is discovered 
that the probability of F shows that the null hypothesis is to be rejected. Therefore, it was 
concluded that the model is not having the problem of heteroscedasticity, which may affect the 
validity of the result. 
Table 5.28:  Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test for Russia 
Null Hypothesis: No Serial Correlation LM Test:  
F-statistic 1.504894     Prob. F(2,11) 0.2644 
Obs*R-squared 6.874708     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0321 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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The null hypothesis for Russia indicates that there is no serial correlation. The F-statistic and the 
probability show that the null hypothesis is to be accepted while we reject the alternative 
hypothesis that there is a serial correlation. Consequently, the estimates from our model are valid 
and can be used for forecasting. 
Figure 5.4: Stability test for Russia 
 
 
Source:  Author’s Computation 
In conclusion, the stability test indicates that the model is reliable (that is, the model does fall 
within the red lines) and does not suffer from any structural break. This is an indication that the 
estimated exhibit the stability required for a model that will be useful for forecasting. 
5.4.3. Analysis of impact of military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth 
1984-2017in India 
This section presents the time series data analysis of the impact of military expenditure and 
institutional quality on inclusive growth for India. 
5.4.3.1 Descriptive statistics result for Objective 3- Military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in India 
Table 5.29 presents the summary statistics of the variables engaged in this study. The mean 
distribution of all the variables was presented in the second row of the table. Mean is unarguably 
one important tool for measuring central tendencies. The third row presents the maximum, while 
the fourth row shows the minimum value for all the variables. Row five presents the standard 
deviation result. The IGI which is the dependent variable has a maximum of only 0650000, and 
the minimum is as low as 0.20000 with a mean of 0.327851 which is closer to the minimum than 
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the maximum. This result strongly lays credence to the extant a priori expectations that inclusive 
growth (IGI) is on the average for the countries is relatively low during the period in Brazil. The 
implication here is that, during the period under review, Inclusive growth in Brazil has never 
gone below 20 per cent. 
Moreover, the results for all the independent variables, namely, Inv, log of pop, mcp, me, cor and 
edu follow similar maximum and minimum trends with the inclusive growth (IGI) except for 
military expenditure. For instance, MCP shows 12.6939 for the maximum, whereas the minimum 
is as low as 0.0000 and its mean value of 7.3108 which is closer to the maximum than the 
minimum. We can, therefore, infer that MCP has been very erratic and unprecedented, looking at 
the gap between the minimum and the maximum. 
We recall from the background and computation of the incidence of inclusive growth and the 
trend of military expenditure in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.12 that there is persistent rise in the 
incidence of inclusive growth in India despite the increase and growth in the military 
expenditure. Our result validated this claim as both the values of Inclusive growth and military 
expenditure are positively related and are increasing. Nevertheless, the information shown in the 
summary statistics can be subjected to further empirical investigation. 
Table 5.29:  Summary of descriptive statistics military expenditure, institutional quality 
and inclusive growth 1984-2017in India 
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean 0.327857 0.997913 20.76715 7.310887 2.827267 2.558271 1.433145 
 Median 0.337500 0.775558 20.78363 6.665849 2.754964 2.500000 0.000000 
 Maximum 0.650000 3.656951 21.01532 12.69395 4.231318 3.000000 4.475090 
 Minimum 0.200000 0.009191 20.45440 0.000000 0.000000 1.500000 0.000000 
 Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 5.30 shows the correlation structure of the adopted variables. The variables show different 
associations with one another. Nevertheless, we show particular interest in the association 
between dependent variable IGI and other independent variables in the table, since this is our 
main interest in this section of the study. IGI weakly and positively correlates with MCP and  
ME with the value rates of 0.249932 and 0.375010 , respectively, but negatively correlates with  
INV., LNPOP, ME, COR and  EDU. These results show a weak correlation existing between the 
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endogenous and the exogenous variables. The implication is that there is no problem of 
multicollinearity in the model. 
Table 5.30:  Covariance Matrix 
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI 1.000000       
INV -0.317876 1.000000      
LNPOP -0.487934 0.839588 1.000000     
MCP 0.249932 -0.481180 -0.723062 1.000000    
ME 0.375010 -0.525300 -0.762580 0.865781 1.000000   
COR -0.011816 -0.227330 -0.374679 0.755142 0.329932 1.000000  
EDU -0.253453 0.243565 0.438801 -0.162477 -0.167215 -0.079843 1.000000 
Source:  Author’s Computation 
5.4.3.2   Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth 
for India 
Various studies such as Kutu and Ngalawa, 2016; Omolade and Ngalawa, 2014 among others 
have advised researchers to always use more than one methods of time-series unit root test in 
order to be sure of the order of integration of the variables to be included in a particular model... 
For this study, both the ADF and PP methods of unit root tests are adopted for consistency. Their 
results are presented in Table 5.31 
Table 5.31: Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth for India  
  Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Phillips-Perron (PP) Status 
  Level First Diff Level First Diff  
Variables Statistics 
P-
value Stat. 
P-
value Statistics  
P-
value Statistics P-value 
 
IGI 0.7562 0.3869 3.1506 0.0018 2.1281 0.0325 2.0673 0.0276 I(1) 
INV 0.9148 0.3183 3.2867 0.0012 0.4843 0.5044 3.4849 0.0006 
I(1) 
LNPOP 2.2622 1.0000 1.1544 0.0254 17.9116 1.0000 8.3912 0.0000 I(1) 
MCP 1.6310 0.0969 2.0673 0.0376 1.4224 0.1438 2.2072 0.0268 I(1) 
ME 1.2896 0.1812 0.8364 0.3518 1.3160 0.1733 1.0293 0.2719  
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COR 0.7402 0.3941 3.8091 0.0002 0.6474 0.4351 3.9676 0.0001 I(1) 
EDU 2.7491 0.0062 2.2072 0.0268 1.8196 0.0656 4.1555 0.0000 I(1) 
Source: Author’s computation 
It is evident from Table 5.30 that all the variables are either stationary at levels or after the first 
difference. The implication of this is that they are suitable for all the analysis adopted in the 
study. The methods of the unit root test give the same levels of integration for each variable. This 
speaks volume of the consistency level of the panel unit root results. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that all variables in the table are stationary after the first difference that is the integration 
of order one I (1). 
5.4.3.3 Test for Structural Breaks  
Bai and Perron (2003) argue that time series data often possess sudden changes either in the 
mean or in the other parameters that bring about the series. The structural break test enables us to 
identify the particular time the changes occur, if any. If this is not identified and corrected, it 
could lead to a misleading result. Therefore, we need to correct for a structural break in the series 
if the break is significant.  
Table 5.32: Structural Breaks Result 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1991Q1 1999Q3 2012Q1   
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4  
F-statistic 6.188124  Prob. F(6,128) 0.0000 
Log likelihood ratio 34.63854  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic  37.12875  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
     
Source- Author’s Computation 
From Table 5.32, we can identify three (3) breaking points in the chosen variables and the years 
where those breaks occurred. Therefore we proceed to test if the breaking points are significant 
by adding dummy variables to the model and regressing the model. 
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5.4.3.4 The ARDL lag Determinants 
Table 5.33: Lag Order Selection Result 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI MCP POP ME INV EDU COR 
Exogenous variables: C     
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
       
       
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
0 -2792.276 NA 2.33e+10 43.73869 43.89466 43.80206 
1 -1781.575 1895.064 6961.263 28.71211 29.95988 29.21909 
2 -1770.603 19.37254 12692.08 29.30630 31.64586 30.25687 
3 -1747.299 38.59736 19279.22 29.70780 33.13915 31.10197 
4 -1360.907 597.6998 102.1987 24.43605 28.95919 26.27383 
5 -1057.344 436.3729 2.018589 20.45849 26.07343* 22.73987* 
6 -1041.490 21.05549 3.673806 20.97641 27.68313 23.70138 
7 -1011.155 36.97128 5.527162 21.26804 29.06656 24.43662 
8 -869.8954 156.7094* 1.538346* 19.82649* 28.71680 23.43867 
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
Source- Author’s Computation 
Table 5.33, above shows the ARDL optimal lag result. The optimal lag length was obtained for 
the regression estimates of the variables under study. This was done using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn information criterion(HQIC), sequential modified 
LR test statistics (LR), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and final prediction error (FPE) which 
are mostly used in ARDL estimation (see Dritsakis, 2011). Relying on the merit that different 
variables can be assigned different lags as they enter the ARDL model that (as indicated in Table 
5.9 above). This study tested for various lag lengths selection criteria, and we chose eight lag 
lengths since three out of the five criteria were chosen by LR,FPE and  AIC at 5% level each. 
Hence, this forms the optimal lag length, which is used for the regression. 
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5.4.3.5 ARDL Bound test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017in India 
The ARDL Bound testing provides the log-likelihood ratio statistics for determining the number 
(r) of the long-run relationship between IG, Me, Corr., Edu. Pop and M*Corr.  Once the F 
statistics is greater than the critical values at both the upper and the lower bounds, the conclusion 
would be to accept the alternative hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis which means that 
there is a long-run relationship between the dependent and independent variables which is the 
case under the India estimated model. The result is shown in Table 5.31. 
Table 5.34:  ARDL Bound test result for military expenditure, institutional quality and 
inclusive growth 1984-2017in India 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Sample: 1984Q3 2017Q1   
Included observations: 131   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
Test Statistic Value K   
F-statistic  7.839137 6   
Critical Value Bounds   
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99 
  
1% 3.15 4.43   
               Source:  Author’s Computation 
The ARDL bound test results are reported for India shows F statistics of 7.839137 while the 
critical values at both lower and upper bounds are 2.45 and 3.61, respectively. This shows that 
there exists a long-run relationship among the variables. 
5.4.3.6 ARDL Co integrating and long-run form for military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in India 
After the confirmation of cointegration among variables, the next line of action is to estimate the 
short-run and long-run form of the coefficients. The results are presented in Table 5.32. 
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Table 5.35:  ARDL Co integrating and long-run form result for military expenditure, 
institutional quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in India 
ARDL Co integrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(5, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1)  
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
Co integrating Form 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(IGI(-1)) 0.036259 0.057597 0.629516 0.5302 
D(IGI(-2)) 0.036259 0.057597 0.629516 0.5302 
D(IGI(-3)) 0.036259 0.057597 0.629516 0.5302 
D(IGI(-4)) -0.188358 0.061914 -3.042252 0.0029 
D(INV) 0.029243 0.009906 2.952070 0.0038 
D(LNPOP) -0.015581 0.043720 -0.356381 0.7222 
D(MCP) -0.000743 0.019287 -0.038509 0.9693 
D(ME) 0.037472 0.047722 0.785211 0.4339 
D(EDU) -0.000346 0.001492 -0.232081 0.8169 
D(COR) -0.027625 0.056534 -0.488640 0.6260 
D(DM5) -0.235407 0.057293 -4.108809 0.0001 
D(DM4) -0.172970 0.050908 -3.397678 0.0009 
D(DM2) -0.048646 0.036220 -1.343059 0.1820 
D(DM1) -0.068156 0.025935 -2.627990 0.0098 
D(DM3) -0.128165 0.044444 -2.883756 0.0047 
CointEq(-1) -0.167315 0.056114 -2.981671 0.0035 
     
Long Run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INV 0.011186 0.032673 -0.342366 0.7327 
LNPOP 0.093123 0.249701 -0.372939 0.7099 
MCP -0.078073 0.108468 -0.719780 0.4731 
ME 0.223959 0.296122 0.756307 0.4510 
EDU -0.002070 0.008993 -0.230191 0.8183 
COR 0.162477 0.309549 0.524885 0.6007 
DM5 -0.075672 0.036911 -2.050098 0.0427 
DM4 -0.020533 0.036073 -0.569207 0.5704 
DM2 0.002129 0.038083 0.055901 0.9555 
DM1 0.022602 0.041461 0.545138 0.5868 
DM3 0.055039 0.041830 1.315765 0.1910 
C 1.790409 5.415044 0.330636 0.7415 
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Note- DM1, DM2, DM3 and DM3 represent the dummy for the three structural breaks points 
identified within the time series data. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Considering the individual variable in the context of India, military expenditure denoted with 
ME and coefficient value 0.223959, though not statistical significant either 5% or 10%. The 
implication is that a unit rise of military expenditure will lead to about 0.223959 increases in 
inclusive growth. 
 Corruption, a proxy for institutional quality with coefficient of 0.162477. The implication is that 
a unit rise of corruption will lead to about 0.162477 decreases in inclusive growth. The result is 
an indication that institutional quality exhibits a negative long-run relationship India inclusive 
growth.  
Another variable employed in the model is education. Education with -0.002070 though not 
statistical significant. The implication is that a unit rise of education will lead to about -0.002070   
decrease in inclusive growth.  
The investment long-run coefficient is 0.011186. The implication is that a unit rise of investment 
will lead to about 0.011186 rises in inclusive growth. The result is an indication that investment 
exhibits a direct relationship with inclusive growth though insignificant. 
Another variable employed is the military expenditure-institutional quality interactive form 
denoted by MCP. Therefore, the implication is that a unit rise of interactive form of military 
expenditure and institutional quality will lead to about 0.078073 decreases inclusive growth 
process in India though insignificant. 
The population long-run coefficient is 0.093123. The implication is that a unit rise of population 
will lead to about 0.093123 rises in inclusive growth. The result is an indication that the 
population exhibits a positive but not significant long-run relationship with inclusive growth in 
India. 
Under the short-run aspect of the cointegration regression, the short-run dynamics produces an 
error correction term that is negative and significant, which is a good adjustment process to 
inclusive growth equilibrium in India. 
However, the result of India is a clear departure from what we have seen in other BRICS 
countries. Firstly, the key variables, namely; military expenditure institutional quality and the 
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interactive for military expenditure and institutional quality failed to have significant impacts on 
inclusive growth. This underscores the irrelevance of military expenditure in the inclusive 
growth process in India. 
In conclusion, other control variables that are shift factors on inclusive growth which are 
included in the model such as investment, population and education did not have a significant 
impact on inclusive growth in India. Notwithstanding, in the short run model, investment, and 
education show a significant impact on inclusive growth, but this impact was not sustained to the 
long-run period. More importantly, the short-run model shows an error correction term of -
0.167315 which is also significant. The implication is that the adjustment process to equilibrium 
inclusive growth is in order. 
5.4.3.7 Post estimation for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth 
1984-2017in India 
Below are the post estimation diagnostic tests ranging from heteroscedasticity to serial 
correlations? The rationale of the post estimation tests is to ascertain the robustness of the 
estimations on India. 
Table 5.36: Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for INDIA 
Null Hypothesis: No Heteroscedasticity 
F-statistic 0.473234     Prob. F(13,18) 0.9130 
Obs*R-squared 8.151080     Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.8336 
Scaled explained SS 2.989523     Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.9980 
Source: Author’s Computation 
The null hypothesis is that there is heteroscedasticity. Using the F statistics, it is discovered that 
the probability of F shows that the null hypothesis is to be accepted. Therefore, it was concluded 
that the model is not having the problem of heteroscedasticity, which may affect the validity of 
the result. 
Table 5.37:  Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for India 
Null Hypothesis: No serial correlation  
F-statistic 6.661372     Prob. F(2,16) 0.0579 
Obs*R-squared 14.53915     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0007 
 Source: Author’s Computation 
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The null hypothesis for India indicates that there is no serial correlation. Considering the F-
statistic and the probability, the null hypothesis is to be accepted while we reject the alternative 
hypothesis that there is a serial correlation. Consequently, the estimates from our model are valid 
and can be used for forecasting. 
Figure 5.5: Stability test for India 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation 
In conclusion, the stability test indicates that the model is reliable (that is, the model does fall 
within the red lines) and does not suffer from any structural break. This is an indication that the 
estimated model for India exhibits the stability required for a model that will be useful for 
forecasting. 
5.4.4 Analysis of the impact of military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017in China 
This section presents the time series data analysis of the impact of military expenditure and 
institutional quality on inclusive growth for China. 
5.4.4.1 Analysis of the impact of military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017 in China 
Table 5.38 presents the summary statistics of the variables engaged in this study. The mean 
distribution of all the variables was presented in the second row of the table. Mean is unarguably 
one important tool for measuring central tendencies. The third row presents the maximum, while 
the fourth row shows the minimum value for all the variables. Row five presents the standard 
deviation result. The IGI which is the dependent variable has a maximum of only 0.880000, and 
the minimum is as low as 0.270000 with a mean of 0.540263 which is closer to the minimum 
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than the maximum. This result strongly lays credence to the extant a priori expectations that 
inclusive growth (IGI) is on the average for the countries is relatively low during the period in China. 
The implication here is that, during the period under review, Inclusive growth in China has never 
gone below 27 per cent. 
Moreover, the results for all the independent variables, namely, Inv, log of pop, mcp, me, cor and 
edu follow similar maximum and minimum trends with the inclusive growth (IGI) except for 
military expenditure. For instance, MCP shows 9.973033 for the maximum, whereas the 
minimum is as low as 0.0000 and its mean value of 4.6655 which is closer to the minimum than 
the maximum. We can, therefore, infer that MCP has been very erratic and unprecedented, 
looking at the gap between the minimum and the maximum. 
We recall from the background and computation of the incidence of inclusive growth and the 
trend of military expenditure in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.12 that there is persistent rise in the 
incidence of inclusive growth in India despite the increase and growth in the military 
expenditure. Our result validated this claim as both the values of Inclusive growth issues and 
military expenditure is positively related and is increasing. Nevertheless, the information shown 
in the summary statistics can be subjected to further empirical investigation. 
Table 5.38:  Summary of the descriptive statistics military expenditure, institutional quality 
and inclusive growth 1984-2017in China  
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean 0.540263 3.042429 20.93908 4.665568 1.846692 2.619048 0.650017 
 Median 0.480000 3.484582 20.96011 3.925372 1.925132 2.000000 0.000000 
 Maximum 0.880000 6.186882 21.04997 9.973033 2.493258 4.500000 2.061550 
 Minimum 0.270000 0.483946 20.75943 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 
 Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Source:  Author’s Computation 
Table 5.39 shows the correlation structure of the adopted variables. The variables show different 
associations with one another. Nevertheless, we show particular interest in the association 
between dependent variable IGI and other independent variables in the table, since this is our 
main interest in this section of the study. IGI weakly and positively correlates with COR and 
EDU with the value rates of 0.493284 and 0.270635, respectively, but negatively correlates with 
INV., LNPOP and ME. These results show a weak correlation existing between the endogenous 
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and the exogenous variables. The implication is that there is no problem of multicollinearity in 
the model. 
Table 5.39:  Covariance matrix for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017in China  
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI 1.000000       
INV -0.605898 1.000000      
LNPOP -0.460669 0.437513 1.000000     
MCP -0.023652 -0.069113 -0.231062 1.000000    
ME -0.476540 0.187840 0.466943 0.590510 1.000000   
COR 0.493284 -0.285034 -0.745218 0.588506 -0.295456 1.000000  
EDU 0.270635 -0.027551 -0.717743 0.048351 -0.516468 0.580178 1.000000 
Source: Author’s Computation 
5.4.4.2 Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth for 
China  
Various studies such as Kutu and Ngalawa, 2016; Omolade and Ngalawa, 2014 among others 
have advised researchers to always use more than one methods of times series unit root test in 
order to be sure of the order of integration of the variables to be included in a particular model.. 
For this study, both the ADF and PP methods of unit root tests are adopted for consistency. Their 
results are presented in Table 5.40. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
Table 5.40: Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth for China  
  Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Phillips-Perron (PP) Status 
  Level First Diff Level First Diff  
Variables Statistics P-value Stat. P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics P-value  
IGI 0.0891 0.7092 3.2134 0.0015 0.6498 0.4340 3.8022 0.0002 I(1) 
INV 1.0473 0.2650 3.7831 0.0002 0.6707 0.4248 4.011 0.0001 I(1) 
LNPOP 1.6624 0.9763 2.9405 0.0035 8.3194 1.0000 2.0742 0.0370 I(1) 
MCP 1.1325 0.2333 3.9495 0.0001 0.6657 0.4270 3.7546 0.0002 I(1) 
ME 0.3924 0.5408 4.2661 0.0000 0.0402 0.6939 3.8917 0.0001 I(1) 
COR 0.9116 0.3196 3.4895 0.0006 1.2868 0.1821 3.7259 0.0003 I(1) 
EDU 2.3733 0.0176 - - 2.0930 0.0354 - - I(0) 
Source: Author’s computation 
It is evident from Table 5.40 that all the variables are either stationary at levels or after the first 
difference. The implication of this is that they are suitable for all the analysis adopted in the 
study. The methods of the time-series unit root test give the same levels of integration for each 
variable. This speaks volume of the consistency level of the time series unit root results. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that all variables in the table are stationary after the first 
difference that is the integration of order one I (1) except for EDU which denote education. 
5.4.4.3 Test for Structural Breaks  
Bai and Perron (2003) argue that time series data often possess sudden changes either in the 
mean or in the other parameters that bring about the series. The structural break test enables us to 
identify the particular time the changes occur, if any. If this is not identified and corrected, it 
could lead to a misleading result. Therefore, we need to correct for a structural break in the series 
if the break is significant.  
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Table 5.41: Structural Breaks Result 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 2005Q1 1999Q2 2005Q3 2016Q4  
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4  
     
     
F-statistic 3.120839  Prob. F(1,134) 0.0796 
Log likelihood ratio 3.131097  Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0768 
Wald Statistic  3.120839  Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0773 
     
Source: Author’s Computation 
From Table 5.41, we can identify four (4) breaking points in the chosen variables and the years 
where those breaks occurred. Therefore we proceed to test if the breaking points are significant 
by adding dummy variables to the model and regressing he model.  
5.4.4.4 The ARDL Lag Determination 
          Table 5.42: Lag Order Selection Result 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI LNPOP INV MCP ME EDU COR  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -269.7754 NA 1.78e-07 4.324615 4.480586 4.387987 
1 711.7352 1840.332 8.38e-14 -10.24586 -8.998100 -9.738890 
2 727.6989 28.18588 1.41e-13 -9.729670 -7.390114 -8.779097 
3 759.5471 52.74851 1.88e-13 -9.461673 -6.030324 -8.067498 
4 1070.958 481.7136 3.21e-15 -13.56184 -9.038700 -11.72407 
5 1364.223 421.5686 7.46e-17 -17.37848 -11.76355* -15.09711 
6 1387.694 31.17256 1.21e-16 -16.97960 -10.27287 -14.25462 
7 1432.759 54.92230 1.44e-16 -16.91810 -9.119582 -13.74952 
8 1596.774 181.9542* 2.81e-17* -18.71521* -9.824899 -15.10303* 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% 
level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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Table 5.42 above shows the ARDL optimal lag result. The optimal lag length was obtained for 
the regression estimates of the variables under study. This was done using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn information criterion(HQIC), sequential modified 
LR test statistics (LR), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and final prediction error (FPE) which 
are mostly used in ARDL estimation (see Dritsakis, 2011). Relying on the merit that different 
variables can be assigned different lags as they enter the ARDL model that (as indicated above). 
This study tested for various lag lengths selection criteria, and we chose eight lag lengths since 
all four out of the five criteria were chosen by LR, FPE, AIC and HQ at 5% level each. Hence, 
this forms the optimal lag length, which is used for the regression. 
5.4.4.5 ARDL Bound test analysis of the impact of military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017 in China 
The ARDL Bound testing provides the log-likelihood ratio statistics for determining the number 
(r) of long-run relationship between IG, Me, Corr., Edu. Pop and M*Corr. In the result of China, 
the F the statistics is greater than 95% critical value at both upper and lower bounds, therefore, 
the null of r= 0, which indicates no long-run relationship, is rejected against the alternative 
hypothesis. 
Table 5.43:  ARDL bounds tests results for military expenditure, institutional quality and 
inclusive growth 1984-2017in China  
ARDL Bounds Test   
Sample: 1984Q3 2017Q1   
Included observations: 131   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
Test Statistic Value k   
F-statistic  6.118468 6   
Critical Value Bounds   
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
  Source: Author’s Computation 
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Specifically, the ARDL bound test results for China show F statistics of 6.118468, which is 
greater than 3.61 upper bound at 5%. This shows that there is a long-run relationship among 
military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth as well as other control variables.    
5.4.4.6 ARDL Co integrating and long-run form for the impact of military expenditure, 
institutional quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in China 
After the confirmation of cointegration among variables, the next line of action is to estimate the 
short-run and long-run form of the coefficients. The results are presented in Table 5.44. 
Table 5.44:  ARDL Co integrating and long-run form result for military expenditure, 
institutional quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in China  
ARDL Co integrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 1, 5)  
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
Co integrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(IGI(-1)) 0.086279 0.071172 1.212256 0.2284 
D(IGI(-2)) 0.086279 0.071172 1.212256 0.2284 
D(IGI(-3)) 0.086279 0.071172 1.212256 0.2284 
D(IGI(-4)) -0.293967 0.072405 -4.060053 0.0001 
D(INV) -0.025529 0.010943 -2.332806 0.0217 
D(INV(-1)) -0.000000 0.014136 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(INV(-2)) 0.000000 0.014136 0.000000 1.0000 
D(INV(-3)) 0.067580 0.014517 4.655144 0.0000 
D(INV(-4)) -0.055895 0.011348 -4.925641 0.0000 
D(LNPOP) 151.117585 35.111552 4.303928 0.0000 
D(LNPOP(-1)) 0.000001 1.276404 0.000001 1.0000 
D(LNPOP(-2)) -0.000001 1.276404 -0.000001 1.0000 
D(LNPOP(-3)) 141.493250 33.672288 4.202068 0.0001 
D(LNPOP(-4)) -115.339613 35.410948 -3.257174 0.0016 
D(MCP) -0.195453 0.043190 -4.525457 0.0000 
D(MCP(-1)) -0.000000 0.009109 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(MCP(-2)) 0.000000 0.009109 0.000000 1.0000 
D(MCP(-3)) 0.058007 0.009952 5.828564 0.0000 
D(MCP(-4)) -0.055996 0.008131 -6.886591 0.0000 
D(ME) 0.432158 0.121325 3.561976 0.0006 
D(EDU) -0.050600 0.014739 -3.433139 0.0009 
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D(COR) 0.405908 0.079956 5.076633 0.0000 
D(COR(-1)) 0.000000 0.028288 0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-2)) -0.000000 0.028288 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-3)) -0.189906 0.031029 -6.120317 0.0000 
D(COR(-4)) 0.178090 0.025309 7.036665 0.0000 
D(DM1) 0.487734 0.062681 7.781165 0.0000 
D(DM2) 0.279396 0.087823 3.181352 0.0019 
D(DM3) 0.395354 0.107101 3.691419 0.0003 
D(DM4) 0.428172 0.123022 3.480443 0.0007 
CointEq(-1) -0.220903 0.072651 -3.040611 0.0030 
     
Long Run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INV -0.044914 0.021671 -2.072562 0.0409 
LNPOP 5.442216 1.931829 2.817131 0.0059 
MCP -0.226026 0.070205 -3.219494 0.0017 
ME 0.556727 0.240942 2.310628 0.0230 
EDU -0.026490 0.046787 -0.566176 0.5726 
COR 0.443946 0.143390 3.096083 0.0026 
DM1 0.447522 0.460345 0.972145 0.3329 
DM2 0.338531 0.528361 0.640718 0.5229 
DM3 0.227042 0.472913 0.480093 0.6320 
DM4 0.291612 0.504754 0.577731 0.5645 
C -115.467539 40.793644 -2.830528 0.0056 
Note- DM1, DM2, DM3, DM3 and DM4 represent the dummy for the four structural breaks 
points identified within the time series data. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Considering the individual variable in the context of China, military expenditure denoted by  ME  
The result revealed that military expenditure with positive coefficient value of 0.556727 and it is 
statistical significant at 5%. The implication is that a unit rise of military expenditure will lead to 
about 0.556727 rises in China’s inclusive growth; hence, this is an indication that military 
expenditure exhibits a direct and significant long-run relationship on inclusive growth.  
Corruption is the proxy of institutional quality in the model. From the analysis, it show that the 
coefficient of corruption  as 0.443946  and it is statistically significant at 5% level The 
implication is that a unit rise of corruption will lead to about 0.443946 rise in inclusive growth. 
The implication of this is that there is the presence of positive additive of institutional quality 
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(proxy by corruption) (i.e. greasing the wheels for growth) which reduces government red tape/ 
bureaucracies, thereby promoting inclusive growth. 
Military expenditure and institutional quality is the interactive form in the model denoted by 
MCP. From the analysis the MCP coefficient show a -0.226026 and it is statistical significant at 
5%. The implication is that a unit rise of interactive form of military expenditure and institutional 
quality will lead to about 0.226026 decreases in inclusive growth. This implies that the 
interactive variable of military expenditure and institutional quality in the model retards inclusive 
growth in China. 
From the result it shows that Education denoted with EDU with coefficient 0.026490 is positive 
and not significant, also in the inclusive growth model of China. It serves as a proxy for human 
capital in the model and according to the result, the long-run coefficient of education is 
0.026490. The implication is that a unit rise of education will lead to about 0.026490 rises in 
inclusive growth. 
From the result it indicate that investment coefficient value of 0.044914 and it is statistical 
significant at 5%. The implication is that a unit rise of investment will lead to about 0.044914 
rises in inclusive growth. The implication of this is that investment has significantly influenced 
inclusive growth in China.  
Population with long-run coefficient is 5.442216 and it is statistical significant at 5%. The 
implication is that a unit rise of population will lead to about 5.442216 rises in inclusive growth. 
The result is an indication that population exhibits a positive and significant long-run 
relationship with inclusive growth in China. The implication of this is that the upsurge in the 
Chinese population is an incentive to inclusive growth in the country.  
Under the short-run aspect of the cointegration regression, the result shows that the lagged values 
of institutional quality (proxy by corruption), education, investment, military expenditure, 
military institutional quality (proxy by corruption)  all have a short-run significant impact on 
inclusive growth in China. Again, the error correction term is -0.220903 and it is statistically 
significant thus showing a good adjustment process to inclusive growth in China. 
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5.4.4.7 Post Estimation Test for Impact of Military expenditure, Institutional quality and 
Inclusive growth 1984-2017in China 
The results below present the post estimation diagnostic tests ranging from heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlations. The rationale of the post estimation tests is to ascertain the robustness of 
the results of the previous estimations. 
Table 5.45 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for China 
Null Hypothesis: No Heteroscedasticity 
F-statistic 0.552917     Prob. F(12,19) 0.8525 
Obs*R-squared 8.282429     Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.7627 
Scaled explained SS 3.270186     Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.9933 
Source: Author’s Computation 
The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity. Using the F statistics, it is discovered 
that the probability of F shows that the null hypothesis is to be accepted. Therefore, the Chinese 
model is not having the problem of heteroscedasticity which may affect the validity of the result. 
Table 5.46:  Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test for China 
No Hypothesis: No Serial Correlation  
F-statistic 0.270933     Prob. F(2,15) 0.7663 
Obs*R-squared 1.115678     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5724 
Source: –Author’s Computation 
The null hypothesis for China indicates that there is no serial correlation. Since the F-statistic is 
not significant, it is obvious that the null hypothesis is accepted while we reject the alternative 
hypothesis that there is a serial correlation. Consequently, the estimates from our model are valid 
and can be used for forecasting. 
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Figure 5.6: Stability test for China 
 
Source: Author’s Computation 
In conclusion, the stability test indicates that the model is reliable (that is, the model does fall 
within the red lines) and does not suffer from any structural break. This is an indication that the 
estimated model for China exhibits the stability required for a model that will be useful for 
forecasting. 
5.4.5 Analysis of the impact of military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017in South Africa 
This section presents the time series results on the analysis of the impact of military expenditure 
and institutional quality on inclusive growth in South Africa. 
5.4.5.1 Descriptive statistics result for the impact of military expenditure, institutional 
quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in South Africa 
Table 5.47 presents the summary statistics of the variables engaged in this study. The mean 
distribution of all the variables was presented in the second row of the table. Mean is unarguably 
one important tool for measuring central tendencies. The third row presents the maximum, while 
the fourth row shows the minimum value for all the variables. Row five presents the standard 
deviation result. The IGI which is the dependent variable has a maximum of only 0.530000, and 
the minimum is as low as 0.090000 with a mean of 0.357083 which is closer to the minimum 
than the maximum. This result strongly lays credence to the extant a priori expectations that 
inclusive growth (IGI) is on the average for the countries is relatively low during the period in South 
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Africa. The implication here is that, during the period under review, Inclusive growth in China 
has never gone below 9 per cent. 
Moreover, the results for all the independent variables, namely, Inv, log of pop, MCP, me, cor 
and edu follow similar maximum and minimum trends with the inclusive growth (IGI). For 
instance, MCP shows 27.74255 for the maximum, whereas the minimum is as low as 0.0000 and 
its mean value of 7.358225 which is closer to the minimum than the maximum. We can, 
therefore, infer that MCP has been very erratic and unprecedented, looking at the gap between 
the minimum and the maximum. 
We recall from the background and computation of the incidence of inclusive growth and the 
trend of military expenditure in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.12 that there is persistent rise in the 
incidence of inclusive growth in South Africa despite the increase and growth in the military 
expenditure. Our result validated this claim as both the values of Inclusive growth and military 
expenditure are positively related and are increasing. Nevertheless, the information shown in the 
summary statistics can be subjected to further empirical investigation. 
Table 5.47: Summary of descriptive statistics for military expenditure, institutional quality 
and inclusive growth 1984-2017in South Africa 
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean 0.357083 1.007243 17.62070 7.358225 1.741681 3.669823 4.127302 
 Median 0.373750 0.744786 17.64714 4.159098 1.383167 2.973958 5.035659 
 Maximum 0.530000 5.978862 17.85359 27.74255 4.623759 6.000000 6.371640 
 Minimum 0.090000 -0.654029 17.31621 0.000000 0.000000 2.000000 0.000000 
 Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 5.48 shows the correlation structure of the adopted variables. The variables show different 
associations with one another. Nevertheless, we show particular interest in the association 
between dependent variable IGI and other independent variables in the table, since this is our 
main interest in this section of the study. IGI weakly and positively correlates with INV, LNPOP 
and EDU with the value rates of 0.512561, 0.384919 and 0.524413, respectively, but negatively 
correlates with MCP, ME and COR. These results show a weak correlation existing between the 
endogenous and the exogenous variables. The implication is that there is no problem of 
multicollinearity in the model. 
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Table 5.48: Covariance matrix for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth 1984-2017in South Africa  
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI 1.000000       
INV 0.512561 1.000000      
LNPOP 0.384919 0.525872 1.000000     
MCP -0.474217 -0.532869 -0.915638 1.000000    
ME -0.376637 -0.484340 -0.914332 0.974136 1.000000   
COR -0.438434 -0.555637 -0.912755 0.859316 0.793938 1.000000  
EDU 0.524413 0.281283 0.343184 -0.412702 -0.292744 -0.461120 1.000000 
Source: Author’s Computation 
One of the major reasons for conducting a Covariance matrix is to ascertain the presence of 
multicollinearity or otherwise among the independent variables. The result on South Africa 
Covariance matrix has therefore shown that three are negative and three are positive, it shows all 
independent variables can be included in the same model without the fear of multicollinearity. 
5.4.5.2 Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth for 
South Africa  
Various studies such as Kutu and Ngalawa, 2016; Omolade and Ngalawa, 2014 among others 
have advised researchers to always use more than one methods of time series unit root test in 
order to be sure of the order of integration of the variables to be included in a particular model... 
For this study, both the ADF and PP methods of time series unit root tests are adopted for 
consistency. Their results are presented in Table 5.49. 
Table 5.49: Unit root test for military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive 
growth for South Africa  
  Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Phillips-Perron (PP) Status 
  Level First Diff Level First Diff  
Variables Statistics P-value Stat. P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics P-value  
IGI 0.7389 0.3945 2.5814 0.0101 0.7286 0.3993 4.1703 0.0000 I(1) 
INV 0.4751 0.5079 3.0426 0.0026 2.2094 0.0267 1.7082 0.0029 I(1) 
LNPOP 0.7017 0.8657 1.6646 0.0906 13.2446 1.0000 1.8965 0.0555 I(1) 
MCP 4.3377 0.0000 - - 4.3268 0.0000   I(0) 
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ME 3.0257 0.0027 .- - 3.3341 0.0010   I(0) 
COR 1.7082 0.0829 3.4013 0.0008 2.2802 0.0223 2.0246 0.0022 I(1) 
EDU 1.1041 0.2435 2.9745 0.0032 1.0848 0.2507 3.7597 0.0002 I(0) 
Source: Author’s computation 
It is evident from Table 5.49 that all the variables are either stationary at levels or after the first 
difference. The implication of this is that they are suitable for all the analysis adopted in the 
study. The methods of the panel unit root test give the same levels of integration for each 
variable. This speaks volume of the consistency level of the panel unit root results. Furthermore, 
the results indicate that apart from the military expenditure (ME), the interactive form of military 
expenditure and corruption(which is proxy for institutional quality) that are stationary at levels, 
all other variables in the table are stationary after the first difference that is the integration of 
order one I (1). 
5.4.5.3 Test for Structural Breaks  
Bai and Perron (2003) argue that time series data often possess sudden changes either in the 
mean or in the other parameters that bring about the series. The structural break test enables us to 
identify the particular time the changes occur, if any. If this is not identified and corrected, it 
could lead to a misleading result. Therefore, we need to correct for a structural break in the series 
if the break is significant.  
Table 5.50: Structural Breaks Result 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1989Q1 1994Q1 1999Q1 2005Q1 2011Q1  
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4  
F-statistic 7.449654  Prob. F(10,124) 0.0000 
Log likelihood ratio 63.98665  Prob. Chi-Square(10) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic  74.49654  Prob. Chi-Square(10) 0.0000 
Source: Author’s Computation 
From Table 5.50, we can identify five (5) breaking points in the chosen variables and the years 
where those breaks occurred. Therefore we proceed to test if the breaking points are significant 
by adding dummy variables to the model and regressing in the model.  
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5.4.5.4 The ARDL lag Determinants 
Table 5.51: Lag Order Selection Result 
  
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI POP ME MCP INV COR EDU  
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -2830.749 NA   4.26e+10  44.33983  44.49580  44.40321 
1 -1791.591  1948.422  8140.549  28.86861  30.11637  29.37558 
2 -1773.222  32.43260  13222.23  29.34722  31.68678  30.29779 
3 -1736.882  60.18893  16383.17  29.54503  32.97637  30.93920 
4 -1466.510  418.2317  532.1660  26.08609  30.60923  27.92386 
5 -1198.342  385.4913   18.27430*   22.66159*   28.27652*   24.94297* 
6 -1182.549  20.97454  33.29069  23.18046  29.88718  25.90543 
7 -1154.098  34.67488  51.58160  23.50153  31.30005  26.67011 
8 -1077.725   84.72680*  39.56869  23.07382  31.96413  26.68600 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% 
level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 5.51 above shows the ARDL optimal lag result. The optimal lag length was obtained for 
the regression estimates of the variables under study. This was done using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn information criterion(HQIC), sequential modified 
LR test statistics (LR), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and final prediction error (FPE) which 
are mostly used in ARDL estimation (see Dritsakis, 2011). Relying on the merit that different 
variables can be assigned different lags as they enter the ARDL model that (as indicated in Table 
5.9 above). This study tested for various lag lengths selection criteria, and we chose five lag 
lengths since four out of the five criteria were chosen by FPE, AIC, SC and HQ at 5% level each. 
Hence, this forms the optimal lag length, which is used for the regression. 
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5.4.5.4 ARDL Bounds test for impact of military expenditure, institutional quality and 
inclusive growth 1984-2017in South Africa 
After the confirmation of time series properties of the variables, the next is the cointegration test 
before the estimation of the ARDL regression for both long and short-run periods. The result of 
the ARDL bound test for cointegration is presented in Table 5.52. 
Table 5.52: ARDL bounds test results for military expenditure, institutional quality and 
inclusive growth 1984-2017in South Africa  
ARDL Bounds Test   
Sample: 1984Q3 2017Q1   
Included observations: 131   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value k   
F-statistic 5.963981 6   
Critical Value Bounds   
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
                Source: Author’s Computation 
The ARDL bound test results indicate that there is a long-run relationship between military 
expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth in South Africa since the calculated value 
of the F statistics is greater than 5% critical values at both lower and upper bounds. This shows 
that there is co-movement among military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth.    
5.4.5.5 ARDL Co integrating and long-run form for the impact of military expenditure, 
institutional quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in South Africa 
After the confirmation of cointegration among variables, the next line of action is to estimate the 
short-run and long-run form of the coefficients. The results are presented in Table 5.53. 
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Table 5.53: ARDL Co integrating and long-run form result for military expenditure, 
institutional quality and inclusive growth 1984-2017in South Africa  
ARDL Co integrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 1)  
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
Co integrating Form 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(IGI(-1)) 0.052673 0.089206 0.590466 0.5561 
D(IGI(-2)) 0.052673 0.089206 0.590466 0.5561 
D(IGI(-3)) 0.052673 0.089206 0.590466 0.5561 
D(IGI(-4)) -0.528956 0.085373 -6.195822 0.0000 
D(INV) -0.000580 0.003814 -0.152091 0.8794 
D(LNPOP) 0.111570 0.116968 0.953851 0.3422 
D(MCP) -0.015626 0.005826 -2.681943 0.0084 
D(ME) 0.087747 0.036155 2.426989 0.0168 
D(EDU) 0.014417 0.003025 4.766461 0.0000 
D(EDU(-1)) 0.000000 0.003259 0.000000 1.0000 
D(EDU(-2)) -0.000000 0.003259 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(EDU(-3)) -0.007774 0.003876 -2.005789 0.0473 
D(EDU(-4)) 0.008425 0.003070 2.744161 0.0071 
D(COR) 0.074138 0.025810 2.872519 0.0049 
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D(DM1) -0.127682 0.042624 -2.995553 0.0034 
D(DM2) -0.110190 0.062646 -1.758939 0.0816 
D(DM3) -0.051776 0.074290 -0.696947 0.4874 
D(DM4) -0.030734 0.088141 -0.348691 0.7280 
D(DM5) -0.075115 0.101554 -0.739652 0.4612 
CointEq(-1) -0.150152 0.082564 -1.818606 0.0116 
     
Long Run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INV -0.003863 0.026497 -0.145785 0.8844 
LNPOP 0.743047 0.717124 1.036148 0.3023 
MCP -0.104067 0.049354 -2.108611 0.0372 
ME 0.584392 0.285228 2.048860 0.0428 
EDU -0.011508 0.021213 -0.542515 0.5885 
COR 0.151391 0.086745 1.745255 0.0837 
DM1 0.007596 0.088441 0.085889 0.9317 
DM2 0.049426 0.096129 0.514169 0.6082 
DM3 0.031379 0.105171 0.298360 0.7660 
DM4 0.120996 0.089729 1.348459 0.1805 
DM5 -0.133898 0.135446 -0.988564 0.3252 
C -13.466066 12.969321 -1.038302 0.3013 
Note- DM1, DM2, DM3, DM3, DM4 and DM5 represent the dummy for the five structural 
breaks points identified within the time series data. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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Considering the individual variable in the context of South Africa, the result revealed that 
military expenditure(ME) has a  positive coefficient of  0.584392 and it is statistical significant at 
5% . The implication is that a unit rise of military expenditure will lead to about 0.584392 rises 
in inclusive growth. The implication of this is that military expenditure will positively and 
significantly stimulate inclusive growth in South Africa. 
The result from the analysis revealed that Corruption (COR) the proxy for institutional quality 
within the model has a positive coefficient of 0.151391 and it is statistical significant at 10%. 
The implication is that a unit increase of corruption will lead to about 0.151391 increases in 
inclusive growth. This indicates there is a presence of positive additive impact of corruption (i.e. 
greasing the wheels for growth) therefore promoting inclusive growth.  
Another variable employed in the model is education. The result indicate that education (EDU) 
has a positive coefficient of 0.011508 but insignificant. The implication is that a unit increase of 
education will lead to about 0.011508 increases in inclusive growth. The implication of this is 
that South African education system stimulates inclusive growth.  
The investment (INV) long-run positive coefficient is 0.003863 but it is insignificant. The 
implication is that a unit increase of investment will lead to about 0.003863 increases in inclusive 
growth. The result is an indication that investment exhibits a direct but not significant long-run 
relationship with inclusive growth. The implication of this is that there is a need for more 
investment to ensure inclusive growth.  
However, the interactive form of military expenditure and institutional quality (MCP) have 
negative coefficient of 0.104067 and it is statistical significant at 5%. The implication is that a 
unit rise of the interactive form of military expenditure and institutional quality lead to about 
0.104067 decreases inclusive growth. The implication of this is that the interactive form of 
military expenditure and institutional quality retards inclusive growth.  
The population long-run negative coefficient is 0.504764 but it is insignificant. The implication 
is that a unit rise of the population leads to about 0.504764 decrease inclusive growth. The 
implication of this is that South Africa population growth rate undermines the actualisation of 
inclusive growth.  
Under the short-run aspect of the cointegration regression,  the result shows that the lagged 
values of institutional quality (proxy by corruption), education, investment, military expenditure, 
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military institutional quality (proxy by corruption)  all have short-run significant impact on 
inclusive growth in South Africa. The error correction term, as usual, is rightly signed and 
significant. 
5.4.5.6 Post estimation test for that impact of military expenditure, institutional quality and 
inclusive growth 1984-2017in South Africa 
The post estimation diagnostic tests ranging from heteroscedasticity and serial correlations for 
South Africa are presented in Tables 5.54 and 5.55. The rationale of the post estimation tests is to 
ascertain the robustness of the estimated ARDL regression results. 
Table 5.54: Heteroscedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test for South Africa 
Null Hypothesis: No Heteroscedasticity  
F-statistic 0.546328     Prob. F(15,16) 0.8755 
Obs*R-squared 10.83854     Prob. Chi-Square(15) 0.7640 
Scaled explained SS 1.903403     Prob. Chi-Square(15) 1.0000 
Source: – Author’s Computation 
The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity. Using the F statistics, it is discovered 
that the probability of F shows that the null hypothesis is to be accepted. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the model is not having the problem of heteroscedasticity, which may affect the 
validity of the result. 
Table 5.55:  Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test for South Africa 
Null Hypothesis: No Serial Correlation   
F-statistic 2.497440     Prob. F(2,14) 0.1182 
Obs*R-squared 8.414697     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0149 
Source: Author’s Computation 
The null hypothesis for the serial correlation test in South Africa indicates that there is no serial 
correlation. Since the F-statistic and the probability values are 2.497440 and 0.1182, 
respectively. The null hypothesis is to be accepted while we reject the alternative hypothesis that 
there is a serial correlation. 
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Figure 5.7: Stability test for South Africa 
 
Source: Author’s Computation 
In conclusion, the stability test indicates that the model is reliable (that is, the model falls within 
the red lines) and does not suffer from any structural break. This is an indication that the 
estimated results exhibit the stability required for a model that will be useful for forecasting. 
5.4.6 Comparison of the results on inclusive growth model with other conventional 
development indicator models 
In order to test the uniqueness, consistency or otherwise of the inclusive growth index that is 
computed in this study, the results of the impacts of military expenditure and institutional quality 
on inclusive growth are compared with other conventional development indicators such as GDP 
growth rate (Economic growth) and per capita income that have been used in previous studies 
such Destek (2016), Zhong et al. (2016), Chang et al. (2015), Hatemi-J et al. (2017), Hatemi-J et 
al. (2015), Dash et al. (2016). In these studies, the per capita income and GDP growth rate 
(Economic growth) were used as development indicators and the dependent variable on which 
the effect of military expenditure was investigated. 
Again, this effort became imperative because to the best of the knowledge of the author, this 
study is the first attempt to compute an inclusive growth index for the economic bloc hence the 
need to test its efficiency, uniqueness and the novelty in general. It will let us know if it produces 
outliers as a result of significant differences that are not theoretically and empirically justifiable. 
The analysis is done using individual country base analysis. 
Table 5.56: Results on inclusive growth, Economic growth and per capital income models  
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Country  
 
 
LONG RUN 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
BRAZIL  Inclusive growth 
as dependent 
variable 
GDP annual % as  
dependent variable 
Per Capita Income 
% as dependent 
variable 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
ME 0.1903*** 
(0.9116) 
3.919048** 
(1.859501) 
3.831907** 
(1.755082) 
COR 0.4190*** 
(0.9817) 
2.701590 
(3.121041) 
2.642287 
(3.073351) 
 
MCP -0.027483*** 
(-0.7117) 
-2.313193 
(1.798294) 
-2.265329 
(1.770904) 
EDU 0.040579*** 
(-2.1136) 
0.68618 
(0.144785) 
0.681247*** 
(0.142632) 
INV  0.013906 
(-0.4288) 
0.439786** 
(0.085249) 
0.432712** 
(0.079494) 
 
POP -1.065010*** 
(1.612903) 
5.653634** 
(2.188610) 
4.569425** 
(2.155026) 
CointEq(-1) 
ECT  
-0.1172** 
(2.4698) 
-2.010631** 
(0.414221) 
-2.014027** 
(0.415035) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
LONG-RUN    
ME  0.075768*** 
(-5.1296) 
1.833696*** 
(0.373000) 
1.557639*** 
(0.386908) 
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COR  -0.183616*** 
(-2.7270) 
4.734802** 
(2.196525) 
4.706125** 
(2.167861) 
MCP 0.046611** 
(2.8829) 
2.407256*** 
(0.523994) 
2.368111*** 
(0.541664) 
EDU 0.007166 
(-0.9385) 
1.743321*** 
(0.441280) 
1.728837*** 
(0.458239) 
INV 0.013326** 
(-0.8171) 
0.819451** 
(0.015339) 
0.812926** 
(0.029111) 
POP -1.484741 
(-1.0834) 
1.591407 
(2.316045) 
0.382257 
(2.402430) 
CointEq(-1) 
ECT  
-0.5626*** 
(-3.8042) 
-2.161112** 
(0.272238) 
-2.193846** 
(0.283959) 
INDIA LONG-RUN     
ME  0.223959 
(0.7563) 
22.198858** 
(9.154600) 
21.959629** 
(8.921385) 
COR -0.162477 
(0.5249) 
-24.198858 
(13.054565) 
-23.803245 
(12.823083) 
MCP 0.078073  
(-0.1778) 
7.969644 
(4.457542) 
7.837201 
(4.378322) 
EDU -0.002070 
(-0.2302) 
0.613279** 
(0.268873) 
0.602996** 
(0.264320) 
INV -0.011186 
(-0.3424) 
2.6854472** 
(0.115955) 
2.644325** 
(0.100498) 
POP 0.093123 
(-0.3729) 
5.342951 
(2.920733) 
4.216146 
(2.871146) 
198 
 
CointEq(-1) 
ECT  
-0.167315*** 
(-2.981671) 
-1.243786** 
(0.289324) 
-1.242356** 
(0.288856) 
    
CHINA LONG-RUN    
ME  0.5567*** 
(2.3106) 
12.747205** 
(5.775693) 
12.596196** 
(5.735140) 
COR 0.4440*** 
(3.0960) 
15.462032*** 
(4.442594) 
15.295601*** 
(4.408808) 
MCP -0.2260*** 
(-3.2195) 
-6.591925*** 
(2.080239) 
-6.521597*** 
(2.06535) 
EDU -0.0264 
(0.5661 
6.442079*** 
(2.059029) 
6.392787*** 
(2.042192) 
 
INV -0.044914 
(-2.0725) 
1.501020*** 
(0.089399) 
1.491976*** 
(0.086590) 
POP -5.442216*** 
(2.8171) 
-0.989676 
(3.251947) 
-2.028573 
(12.843628) 
CointEq(-1) 
ECT  
-1.453658** 
(0.402880) 
-0.724131** 
(0.176870) 
-0.723104** 
(0.176884) 
     
South 
Africa 
LONG-RUN     
ME  0.584392*** 
(2.0489) 
3.238539*** 
(0.964274) 
3.198722*** 
(0.949724) 
COR 0.151391*** 
(1.7453) 
1.673626*** 
(0.495893) 
1.642390*** 
(0.488388) 
199 
 
MCP -0.104067*** 
(-2.1086) 
-0.599474*** 
(0.197147) 
-0.591037*** 
(0.194180) 
EDU 0.011508** 
(-0.5425) 
0.877852*** 
(0.181566) 
0.863060*** 
(0.178828) 
INV 0.03863 
(-0.1458) 
1.006121*** 
(0.087987) 
0.994755*** 
(0.083720) 
POP -0.743047*** 
(1.0361) 
-5.931991*** 
(1.190381) 
-6.837041*** 
(1.172335) 
CointEq(-1) 
ECT  
-0.1501* 
(-1.8186) 
-1.275532** 
0.189187 
-1.277448** 
(0.189705) 
Notes: Dependent variables: Inclusive growth (model I); GDP annual % (model II) and Per 
Capita % (model III); robust standard errors are indicated in parenthesis ***, **,* indicates 
significance at 1, 5 % and 10 % levels. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
(1) Brazil interpretation 
As discussed before, the result of the inclusive growth model as discussed shows that the 
coefficient of military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth is positive. 
However, the interactive relationship between military expenditure and institutional quality, 
education, investment and population were negative and significant. But the coefficient of 
investment was not significant. For Model II which is the economic growth model, the results 
also show that military expenditure exhibits a positive and significant relationship with the 
economic growth of Brazil. The same result goes for institution quality and economic growth but 
the interaction of military expenditure and institutional quality failed to produce a significant 
impact on the economic growth of Brazil. The result of the per capita income model for Brazil 
shows a similar result with the economic growth model. The interaction of military expenditure 
and institutional quality also failed to have a significant impact on per capita income. Although it 
is also negative signs like inclusive growth and economic growth model, the inclusive growth 
model short-run result shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was 
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significant at 5% and had a negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -1.49 implied that 
the speed of adjustment to equilibrium after a shock was high. As such, disequilibrium from 
shock in the previous year converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year 
with an adjustment speed of 149 %, appropriately. The economic growth model short-run result 
shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and had a 
negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -2.01 implied that the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium after a shock was high such that a disequilibrium from shock in the previous year 
converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an adjustment speed of 
201 %, appropriately. Similarly, the short-run result for per capita income model shows that the 
coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and had a negative sign, as 
expected. The ECT estimated of -2.01 implied that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium after a 
shock was high. As such, disequilibrium from shock in the previous year converged quickly back 
to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an adjustment speed of 201 %, appropriately.  
(2) Russia interpretation 
 The results on Russia for all the three models, namely, inclusive growth, economic growth and 
per capita income models, are overwhelmingly the same. They show that there is consistency in 
the results obtained for the inclusive growth and the remaining two. The result of Russia is 
different from that of Brazil in that the interaction of military expenditure and institutional 
quality produced a significant positive impact on all the three growth indicators used, unlike the 
negative relationship that was seen in Brazil estimated models.  This is an indication that the 
institutional quality in Russia supports military expenditure to have a significant positive impact 
on their economic development. In the same vein, the short-run result for an inclusive growth 
model shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and 
had a negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -2.40 implied that the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium after a shock was high. Thus, disequilibrium from shock in the 
previous year converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an 
adjustment speed of 240 %, appropriately. While, the short-run result for economic growth 
model for Russia shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 
5% and had a negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -2.18 implied that the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium after a shock was high. As such, disequilibrium from shock in the 
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previous year converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an 
adjustment speed of 218%, appropriately. Lastly, the per capita income model short-run result 
shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and had a 
negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -2.19 implied that the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium after a shock was high. Thus, disequilibrium from shock in the previous year 
converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an adjustment speed of 
219 %, appropriately. 
(3) India interpretation 
The results on India for the three models present a clear difference from what we noticed under 
Russia and Brazil. Notwithstanding, economic growth and per capita income models show a 
similar result in that military expenditure shows a significant positive relationship with economic 
growth and per capita income respectively in India. However, the inclusive growth model shows 
a different situation where military expenditure fails to have a significant positive impact on 
inclusive growth. All other variables such as military expenditure interaction with institutional 
quality as well as institutional quality fail to have a significant impact on inclusive growth, 
economic growth and per capita income in the results of India. The inclusive growth model 
short-run result shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 
5% and had a negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -0.90 implied that the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium after a shock was high. As such, disequilibrium from shock in the 
previous year converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an 
adjustment speed of 90 %, appropriately. Again, the economic growth model short-run result 
shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was -1.24 significant at 5% and had 
a negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -1.24 implied that the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium after a shock was high. Thus, disequilibrium from shock in the previous year 
converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an adjustment speed of 
124 %, appropriately. Finally, the per capita income model short-run result for India shows that 
the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was -1.24 significant at 5% and had a negative 
sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -1.24 implied that the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium after a shock was high. Thus, disequilibrium from shock in the previous year 
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converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an adjustment speed of 
124 %, appropriately. 
(4) China  interpretation 
 The results from China on the three models almost give the same result. The following three 
variables which are the core independent variables of interest, namely, military expenditure, 
institutional quality and military expenditure interaction with institutional quality were all 
significant in all three models. It is almost a similar result to what was obtained under Brazil 
models. Military expenditure and institutional quality both show a significant positive 
relationship with inclusive growth, economic growth and per capita income but the interaction of 
military expenditure and institution quality failed to produce a positive and significant impact on 
inclusive growth, economic growth and per capita income. The inclusive growth short-run result 
in China shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and 
had a negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -1.45 implied that the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium after a shock was high. As such, disequilibrium from shock in the 
previous year converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an 
adjustment speed of 145 %, appropriately. Similarly, the economic growth model short-run result 
shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and had a 
negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -0.7241 implied that the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium after a shock was high. Thus, disequilibrium from shock in the previous year 
converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an adjustment speed of 
72 %, appropriately. Also, per capita income model short-run results for China show that the 
coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and had a negative sign, as 
expected. The ECT estimated of -0.7231 implied that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium 
after a shock was high. As such, disequilibrium from shock in the previous year converged 
quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an adjustment speed of 72 %, 
appropriately.  
(5) South Africa  interpretation 
The results from South Africa’s three models are also similar. The summary of the result is the 
same as what we obtained under Brazil and China. The results on an inclusive growth model, 
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economic growth model and per capita income model generally show that the same variables are 
significant across the three models. Like what was obtained in Brazil and China, the interaction 
of military expenditure and institution quality also failed to have a positive significant impact. 
Notwithstanding military expenditure and institutional quality individually show a significant 
positive relationship with inclusive growth, economic growth and per capita income in South 
Africa. The inclusive growth model short-run result shows that the coefficient of the error 
correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and had a negative sign, as expected. The ECT 
estimated of -2.47 implied that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium after a shock was high. As 
such, disequilibrium from shock in the previous year converged quickly back to long-run 
equilibrium in the current year with an adjustment speed of 247 %, appropriately. Again, the 
economic growth model short-run result shows that the coefficient of the error correction term 
(ECT) was significant at 5% and had a negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -1.27 
implied that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium after a shock was high. Thus, disequilibrium 
from shock in the previous year converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current 
year with an adjustment speed of 127 %, appropriately. Finally, the short-run result for per capita 
income shows that the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) was significant at 5% and 
had a negative sign, as expected. The ECT estimated of -1.27 implied that the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium after a shock was high. Thus, disequilibrium from shock in the 
previous year converged quickly back to long-run equilibrium in the current year with an 
adjustment speed of 127 %, appropriately. 
In conclusion, the effort to compare the results obtained on the inclusive growth model with 
other models used by previous authors appears to have yielded the desired results. Firstly, it has 
shown some degrees of consistencies with other growth indicator models in many areas. 
Secondly, it has shown some differences with justifiable reasons. 
In terms of consistency, the results obtained for Russia, China and South Africa are similar 
across the three models. In other words, all the variables that were significant under the inclusive 
model are also the same as that of economic growth model and per capita income model for 
these three countries.  
However, some significant differences are also evident in the results. For instance, under Brazil, 
the interaction of military expenditure and institutional quality which shows the negative sign for 
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all the three models is only significant in the inclusive growth model but not significant under the 
economic growth and per capita income models. This is an indication that the debilitating effect 
of military expenditure interaction of institutional quality appears not to be significant when 
economic growth and per capita income are used. But with the usage of inclusive growth, it 
becomes clearer that the negative impact of this variable is significant.  Other outstanding 
differences are also noticed under India. All the variables that are significant under the economic 
growth and per capita income models are not significant under the inclusive growth model. Most 
important of these variables is military expenditure which is shown to be significant in both 
economic growth and per capita income model but not significant under the inclusive growth 
model. This is an indication that the belief that military expenditure has a significant positive 
impact on the growth of India might be erroneous when inclusive growth is used to proxy 
growth.    
Table 5.57: Post estimation test results for all the three estimated models on individual 
countries 
Country Diagnostics Model1 Model 2 Model 3 
BRAZIL Cointegration test    
F statistics 6.052933 3.846919 3.84883 
Lower at 5% 3.23 3.23 3.23 
Upper at 5% 3.99 3.99 3.61 
Serial correlation 
test 
   
F statistics 2.907085 6.5511506 6.503902 
Probability 0.0905 0.0100 0.0101 
Heteroscedasticity 
test 
   
F statistics 0.577655 0.846575 0.847183 
Probability 0.8565 0.6242 0.6237 
Normality Test    
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JARQUE BERA 0.914470 0.860135 0.849125 
Probability 0.633032 0.650465 0.654056 
     
RUSSIA     
Cointegration test    
F statistics 7.363916 6.868184 6.817248 
Lower at 5% 3.23 3.23 3.23 
Upper at 5% 3.99 3.99 3.99 
Serial correlation 
test 
   
F statistics 4.703732 2.242888 3.072865 
Probability 0.0334 0.1487 0.0836 
Heteroscedasticity 
test 
   
F statistics 4.642078 1.482117 1.253703 
Probability 0.0036 0.2312 0.3382 
Normality Test    
JARQUE BERA 0.995457 2.180203 1.935405 
Probability 0.607910 0.336182 0.379955 
 
     
INDIA     
Cointegration test    
F statistics 4.119241 3.924320 3.928960 
Lower at 5% 3.23 3.23 3.23 
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Upper at 5% 3.99 3.99 3.99 
Serial correlation 
test 
   
F statistics 0.183257 12.17440 12.11840 
Probability 0.8341 0.0010 0.0011 
Heteroscedasticity 
test 
   
F statistics 0.522786 1.245096 1.243982 
Probability 0.8654 0.3380 0.3386 
Normality Test    
JARQUE BERA 0.631021 0.771847 0.777519 
Probability 0.729416 0.679823 0.677897 
     
CHINA     
Cointegration test    
F statistics 2.287263 6.339673 6.294887 
Lower at 5% 3.23 3.23 3.23 
Upper at 5% 3.99 3.99 3.99 
Serial correlation 
test 
   
F statistics 0.228031 2.139876 2.180429 
Probability 0.7998 0.1546 0.1498 
Heteroscedasticity 
test 
   
F statistics 0.563749 2.641532 2.668204 
Probability 0.8714 0.0314 0.0301 
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Normality Test    
JARQUE BERA 4.849865 0.839394 0.839623 
Probability 0.088484 0.657246 0.657171 
     
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
    
Cointegration test    
F statistics 5.678228 5.967575 5.949699 
Lower at 5% 3.23 3.23 3.23 
Upper at 5% 3.99 3.99 3.99 
Serial correlation 
test 
   
F statistics 3.152914 2.526772 2.582216 
Probability 0.0917 0.1113 0.1067 
Heteroscedasticity 
test 
   
F statistics 0.796417 0.843145 0.840386 
Probability 0.6836 0.6166 0.6189 
Normality Test    
JARQUE BERA 1.038820 19.24733 19.74499 
 Probability 0.594871 0.000066 0.000052 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Generally, four-post estimation tests are carried out for each of the three models estimated for the 
five countries. The heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, normality and stability tests. All their 
results are presented in Table 5.40. The results show that they are largely in order and confirmed 
the validity of the estimates in all the three models for all the five countries. For instance, the null 
hypothesis that there is no heteroscedasticity is accepted for all the three models across the five 
countries because the probability of the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F statistics is not significant.  
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Similarly, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is also accepted because the Breusch-
Godfrey F statistics probability is not statistically significant across the five countries for all the 
three models. In the same vein, the normality test for all the five countries and for the three 
models is also good. The Jarque-Bera Statistics probability is also not significant at 5% in all the 
models thus, confirming that the residuals of all the models conform to normal distribution. 
In conclusion, all the models also passed the stability tests as depicted by the figures in the 
appendix where the cumulative sum of recursive (CUSUM) and CUSUM of squares 
(CUSUMSQ) graphical illustrations show that the plots of the residual do not cross the 5% 
critical lines of parameter stability. This, in essence, means the stability of the long- run 
parameters of the military expenditure, institutional quality, and inclusive growth over the period 
1984 to 2017 for all the three models and across the five countries.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
1.1. Introduction 
The focus of this study has been to examine the relationship between military expenditure, 
institutional quality, and inclusive growth in BRICS countries 1970 to 2017. Three sub-
objectives are identified and have been empirically analysed in the previous chapter. The 
objectives are to investigate determinants of BRICS military expenditure from 1970 to 2017; 
computation of BRICS inclusive growth index; and assessment of the combined impact of 
military expenditure and institutional quality on Inclusive growth in BRICS countries. These 
three areas are interrelated with the core-stylised information on BRICS military setting and their 
developmental challenges: the high growth, poor people dilemma; the core determinant of 
military expenditure as a public good, establishment of whether the impact of military 
expenditure on BRICS inclusive growth depends on the institution quality or not are all 
interwoven. Therefore, the analysis encompasses these three inter-related topics, although 
separated for clarity.  
The results and interpretation presented in the previous chapter follow the following 
arrangement. The first objective, which deals with the determinant for BRICS military 
expenditure, is investigated by adopting the neoclassical demand model and panel data 
estimation techniques. The second objective has to do with developing a BRICS inclusive 
growth index from 1970 to 2017. The inclusive growth index is a composition of 10 socio-
economic development indicators which Z-score technique harmonized them to generate the 
inclusive growth index. The third objective analysed the impact of BRICS countries' military 
expenditure and institutional quality on its inclusive growth using the (Aizenman and Glick, 
2006) model.  The data period was reduced to 1984 to 2017
3
. Discussions on each of the results 
presented for each of the objectives are as follows. 
 
                                                          
3The ICRG database only started from 1984, so this inform the reduction from 1970 to 1984 for a 
more equitable and reliable inferences to be made. 
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1.2. Discussions of result for Objective 1: Determinant for BRICS military 
expenditure 1970 to 2017 
This section discusses the empirical result of the determinant for the military expenditure of 
BRICS countries from 1970 to 2017 employing the panel data analysis approach. Based on the 
detailed theoretical and empirical literature on determinant for military expenditure, the 
neoclassical model was considered the best to analyse determinant of BRICS countries military 
expenditure. BRICS countries' political economy and security factors were incorporated for 
model specification. The fixed effects results revealed that four variables have significant 
impacts on military expenditure namely security web, GDP, inflation, and Trade Balance (TB). 
The Security Web represents the variables that captured the possibility of the arms race for each 
BRICS neighbour. The coefficient is significant and positive. The implication of this is that there 
is a positive significant security web among BRICS and their neighbouring countries. In 
literature security web explains the tendency of a country’s military expenditure being influenced 
by her neighbour’s expenditures on the military. This is much more evident when there is 
hostility between two neighbouring countries or when a country is involved in regional or 
continental peacekeeping missions or international war (for instance, the South African Army 
joined UN peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and South 
Sudan). South Africa is considered as the 11
th
 biggest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping in 
Africa and the 17
th
 biggest in the World (SIPRI, 2019, WorldBank, 2018). 
 It thus implies that has the hostile neighbour is increasing her armouries, the country also will be 
poised to increase her expenditures on the military so as to match-up with her neighbours level of 
ammunition in case of a future attack. This finding is supported by the findings of (Rosh, 1988, 
Sun and Yu, 1999, Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003, Tambudzai, 2011) on the security web. 
Again, economic growth is the most significant determinant for military expenditure. The 
coefficient of economic growth, which is proxied by the GDP growth rate, is positive and 
significant. This indicates that BRICS countries’ economic growth is majorly responsible for the 
drive to invest in the military. The implication is that the levels of economic growth in the 
BRICS countries are important factors that influence their expenditure in the military. These 
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findings support the Keynesian school of thought on the importance of military expenditure as 
part of total government expenditure. The findings of (Tambudzai, 2011) are also in line with the 
results obtained in this study. It shows that our results on the relationship between military 
expenditure and economic growth enjoyed both theoretical and empirical support. 
The third variable with a significant effect on military expenditure is the trade balance. Since 
most of the BRICS countries buy their ammunition from developed countries, there exists a 
strong relationship between their trade balance and military expenditure. This implies that a 
favourable balance of trade encourages military expenditure in the BRICS. Some studies have 
also obtained a similar result (Yakovlev, 2007, Tambudzai, 2011). 
The fourth variable with significant effect as a determinant of BRICS military expenditure is 
inflation. The results confirm a positive and significant relationship between the two, which is an 
indication that when domestic inflation is rising, there will be a significant increase in military 
expenditure. Inflation reflects the general price level therefore whenever there is a persistent rise 
in the general price level there will be a significant increase in the expenditure on the military. 
The reason for this might not be unconnected with the fact that the value of the currency falls 
during rising inflation rate hence there will be the need to raise general expenditure in order to 
purchase what could have been purchased with the lower amount before. (Kaufman, 1972, 
Capra, 1981, Günana, 2004) in their studies also obtained a positive and significant relationship 
between military expenditure and inflation. 
However, the following variables failed to have individual significant impact on military 
expenditure; democracy index, exchange rate, external and internal threats. Notwithstanding, the 
test of the overall significance of the factors influencing military expenditure shows that the 
model is statistically significant which is an indication that all the variables used as factors 
influencing military expenditure in the BRICS are all desirable variables in the model and will 
jointly affect military expenditure significantly. On this note, as obtained in this study these 
variables are genuinely determinants of military expenditure in the BRICS. 
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1.3. Discussions of result for Objective 2: Computation of BRICS inclusive growth from 
1970 to 2017 
This section presents the discussion on the computation of BRICS Inclusive Growth Index (IGI) 
from 1970 to 2017. The computation of inclusive growth for the BRICS appears to have revealed 
some important lines of discussions concerning the inclusive growth of all the member countries. 
It would be recalled that at the introductory aspect of this study and under the literature review as 
well, an effort was made to explain the importance of inclusive growth, especially over economic 
growth indicators. Consequently, the results from the computation of inclusive growth for the 
BRICS have shown that some of the countries with promising economic growth might not have 
the kind of growth that trickles down to the poor (George, 2011). 
For instance, out of all the five countries, it was shown from the result that inclusive growth of 
Russia, China and Brazil are the highest on the average in that order while South Africa and 
India have the lowest inclusive growth. Russia has the most promising inclusive growth among 
the five countries and the implication is that the economic growth of Russia has much more 
effects on the poor than it does in the remaining four countries. The result has further supported 
the opinions of development organisations such as UNDP, UNEP, and UNESCO who have 
identified Russia and China as a leading countries among the BRICS in terms of development 
plans (WorldBank, 2009). The paces of technology and drive to reduce poverty in these two 
countries have been well commended by these organisations and their development trajectory 
have been identified as very promising. These conclusions were reached by the organisation after 
consideration of some key indicators such as the human development index, technology 
advancement, poverty, and health indicators, among others in the BRICS. Brazil also has an 
average inclusive growth that is relatively high after these two countries notwithstanding some 
developmental issues facing the country recently, it still remains one of the BRICS countries 
with promising inclusive growth. 
On the other hand, South Africa and India's inclusive growth index are not promising with India 
(that is, 0.37 and 0.38 which are below the average of 0.50 respectively) emerging as the worst 
out of the five countries. It will be noted that until 2018 November, India was categorised as the 
country with the highest number of impoverished people in the world   (WorldBank, 2009). The 
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endemic effect of poverty in India has been reflected by the inclusive growth index computed in 
this study. Again, this result is a confirmation of the findings of various international 
development organisations that have condemned the increasing rate of poverty and the poor 
human development index that is prominent in India as a member of the BRICS. All these might 
not be shown by economic growth which has been used as a parameter for assessing economic 
development by some authors. For instance, in 2015 India’s economic growth was one of the 
highest among the BRICS with about 7.5% GD growth rate compared to China then which was 
7%. However, findings from this study have shown that relying on those growth indicators might 
be misleading but instead, inclusive growth index performs better as a development indicator 
more than GDP growth rate. 
The recent downward trend in the economy of South Africa in recent times, especially within the 
last one decade, has reflected in the inclusive growth index. The study has revealed that South 
Africa’s inclusive growth is not a promising one. Although the average GDP growth rate within 
the last decade, especially in the last three years, has not shown a good outlook, the inclusive 
growth index has shown a more damning result about the level of development in Africa’s most 
developed economy. The concern raised by the Africa Development Bank, World Bank, among 
others, in 2018 about the rising inequality, unemployment and poverty generally in South Africa 
has been justified by the findings on inclusive growth index computed for South Africa in this 
study. 
Generally, it has been shown by this study that reliance on economic growth and the growth 
indicators to measure economic development might be misleading. Some development literature 
has used per capita income to proxy economic development because of its direct nexus with the 
standard of living; however, this study has shown that inclusive growth is much deeper than the 
per capita income which might not reflect the level of inclusiveness in the growth of the 
countries. 
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1.4. Discussion of Objective 3 - Analysis of the impact of military expenditure and 
institutional quality on inclusive growth for individual BRICS countries  
The author deemed it wise to toe the line of carrying data analysis for objective three research 
finding to focus on individual BRICS countries due to the heterogeneous results earlier showed 
in objective two computations of BRICS inclusive growth index for BRICS countries. Therefore, 
to capture these peculiarities the author deemed it reasonable to toe the line of carrying out 
country-based analysis for further clarifications on the relationship between military expenditure, 
institutional quality, and inclusive growth. Discussions on the results from this are summarised 
in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Discussion Table for Objective three- Individual BRICS analysis 
Countries Significant variables 
and sign 
Insignificant variables 
and sign 
Short remark 
Brazil The institutional quality 
(proxy by corruption) 
exhibits a positive long-
run relationship with 
inclusive growth. 
Other variables with 
significant impact on 
inclusive growth are 
education and 
population. 
Investment is positive but 
not significant in the long-
run on inclusive growth 
Military expenditure 
indicates a insignificant 
positive long-run 
relationship on inclusive 
growth. 
The interactive form of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality form 
exhibits an adverse but not 
long-run relationship with 
inclusive growth. 
The result indicates that 
despite the positive 
relationship between 
military expenditure and 
inclusive growth, when 
the military expenditure 
interacts with the 
institutional quality, it 
reflects a negative 
impact on inclusive 
growth but not 
significantly. 
 
 
Russia Military expenditure 
result shows a positive 
and significant 
relationship with 
inclusive growth. 
Institutional quality 
(proxy by corruption) is 
The population is negative 
and also not significant. 
 
Investment is positive but 
insignificant. 
Population is positive but 
Military expenditure 
with institutional quality 
will jointly improve 
inclusive growth.  
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negative. 
The interactive form of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality 
produce a positive 
relationship with 
inclusive growth.  
Education is negative 
also. 
 
insignificant. 
India All the variables failed to 
have a significant impact 
on inclusive growth in 
India. 
All the variables, 
including military 
expenditure, institutional 
quality, the interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional quality failed 
to have a significant 
impact on inclusive 
growth. Again, other 
control variables also do 
not have a significant 
impact on inclusive 
growth in India 
Military expenditure 
with institutional quality 
will jointly improve 
inclusive growth. 
China Military expenditure 
exhibits a positive long-
run relationship with 
inclusive growth along 
with institutional quality. 
However, military 
expenditure- and 
institutional quality 
interactive form shows a 
coefficient that is 
negative and significant.  
Population is negative 
and significant as well. 
  
Investment is positive but 
not significant.  
 
Also, education is positive 
and not significant. 
 
The result shows that 
the interaction of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality 
growth does not 
influence inclusive 
growth significantly. 
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South 
Africa 
The military expenditure 
result, inclusive growth 
both have a positive and 
direct relationship with 
inclusive growth while 
the interactive form of 
the two has a significant 
negative impact on 
inclusive growth.  
Other variables, such as 
investment, education and 
population also have 
insignificant impact. 
The result is almost 
similar to what was 
obtained in China. 
Again, the interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional quality 
failed to produce a 
significant positive 
impact on inclusive 
growth.  
 
 
In summary, China and South Africa support the assertion of adverse inclusive growth effect of 
military expenditure and institutional quality interactive form. In the two countries, military 
expenditure and institution quality exhibit positive and significant relationship with inclusive 
growth but the interaction of the two produced a significant negative impact on inclusive growth 
index of the two countries. This result is similar to the findings supported by (Compton and 
Paterson, 2016). Therefore, it shows that in China and South Africa the quality of their institution 
and the management of the expenditure on the military have not significantly and positively 
promoted inclusive growth. 
On the other hand, Russia’s interactive form of military expenditures and institutional quality is 
unique and a classic example of where military expenditure and institutional quality drives 
strong and significant inclusive growth. The result of Russia is a clear departure from the 
previous results as it indicates that apart from the fact that military expenditure and institutional 
quality individually have significant positive impacts on their inclusive growth, the interaction of 
the two also produces a significant and positive inclusive growth. The result implies that military 
expenditure drives inclusive growth in Russia due to good institutional quality. This finding has 
also shown some levels of consistency in our results because under Objective 2 of this study 
Russia has the highest average inclusive growth index among the BRICS member countries. This 
underscores the importance of government in terms of management of military expenditure in 
this country. It can, therefore, be inferred from the findings that there appears to be less 
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corruption in the management of military expenditure in Russia hence allowing it to have a 
trickling down positive effect on the society (George, 2011). This is what interaction of the two 
is meant to achieve and portray. It points to the fact that a weak institutional quality where 
corruption is endemic will weaken the positive impact of military expenditure on inclusive 
growth. The result further affirms the findings of the UNO (2010) that Russia is fast becoming 
the world superpower in terms of military armoury and that this has promoted the economic 
power of the country. The position of the UNO was premised on the fact that most of the 
expenditures of Russia on the military are basically on the production of ammunitions because 
they manufacture almost 80% of their military weapons (UNO, 2010). This implied that apart 
from the promotion of internal security which guarantees investment, the production and 
manufacturing of the weapons locally would have assisted in generating more employment 
opportunities and hence reduces inequality and poverty which is core to inclusive growth. 
The results of Brazil and India in this study are the direct opposite of Russia. Virtually all the 
indicators are not significant in the inclusive growth model of India. Firstly, the military 
expenditure failed to have a significant impact on inclusive growth, institution quality also does 
not have a significant impact on inclusive growth and most importantly, the combination of both 
which depicts the interaction between military expenditure and institutional quality also failed to 
have a significant impact on inclusive growth. The implication of this result is that the rising 
trend of military expenditure in India has not impacted significantly on their inclusive growth. 
This is worsened by the lack of quality in a government institution. Worse still, the management 
of military expenditure by the institution in India, which is shown via the interactions of both 
also failed to have a significant impact on inclusive growth of India. This result shows a high 
degree of consistency in the findings of this study as it was shown earlier under the computation 
of the inclusive growth index that India as a country has the least average inclusive growth index 
among the BRICS. However, this result has also been supported by (Yildirim and Öcal, 2016, 
Zhang et al., 2017b). Currently, India is estimated to have one-third of the world's poor. In 2012, 
37 per cent of India's 1.21 billion people fell below the international poverty line, which is $1.25 
a day (Indian Planning Commission, 2013). It would also be noted that during these periods, 
military expenditure has always been on the rise but this study has shown that the effect on 
inclusive growth is not significant. Notwithstanding, this result is contrary to the findings of 
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(Dunne, 2012, Zhang et al., 2016) who concluded that military expenditure has a positive and 
significant impact on the economic growth of India. The reason for the difference in the findings 
is not unconnected to the fact that the study used GDP growth rate while the inclusive growth 
index computed for India in this study was used in the analysis. Consequently, the developmental 
impact of military expenditure and institution quality in India leaves much to desire and this has 
culminated in the economic struggle of the second-most populous country in the World.  
Furthermore, the study compared the results of the inclusive growth model with other models 
that have been used by previous authors to investigate the effect of military expenditure and 
institutional quality. It was discovered from the existing literature on military expenditures that 
GDP growth rate and per capita income are other development indicators used by previous 
authors to measure the effectiveness of military expenditure consequently, in order to draw the 
line between the usage of these indicators and inclusive growth computed in this study, effort 
was also made to compare the results obtained under the inclusive growth model with these two 
models. The summary of the results is presented in Table 6.2.   
Table 6.2: Discussion on the comparison of results on inclusive growth, economic growth 
and per capita income models 
Country  
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
 
 
 
Remarks 
Brazil  Inclusive 
growth as 
dependent 
variable 
GDP annual % 
as  
dependent 
variable 
Per Capita 
Income % as 
dependent 
variable 
Military 
expenditure is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Military 
expenditure is 
positive and 
insignificant on 
GDP annual.   
Military 
expenditure is 
positive and 
insignificant on 
per capita income.  
In the model, I, II and III 
military expenditure alone 
it is positive but not 
significant. 
Institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
positive on the 
Institutional 
quality is positive 
and insignificant 
on GDP annual.  
Institutional 
quality is positive 
and insignificant 
on per capita 
In the model, I, II and III 
institutional quality alone 
it is positive but not 
significant. 
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inclusive growth 
index. 
 
income.  
The interactive 
form of Military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
negative on per 
capita income.  
The interactive form of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality in 
models I, II and III, it was 
negative but not 
significant. Hence, 
retarded inclusive growth 
within the Brazil countries 
for the period study. 
Education is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Education is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Education is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
Education, in model I, is 
negative and significant in 
model one; however, in 
model II, it was positive 
but not significant. In 
model III, it was positive 
and significant. 
Investment is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Investment is 
negative and 
insignificant on 
the annual GDP.  
Investment is 
negative and 
insignificant on 
per capita income. 
Investment, in model I, is 
positive but not 
significant. However, in 
models II and III, it was 
negative and significant. 
Population is 
significant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
 
Population is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
 
Population is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
 
Population was found to 
be negative at 1% in 
model I while in models II 
and III, it was negative and 
significant at 5%. 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
 
The Speed of adjustment 
(ECT) for all models (1, II 
and III) are negative and 
significant. The speed of 
adjustment is faster and 
evident in model III than 
other models. 
     
Military Military Military In model I, military 
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Russia 
 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
expenditure alone is 
significant and negative, 
whereas, in models II and 
III, it is positive and 
significant.  
Institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
In model I, Institutional 
quality alone is significant 
and positive, but in model 
II, it is positive but not 
significant. In model III, it 
is positive and significant. 
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
The interactive form of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality in 
model one is significant 
and positive. In models II 
and III, it was negative and 
significant. Therefore, the 
result here is mixed and 
inconclusive depending on 
the dependent variable 
used in the estimation. 
Education is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Education is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Education is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
Education, in model one, 
is negative but not 
significant in model I, 
however, in models II and 
III, it was positive and 
significant.  
Investment is 
significant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Investment is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Investment is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
Investment, in model I, is 
negative but not 
significant. However, in 
models II and III, it was 
positive and significant. 
Population is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Population is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Population is 
insignificant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
Population was found to 
be positive but not 
significant in models I and 
III while in model II, it 
was positive and 
significant.  
The speed of 
adjustment is 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
The Speed of adjustment 
(ECT) for all models (1, II 
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significant  and 
negative on 
inclusive growth 
index 
significant  and 
negative on GDP 
annual 
significant  and 
negative on per 
capita income 
and III) are negative and 
significant and positive. 
However, the speed of 
adjustment is more evident 
faster in model I than the 
other models. 
 
 
India     
Military 
expenditure is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Military 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Military 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
In model I, military 
expenditure alone is 
positive but significant.  
Institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
negative on GDP 
annual. 
Institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
In the models I and II, 
institutional quality alone 
is negative but not 
significant, but in model 
III, it is negative but 
significant.  
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
The interactive form of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality in 
model one is not 
significant and positive. In 
models II and III, it was 
positive and significant. 
Therefore, the result here 
is mixed and inconclusive 
depending on the 
dependent variable used in 
the estimation. 
Education is 
insignificant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Education is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Education is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
Education, in model I, is 
negative but not 
significant in model I; 
however, in models II and 
III, it was positive and 
significant.  
Investment is Investment is Investment is Investment, in model I is 
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insignificant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
negative but not 
significant. However, in 
models II and III, it was 
positive and significant. 
Population is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Population is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Population is 
insignificant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
Population was found to 
be positive but not 
significant in models I, II 
and III.  
The speed of 
adjustment is 
negative and 
significant. 
 
 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
negative and 
significant.  
 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
negative and 
significant  
 
The Speed of adjustment 
(ECT) for all models (1, II 
and III) are negative and 
significant. However, the 
speed of adjustment is 
more evident faster in 
model II than the other 
models. 
China     
Military 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Military 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Military 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
In model I, military 
expenditure alone is 
significant and positive. 
Institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
In models I and II, 
institutional quality alone 
is positive and significant, 
but in model III, it is not 
significant.  
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
The interactive form of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality in 
models I, II and III is 
significant and negative. 
Therefore, the result here 
is negative and significant 
in all the models in all the 
estimation. 
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Education is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Education is 
significant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
Education is 
significant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
Education, in model I is 
negative but not 
significant in model I, 
however, in models II and 
III, it was negative and 
significant.  
Investment is 
insignificant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Investment is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Investment is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
Investment, in model I is 
negative but not 
significant. However, in 
models II and III, it was 
positive and significant 
Population is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Population is 
insignificant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
Population is 
insignificant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
Population was found to 
be positive and significant 
in model I; In model II, it 
is negative but not 
significant while model 
III, it is negative and 
significant. 
 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on per 
capita. 
The Speed of adjustment 
(ECT) for all models (1, II 
and III) are negative and 
significant and positive. 
However, the speed of 
adjustment is more 
evidently faster in model I 
than the other models. 
South 
Africa 
    
Military 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Military 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Military 
expenditure is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
In model I, military 
expenditure alone is 
significant and positive. 
Institutional 
quality is 
insignificant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Institutional  
quality is 
significant  and 
positive on per 
capita income 
In model I, institutional 
quality alone is negative 
but not significant; model 
II, it is positive and 
significant; model III, it is 
positive and significant.  
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The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
The interactive 
form of military 
expenditure and 
institutional 
quality is 
significant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
The interactive form of 
military expenditure and 
institutional quality in 
model I, II and III, it was 
negative and significant. 
Therefore, the result here 
is conclusive  
Education is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Education is 
significant and 
positive on the 
annual GDP.  
Education is 
significant and 
positive on per 
capita income. 
Education, in model I is 
negative and significance 
in model I, however, in 
model II and III, it was 
positive and significant.  
Investment is 
insignificant  and 
negative on 
inclusive growth 
index 
Investment is 
significant  and 
negative on GDP 
annual 
Investment is 
significant  and 
negative on per 
capita income 
Investment, in model I, II 
and III is negative and 
significant. 
Population is 
significant and 
positive on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
Population is 
significant and 
negative on the 
annual GDP.  
Population is 
significant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
Population was found to 
be positive and significant 
in models I, II and III.  
 
 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on the 
inclusive growth 
index. 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on 
annual GDP. 
The speed of 
adjustment is 
significant and 
negative on per 
capita income. 
The Speed of adjustment 
(ECT) for all models (1, II 
and III) are negative and 
significant. However, the 
speed of adjustment is 
more evidently faster in 
model I than the other 
models. 
 
The summary of discussions as shown in Table 6.2 shows some degree consistencies of the 
results obtained under the inclusive growth model with the results of both economic growth and 
per capita income models. One of the major reasons behind this comparison is to either validate 
or invalidate the conclusions of some previous studies on military expenditure and growth 
relationships. However, the results from an inclusive growth model are not completely different 
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from those of economic growth and per capita income models due to the following similarities. 
Generally, the results obtained on Russia, China and South Africa is very similar across the three 
growth indicators. In other words, the same conclusions that were reached about the relationship 
between inclusive growth, military expenditure, institutional quality and other independent 
variables are similar to the conclusions obtained from when both economic growth and per capita 
income are used as dependent variables. This revelation is a pointer to that fact that the inclusive 
growth index computed in this study has not completely produced results that are outliers. 
Hence, some levels of consistency with the findings using other existing growth indicators are 
also obtained. This effort is worth it in order to verify the reliability of the results on the 
inclusive growth index since this is the first effort to compute it for the BRICS countries to the 
best of the author’s knowledge. 
Notwithstanding, some clear differences are also obtained when the findings on an inclusive 
growth model are compared with that of economic growth and per capita income models. From 
the interpretation of the result presented in Chapter 5, it appears there are justifiable reasons why 
this is so. 
Firstly, the interaction of military expenditure and institutional quality that showed a significant 
negative impact under the inclusive growth model was not significant under both economic 
growth and per capita income models. The results imply that the adverse impact of the 
interactions of military expenditure and institutional quality is significant on inclusive growth 
whereas if the findings were to be based on economic growth and per capita income results the 
conclusion would have been that the adverse impact is not significant. This might allow 
erroneous conclusion that this variable is not important in determining growth in Brazil. 
However, the results from the inclusive growth index have revealed that treating the interplay 
between military expenditure and institutional quality with “kid gloves” might be a mistake 
because the negative effect on inclusive growth is severe. 
Secondly, another area of difference is that of India. Military expenditures and institutional 
quality showed a significant impact on both economic growth and per capita income models but 
failed to show a significant impact under the inclusive growth model. The implication of this 
difference is that had it been inclusive growth index is not computed for India, there would have 
226 
 
been erroneous conclusions based on economic growth and per capita income that military 
expenditure and institution quality have a positive and significant impact on economic 
development in India.  The conclusions would have been in a direct opposite with the realities 
which is evident in the country and that has been attested to by various development agencies. 
The alarming rate of poverty, unemployment and inequalities, among others, are ravaging the 
Indian economy; all this might not be taking into account when GDP growth rate and per capita 
income are used as development indicators. Furthermore, the result implies that military 
expenditure has been rising consistently with the country’s economic growth but this has not 
reflected on inclusive growth. 
Again, another implication of this result is that institutional quality in India which shows a 
significant impact on their economic growth failed to reflect on their inclusive growth. Many 
studies such as (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, Jain, 2001, Méon and Sekkat, 2005) in the past have 
also attributed the alarming rate of poverty, inequality and high unemployment rate to lack of 
good institutions but with economic growth and per capita income, the result has gone contrary 
to this reality and showed a positive and significant relationship between institution quality and 
economic growth. This shows that the larger population of the poor in the country have not been 
positively influenced by the institutional quality in India. 
Finally, the computation of inclusive growth index for the BRICS appears to have been justified 
based on the various differences as well as similarities that exist between its model and the usual 
GDP growth rate and per capita income models that have been used by many of the past 
literature.   
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This chapter presents the summary, conclusion and proffers some recommendations based on the 
findings of the thesis. This section also highlights some recommendations for BRICS countries 
on how to sustain inclusive growth. 
7.1 Summary  
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the introduction and detailed the main 
research problem and objectives of the study. Chapter 2 covers an overview of military 
expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth of BRICS from 1970 to 2017. To 
complement the trend analysis, a survey on the economic potentials, strengths and weakness of 
each of BRICS, the trends of military expenditure; state of institutional quality and level of 
growth inclusiveness were reviewed. This revealed some socio-economic challenges faced by 
BRICS countries and also provides a good background for subsequent empirical investigation. 
Chapter 2 presents the relevant theory and empirical literature on the determinant for military 
expenditure; computation of an index; the impact of military expenditure and institutional quality 
on growth in BRICS and outside BRICS countries. The fourth chapter focuses on data and 
methodology employed for the study as well as the definition and description of key variables in 
the study. 
In Chapter 5, the empirical results are presented and interpreted. The first objective is to 
investigate the main drivers of military expenditure in BRICS countries from 1970 to 2017 and 
to explore fully the determinants of BRICS military expenditure; the study used an ICRG index 
(which has been adjudged better measure the measurement of threats) to capture external and 
internal threats. This is done by employing a cross-sectional estimation technique. The 
econometric tests utilised enabled us to identify the main determinant military expenditure in the 
BRICS. 
The second objective is based on the computation of the inclusive growth index for BRICS 
countries from 1970 to 2017. Z-sum technique was employed for the computation of the 
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inclusive growth index. Values close to zero were termed as having low growth inclusive (0.00-
0.50) while any country with an inclusive growth index rate of (0.51 to 1.00) was termed to 
having a high inclusive growth. 
The third objective examines the combined effect of military expenditure and institutional 
quality on inclusive growth in BRICS countries. The analysis was done using panel data analysis 
as well as time series analysis of individual BRICS member countries. Also, the results were 
compared with other situations where other development indicators, such as GDP growth rate 
and per capita income were used as dependent variables instead of inclusive growth. This was 
done to verify the robustness of the inclusive growth computed in this study for the first time for 
the BRICS.  
Chapter 6 includes the discussions of the empirical findings, drawing inferences and comparison 
with previous empirical studies’ results. The last chapter which is Chapter 7 which gives a 
summary of the thesis, conclusion and recommendations. 
Considering the fact that the empirical findings from all the objectives of the study are 
interwoven, all the empirical findings are summarised as follows; 
The first objective of the thesis focuses on the use of econometric methods to ascertain the major 
determinants of military expenditure in BRICS countries from 1970 to 2017. The analysis 
involved the cross-country investigation of the determinant military expenditure in BRICS 
countries using panel data analysis. The results from the fixed effect revealed that four out of the 
eight variables considered in this study are significant. The significant variables are trade 
balance, security web, GDP and inflation. They are all significant at both 1% and 5%, 
respectively. These findings, therefore, show that the major drivers of military expenditures in 
the BRICS are trade balance, security web, economic growth and inflation rate. 
Findings on the second objective which is based on the computation of BRICS Inclusive Growth 
Index (IGI) from 1970 to 2017 remain one of the most important contributions of this study. The 
computation included both the economic and social indicators in the BRICS economies. Findings 
revealed that Russia has the highest inclusive growth index on the average during the period 
under study. This is followed by China, Brazil, South Africa and India in that order. It was also 
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discovered from the result that the dominant trend in the computed inclusive growth index for 
the BRICS during the period under review is downward in nature. This shows that the inclusive 
growth index for the entire BRICS has been on a downward movement within the period 
investigated in the study. 
The third objective focuses on the impact of military expenditure and institutional quality on 
inclusive growth for BRICS countries. The analysis made use of two approaches, namely, panel 
data and time series techniques. The reason behind this is to verify the consistency of the 
individual countries results with the panel results. This will go a long way to identify the most 
dominant country among the five and it can be a useful policy reference on BRICS. Findings 
from the panel data analysis results show that military expenditure and institutional quality 
(proxy with corruption index) are positive and significant.  The implication of this is that there is 
the presence of positive additive of corruption (i.e. greasing the wheels for growth) reduces 
government red tape
4
/ bureaucracies, thereby promoting inclusive growth. The result also shows 
that there exists a positive and significant relationship between military expenditure and 
inclusive growth. Again, the interactive form of military expenditure and institutional quality 
which is also used as a variable in the model exhibits an adverse significant long-run relationship 
with inclusive growth.  
Based on the post estimation results of the panel estimation of the impact of military expenditure, 
institutional quality on inclusive growth for BRICS countries which includes cross-sectional 
dependence test and normality test, it was found necessary to conduct a time series analysis of 
the impact of military expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth for each of the 
five-member countries. The results are also summarised as follows;  
In Brazil, military expenditure indicates a significant positive long-run relationship with 
inclusive growth. The implication of the findings is that military expenditure rises and falls with 
inclusive growth. The long-run relationship result of institutional quality shows that it exhibits a 
positive long-run relationship with inclusive growth, which is a proxy for institutional quality. 
                                                          
4Red tape is an idiom that refers to excessive regulation or rigid conformity to formal rules that is 
considered redundant or bureaucratic and hinders or prevents action or decision-making. It is 
usually applied to governments, corporations and other large organisations. 
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The implication of this is that there is the presence of positive additive of corruption (i.e. 
greasing the wheels for growth) reduces government red tape
5
/ bureaucracies, thereby promoting 
inclusive growth. However, the interactive form of military expenditure and institutional quality 
shows a significant negative impact on inclusive growth. It shows that the institutional 
management of military expenditure in Brazil might not promote growth. 
Findings on Russia indicated that military expenditure influences inclusive growth positively 
while institutional quality proxy with corruption discourages inclusive growth. However, the 
interaction of military expenditure and inclusive growth produce a positive and significant 
impact on inclusive growth in Russia, unlike what we saw under Brazil. Education in Russia is 
revealed as a driver of inclusive growth. Investment and population growth show a positive and 
negative impact, respectively on inclusive growth but they are not significant. 
The result on India is a clear departure from what we have seen under the two previous BRICS 
countries that is Brazil and Russia. Findings on India show that none of all the variables has a 
significant impact on inclusive growth in the country. Notwithstanding investment and education 
have short-run impact but the effect is not sustained to the long run. Again, the overall evaluation 
of the inclusive growth model estimated for India indicates that all the variables will jointly 
affect inclusive growth but not individually as noticed in the previous two countries. Therefore, 
military expenditure, institutional quality and the interactive form of the two failed to exert a 
significant effect on inclusive growth in India during the period under study.  
Findings on China were almost similar to what was obtained for Brazil as the results also showed 
that military expenditure and institutional quality individually exhibit a positive relationship with 
inclusive growth but the interaction of the two shows a significant negative impact on inclusive 
growth. This implies that the management of military expenditure by the Chinese institutions has 
not produced a significant positive result on inclusive growth in the country. Also, the result in 
China shows that the upsurge in population is an important deterrent to inclusive growth. In 
                                                          
5
 Red tape is an idiom that refers to excessive regulation or rigid conformity to formal rules that 
is considered redundant or bureaucratic and hinders or prevents action or decision-making. It is 
usually applied to governments, corporations and other large organisations. 
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addition, education in the country although have a positive impact on inclusive growth but the 
impact is not significant.  
South Africa findings practically almost replicated what was obtained for Brazil and China. 
Apart from the fact that both military expenditure and institutional quality have a significant 
positive relationship with inclusive growth individually, their interactive form that is the 
interactive variables between military expenditure and the institutional quality shows a negative 
and significant impact on inclusive growth in South Africa. However, population growth was 
shown as a disincentive to inclusive growth in South Africa because the result shows that 
population in South Africa has a significant negative relationship with inclusive growth. On the 
contrary, education shows a positive and significant impact on inclusive growth in South Africa. 
In order to check the robustness of the results on inclusive growth, the consistency or otherwise 
of these results is compared with the results from other development indicators such as economic 
growth and per capita model which has been used in some studies in the past of the results 
inclusive growth index with other existing development indicators like GDP per capita and per 
capita income. This will enable the author to identify if the results we have obtained under the 
inclusive growth are outliers of produce different results that are justifiable or it produces direct 
similar results to these other two most commonly used development indicators. 
In Brazil, there are some differences in the results obtained under the inclusive growth index 
when compared to economic growth and per capita income models. For instance, employing 
inclusive growth index as the dependent, military expenditure alone is significant and positive, 
institutional quality alone is significant and positive while the interactive form of military 
expenditure and institutional quality is significant and negative. Employing GDP growth annual 
as a dependent variable, military expenditure alone is significant and positive while institutional 
quality alone is significant and positive. The interactive form of military expenditure and 
institutional quality is insignificant and negative. This study produced the same result as under 
the economic growth model. Other control variables such as investment show a significant 
impact on both economic growth and per capita income but not significant under an inclusive 
growth model.  The summary of the comparison here shows that the interactive form of military 
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expenditure and institutional quality have a significant negative impact on inclusive growth but 
under economic growth and per capita income this impact is not significant.  
For Russia, all the three models produced almost similar results all through especially for the 
three variables of interest. For instance, military expenditure, institutional quality and the 
interactive form of military expenditure and institutional quality all show the same relationships 
with inclusive growth, economic growth and per capita income.  
In India, there are some differences in the result obtained under the inclusive growth index and 
the ones gotten for economic growth and per capita income. Firstly, military expenditure showed 
a significant and positive impact on both economic growth and per capita income but not 
significant on inclusive growth. Again, institutional quality yielded the same result in that it was 
significant in both economic growth and per capita income models but not on inclusive growth. 
Findings on China show some slight differences among the three models. But these differences 
were not on the core variables of interest. This implies that military expenditure, institutional 
quality and the interaction of the two show similar results across the three models 
Notwithstanding, considering the other control variables, investment showed significant impacts 
on both economic growth and per capita income but not significant on inclusive growth. Again, 
the negative impact of population is not significant on economic growth and per capita income 
but it is significant on inclusive growth. 
South Africa findings on the three models have overwhelming similarities. All the core variables, 
namely; military expenditure, institutional quality and their interactive form produce the same 
signs and significance across the three models. The same thing with control variables except for 
investment that shows significant impacts on economic growth and per capita income but not on 
inclusive growth index. 
7.2. Conclusion 
Following the findings from this study there are some conclusions that are pertinent to the 
relationship between military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth in the 
BRICS during the period under review. 
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Firstly, the study revealed that security web, GDP, inflation, and Trade Balance (TB) are the 
most important factors that determine military expenditure in the BRICS. From these findings, it 
can be concluded that the level of their economic growth in terms of national income is an 
important factor that affects their expenditures on the military. In addition, the activities of the 
neighbouring countries in terms of arms purchase and the level of relationship between the two 
countries goes a long way to determine the expenditures on the military in the BRICS. This is 
described by the security web which further shows that the BRICS countries prioritise the level 
of ammunitions acquired by their neighbouring countries in their decisions to increase or 
decrease military expenses. Inflation rate which influences the general price levels of military 
ammunition is revealed from the findings of this study as an important factor influencing military 
spending and finally trade balance in other words decisions on military expenditure in the BRICS 
is also guided by whether the terms of trade is favourable or not. This is much more important in 
BRICS members like Russia and China who manufacture some of their military apparatus 
themselves.  
The second objective of this study is the computation of inclusive growth index for the BRICS. 
Findings from the analysis also lead to some conclusions about the BRICS inclusive growth 
pursuit. 
Firstly, at the beginning of the study, it was reviewed from the literature that the major problem 
faced by the BRICS is the fact that some of their growth processes still lack sustainability and 
this has prevented the recent accelerated growth witnessed by some of the members’ countries 
from trickling down to the poor society. This led to the computation of inclusive growth index 
for the BRICS. This thesis has shown that the five-member countries have different inclusive 
growth trajectories during the period under review. Notwithstanding, the common trend noticed 
when the inclusive growth index was computed for the BRICS is that of a downward movement 
during the period under study. This shows that despite the fact that recent data on BRICS shows 
that economic growth in the economic bloc is rising especially in India; the inclusive growth 
index computed for the bloc shows a downward trend. This brings this conclusion that the nature 
of economic growth currently witnessed in the BRICS is not having a trickling down effect to the 
poor society in the countries. 
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Secondly, conclusions on the comparison of the average inclusive growth of each member 
countries show that Russia has the highest inclusive growth index during the period. This is 
followed by China, Brazil, South Africa and India in that order. Therefore, Russia has been 
shown by this study as the country among the BRICS with the most promising inclusive growth 
index. China and Brazil are so close with their inclusive growth indices slightly above the 
average. But both South Africa and India have weak inclusive growth indexes that fall below 
average with India emerging as the weakest of all the five-member countries of the BRICS.  The 
implication of this is that Russia has the most promising inclusive growth among the five 
countries and the implication is that the economic growth of Russia has much more effects on the 
poor than it does in the remaining four countries. The result has further supported the opinions of 
development organisations such as UNDP, UNEP, and UNESCO who have identified Russia and 
China as a leading country among the BRICS in terms of development plans (WorldBank, 2009). 
The pace of technology and drive to reduce poverty in these two countries has been well 
commended by these organisations and their development trajectories have been identified as 
very promising. These conclusions were reached by the organisation after consideration of some 
key indicators such as human development index, technology advancement, poverty, and health 
indicators, among others, in the BRICS. Brazil also has an average inclusive growth that is 
relatively high after these two countries notwithstanding some developmental issues facing the 
country recently. 
The third objective which investigates the impact of military expenditure and institutional quality 
on inclusive growth also revealed some important conclusions which are discussed as follows. 
Firstly, the study discovered that the panel result on BRICS investigating the impacts on military 
expenditure and institutional quality on inclusive growth index failed to pass some post 
estimation test that will enable us generalise our findings for the whole countries hence the study 
decided to leverage on individual country-based analysis to ascertain the relationships between 
military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth. This leads to the conclusion that 
the study on inclusive growth for BRICS can better be studied on individual country basis as the 
results from this study as shown that generalisation via panel results for all the countries might 
be misleading. Notwithstanding the BRICS member countries share a lot of similarities but 
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evidence from this study has shown that they have different inclusive growth trajectories hence 
any study that included inclusive growth can best be studied on individual country bases after 
which comparative analysis can now be done to extract policy implications of the results. 
Secondly, conclusions from the findings on individual countries show that Brazil, South Africa 
and China have a lot of similarities in their results. In these three countries, military expenditure 
and institutional quality have a positive and significant impact on inclusive growth index. This 
means that military expenditure and institutional quality supports inclusive growth in these three 
countries. But the interactive form of both military expenditure and the institutional quality 
shows a negative and significant impact on inclusive growth. This result seems ambiguous but 
literature has emphasised that the joint relationship between the two matter most in the inclusive 
growth process. According to the literature, military expenditure will rise significantly whenever 
some countries achieve accelerated growth rate because they have much more to spend on the 
military but the administration and management of the spending on the military are reflected by 
the interactive form of both. On theoretical grounds, the theoretical models embraced for the 
study implies that the relationship between military expenditure and growth depends on 
corruption and rent-seeking behaviour and that the joint effect of both of them is much more 
important for sustainable growth which inclusive growth is all about. Therefore, the conclusions 
on these countries are that the interaction of the two fails to support the inclusive growth process 
in Brazil, China and South Africa. However, considering other variables included in the model as 
drivers of inclusive growth, education remains an important factor driving inclusive growth but 
the levels of investment during the period under study failed to drive inclusive growth 
significantly in the three countries. However, population has a significant negative impact on 
inclusive growth in China but not in South Africa and Brazil. This further shows that the 
hypothesis that the rising population discourages inclusive growth is much more pronounced and 
confirmed in China which is the most populous country in the world than South Africa and 
Brazil. 
Thirdly, Russia exhibits different results from the remaining four BRICS members in terms of 
the relationship between military expenditure, institutional quality and inclusive growth. 
Conclusions on Russia indicate that the country apart from having results that show that military 
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expenditure and institutional quality influence inclusive growth significantly, the country result 
further shows that the interaction between military expenditure and institutional quality show a 
significant positive impact on inclusive growth unlike what we saw in Brazil, China and South 
Africa. This is an indication that the joint relationship between the two which failed to drive 
inclusive growth in those three countries actually drives inclusive growth in Russia. This 
conclusion is consistent with what was obtained under objective two of the study where the 
computation of the inclusive growth shows that Russia has the highest average inclusive growth 
index among the BRICS. The implication of this finding is that military expenditure appears to 
be better managed by institutional in Russia and it is less influenced adversely by corruption. 
This might be the reason why this variable shows a significant positive impact on inclusive 
growth in Russia and not on Brazil, China and South Africa. Concerning other control variables, 
both education and investment show a significant impact on inclusive growth in Russia, unlike 
the previous three countries where investment failed to drive inclusive growth. The implication 
of this conclusion is that the levels of investment during the period under consideration support 
the inclusive growth process in Russia that is, the level of investment trickles down to the poor. 
However, the results on India lead to conclusions that are a clear departure from what we saw in 
the other four BRICS countries. The result from India shows that none of all the core variables 
have a significant impact on inclusive growth. This shows that military expenditure and 
institutional quality do not have a significant impact on inclusive growth. In addition, the 
interactive form of the two which actually measure how institutional manages the expenses on 
the military also failed to show a significant impact on inclusive growth in India. Consequently, 
it is concluded from this study that military expenditure during the period under review in India 
has not been significantly supporting their inclusive growth. Again, the result is consistent with 
what we obtained under objective two of the study where the average inclusive growth index for 
India is the least among the five countries in the BRICS. Also, other control variables used in the 
model failed to produce any significant impact on inclusive growth in the country. That is 
education, an investment which was found to be significant inclusive growth drivers in the other 
four countries are not significant inclusive growth drivers in India. 
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The last batch of conclusions on objective three is on the comparison of the results on inclusive 
growth with the results of other conventional development indicators which were used in most of 
the previous studies. 
Firstly, conclusions form the results show that usage of inclusive growth index to measure the 
impact of military expenditure and institutional quality on the BRICS economy is well justified 
because it produces some significant differences from the results obtained for economic growth 
and per capita income as development indicators in BRICS. Notwithstanding some similarities 
were also ascertained which confirms some consistencies with the results on both economic 
growth and per capita income. It was also discovered that the areas of differences in the results 
are not outliers but they are differences that are reasonable, justifiable and empirically supported. 
Firstly, the areas of similarities are noticed under Russia, South Africa and China. In these three 
countries, the results obtained when inclusive growth index is used as a dependent variable is 
similar to what is obtained when economic growth and per capita income are used as dependent 
variables. The implication is that conclusions on inclusive growth index in terms of its 
relationship with military expenditure, institutional quality and other control variables are the 
same with conclusions on the relationships between these variables and GDP growth rate 
(economic growth) and per capita income for these three countries. This conclusion speaks 
volumes of the consistency in the results for inclusive growth index since this study is the first 
effort to compute an inclusive growth index for the BRICS; therefore, this consistency serves as 
a good robustness test outcome for the inclusive growth index. 
Secondly, as emphasised that there are some differences in the results where inclusive growth 
index is used as a dependent variable and the ones where economic growth and per capita 
income are used as dependent variables. Under Brazil's results it was discovered that the 
interaction of military expenditure which shows a negative significant impact on inclusive 
growth index do not show a significant impact on economic growth and per capita income 
although the coefficient is still negative in both models. The implication of the differences is that 
the negative influence of misappropriation of military expenditure by the institutional of Brazil 
has a more severe negative impact on inclusive growth index than economic growth and per 
capita income. These efforts might have prevented wrong conclusions that would have emanated 
238 
 
that the negative impact of corruption in military expenditure is not significant in Brazil 
economy. However, the conclusions have shown that if inclusive growth is used the adverse 
effect of corruption in the spending of the military would be more significant in Brazil economy. 
Thirdly, the three core independent variables which are the focus of this study namely military 
expenditure, institutional quality and the interactive form of the two which failed to have a 
significant impact on inclusive growth but they exert a significant impact on economic growth 
and per capita income in India. The implication is that the conclusions that would have been 
made if economic growth or per capita income is used to represent Indian economy would have 
been that military expenditure and institutional quality have a significant positive impact Indian 
economy. However, with the usage of inclusive growth index, this conclusion is different as it is 
evident from the analysis that this variable failed to drive inclusive growth significantly in India 
during the period under review. Empirical justification for this is seen in the rising poverty and 
unemployment rates in India and yet the country recorded the highest economic growth rate 
among the BRICS recently.  
Finally, conclusions from this study have shown that all the shift factors such as investment, 
population and education are largely more significant under the economic growth and per capita 
income results. But under the inclusive growth models, they are not significant in all the 
countries. In fact, in most of the countries, the conclusion is that their levels of investment during 
the period under review failed to drive inclusive growth except in Russia. On the contrary for 
investment is shown as an important driver of economic growth and per capita income in all the 
five countries of the BRICS. 
7.4 Contribution to literature and body of knowledge 
 Firstly, many studies on the determinants of military expenditure have focused mostly on 
individual countries. This thesis has not only contributed to economics literature, but it has also 
contributed to the body of knowledge in the field of political science, defense economics and 
peace studies where usually qualitative analysis is used to examine topics like this. In addition, 
some important variables that have been identified in the literature as important factors 
influencing military expenditure which have been used studies outside BRICS are tested in 
BRICS by this study. Examples of these variables are external threats and internal threats, 
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Democracy index and security web. 
Secondly, the computation of BRICS Inclusive Growth Index (IGI) is unprecedented to the best 
of the knowledge of the author. Globally, attention to development economics researchers has 
shifted to the concept of inclusive growth since economic growth is not working. The inability of 
the economic growth witnessed by many developing countries in the world to trickle down to the 
downtrodden and the poor in general has generated a lot of developmental debates on whether 
economic growth is the way to go(Ullah and Kiani, 2017). Consequently, the emphasis has been 
placed more on inclusive growth rather than economic growth. This study has contributed to 
literature and a more important body of knowledge with the successful attempt to compute 
inclusive growth index for the BRICS. The BRICS Inclusive Growth Index (IGI) computed in 
this study is unique as it includes both economic and social variables. Z-sum score technique is 
employed to find the index. Value for IGI close to zero shows low growth, while, a value close 
to one denotes the high inclusive growth. For instance, out of all the five countries, it was shown 
form the result that inclusive growth of Russia, China and Brazil are the highest on the average 
in that order while South Africa and India have the lowest inclusive growth. The robustness of 
the inclusive growth was also tested and the results also followed the positions of international 
development organisations such as World Bank, UNESCO, and UNDP among others that 
pronounced Russia and China as the two countries with the most promising inclusive growth 
trajectories among the BRICS. 
Thirdly, on the investigation of the effect of military expenditure and institutional quality on 
inclusive growth in the BRICS, this study took a step further from where previous empirical 
literature stopped on BRICS by incorporating additional variables called the interactive form of 
the two which has been used in studies outside BRICS. The significance of the variable is its 
ability to present a joint effect of the two on inclusive growth. This effort has yielded promising 
outcomes because the variables produced a result that is more consistent with realities in the 
individual countries of the BRICS.   
In addition, for the first time to the best of the knowledge of the author three separate 
development indicators are used to measure the effects of military expenditure and institutional 
quality on the BRICS economy. In order to test the robustness of the results on the inclusive 
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growth index, both economic growth and per capita income are used in this study to separately 
investigate the effect of military expenditure and institutional quality. This effort yielded the 
desired result as it shows that there are both areas of similarities that show consistency and some 
areas of dichotomy which are empirically and theoretically justifiable.  
7.3 Recommendations 
Based on the findings from this study, the following recommendations are made 
I. Improvement of synergy between military expenditures and institutional: There is 
overwhelming evidence from the findings of this study that there exists a poor synergy 
between military expenditure and institutional in the BRICS. The results from the 
analysis show that the existence of corruption (a proxy for institutional quality) in the 
management of military expenditure portends more damming consequences on the 
inclusive growth of the BRICS economy. Consequently, the level of corruption, 
especially in the administration of military expenditure in the BRICS, should be reduced 
drastically as it is affecting their inclusive growth trajectory. 
II. Prioritizing inclusive growth more than economic growth: results from the study have 
also shown that it might be misleading if the effectiveness of military expenditure on 
BRICS economy is assessed using economic growth only. Consequently, it is 
recommended that the BRICS economy should improve on its drive towards the 
achievement of inclusive growth.  
III. General improvement in the inclusive growth of the BRICS: Again, findings from the 
study show that the highest level of inclusive growth recorded by the BRICS is in Russia. 
However, India and South Africa showed a gloomy inclusive growth trajectory. This 
study, therefore, advocates for more efforts in achieving inclusive growth in these two 
countries. This is imperative since they are lagging behind in inclusive growth pursuit by 
the BRICS as revealed by this study. 
IV. Pursuit of investment that drives inclusive growth: Generally across all the results 
obtained for this study it was discovered that levels of investment currently witnessed in 
the BRICS have not supported inclusive growth drive immensely. The only exception is 
Russia where investment shows a significant impact on inclusive growth. Consequently, 
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it is recommended that investment that is inclusive growth driven or oriented should be 
prioritized by the BRICS. 
V. Increase in investment in the education sector: All through the study, results have 
shown that education is important for inclusive growth. On this note, this study advocate 
for more investments in the education sectors of the BRICS in order to promote the 
drives toward the achievement of inclusive growth. 
 
 
7.4 Areas for Further research 
There are quite a number of possible research avenues that could be explored  
I. Another avenue would be to consider other alternative methodical approaches. 
II. Considering alternative measures of institutional would permit for further testing of the 
robustness of the results, while country case studies would allow for more discussion of 
how particular types of the institution might affect the amount and type of military 
expenditure and how it translates to inclusive growth. 
III. Consider a more advanced / developed economic union/ blocs such as NATO, the 
European Union and Nordic countries can provide more useful and more interesting 
results. 
IV. An item of military expenditure and external debt analysis can be examined. 
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Appendix 1 
Objective one: Determinant of BRICS military expenditure 
 1970 to 2017 
 
 
Appendix 2  
Objective 2: Computation of the Inclusive growth index for BRICS 
countries. 
(A) BRICS inclusive growth index from 1970 to 2017 using Z sum technique 
Year Brazil   
IGI 
Year Brazil   
IGI 
Year Brazil  
IGI 
Year Brazil  
 IGI 
1970 0 1982 0.43 1994 0.7 2006 0.53 
1971 0.58 1983 0.38 1995 0.61 2007 0.53 
1972 0.62 1984 0.52 1996 0.65 2008 0.53 
1973 0.63 1985 0.53 1997 0.67 2009 0.59 
1974 0.58 1986 0.36 1998 0.64 2010 0.54 
1975 0.65 1987 0.47 1999 0.61 2011 0.56 
1976 0.52 1988 0.58 2000 0.57 2012 0.56 
1977 0.59 1989 0.61 2001 0.61 2013 0.56 
1978 0.65 1990 0.38 2002 0.59 2014 0.61 
1979 0.56 1991 0.5 2003 0.55 2015 0.6 
1980 0.38 1992 0.61 2004 0.58 2016 0.66 
1981 0.55 1993 0.68 2005 0.51 2017 0.91 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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Year Russia 
 IGI 
Year Russia 
 IGI 
Year Russia 
IGI 
Year Russia 
 IGI 
1970 0.92 1982 0.84 1994 0.5 2006 0.47 
1971 0.91 1983 0.82 1995 0.48 2007 0.43 
1972 0.91 1984 0.8 1996 0.4 2008 0.46 
1973 0.9 1985 0.83 1997 0.4 2009 0.51 
1974 0.9 1986 0.85 1998 0.4 2010 0.51 
1975 0.88 1987 0.84 1999 0.4 2011 0.44 
1976 0.89 1988 0.84 2000 0.41 2012 0.47 
1977 0.86 1989 0.78 2001 0.43 2013 0.47 
1978 0.86 1990 0.7 2002 0.41 2014 0.44 
1979 0.79 1991 0.71 2003 0.42 2015 0.57 
1980 0.83 1992 0.41 2004 0.43 2016 0.72 
1981 0.83 1993 0.48 2005 0.47 2017 0 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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Year India 
 IGI 
Year India 
 IGI 
Year India 
 IGI 
Year India 
 IGI 
1970 0.98 1982 0.57 1994 0.36 2006 0.35 
1971 0.43 1983 0.66 1995 0.38 2007 0.37 
1972 0.44 1984 0.65 1996 0.32 2008 0.35 
1973 0.4 1985 0.32 1997 0.33 2009 0.3 
1974 0.37 1986 0.37 1998 0.31 2010 0.21 
1975 0.37 1987 0.35 1999 0.24 2011 0.32 
1976 0.27 1988 0.3 2000 0.37 2012 0.23 
1977 0.31 1989 0.25 2001 0.36 2013 0.25 
1978 0.4 1990 0.36 2002 0.36 2014 0.23 
1979 0.37 1991 0.38 2003 0.37 2015 0.25 
1980 0.46 1992 0.33 2004 0.41 2016 0.35 
1981 0.56 1993 0.34 2005 0.35 2017 0.2 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Year China 
 IGI 
Year China 
IGI 
Year China 
 IGI 
Year China 
IGI 
1970 0.75 1982 0.85 1994 0.4 2006 0.41 
1971 0.72 1983 0.65 1995 0.56 2007 0.4 
1972 0.45 1984 0.88 1996 0.49 2008 0.47 
1973 0.48 1985 0.87 1997 0.49 2009 0.4 
1974 0.49 1986 0.87 1998 0.4 2010 0.52 
1975 0.48 1987 0.51 1999 0.52 2011 0.42 
1976 0.5 1988 0.27 2000 0.45 2012 0.47 
1977 0.51 1989 0.75 2001 0.37 2013 0.42 
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1978 0.56 1990 0.68 2002 0.52 2014 0.46 
1979 0.55 1991 0.75 2003 0.39 2015 0.54 
1980 0.72 1992 0.74 2004 0.41 2016 0.87 
1981 0.82 1993 0.61 2005 0.44 2017 0.87 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Year South 
Africa IGI 
Year South 
Africa IGI 
Year South Africa 
IGI 
Year South 
Africa IGI 
1970 0.58 1982 0.43 1994 0.33 2006 0.52 
1971 0.46 1983 0.32 1995 0.41 2007 0.39 
1972 0.52 1984 0.26 1996 0.45 2008 0.53 
1973 0.51 1985 0.23 1997 0.35 2009 0.38 
1974 0.52 1986 0.24 1998 0.32 2010 0.38 
1975 0.53 1987 0.28 1999 0.4 2011 0.52 
1976 0.45 1988 0.36 2000 0.53 2012 0.4 
1977 0.43 1989 0.19 2001 0.39 2013 0.39 
1978 0.38 1990 0.35 2002 0.37 2014 0.41 
1979 0.38 1991 0.27 2003 0.3 2015 0.26 
1980 0.43 1992 0.24 2004 0.43 2016 0.24 
1981 0.39 1993 0.39 2005 0.38 2017 0.09 
Source: Author’s Computation  
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Appendix 3 
Objective three: Military expenditure, institutional quality and Inclusive growth in individual 
BRICS countries 1970 to 2017 
 
 Individual country result 
o Brazil 
Descriptive stats 
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean  0.576654  2.240048  18.96875  5.081614  1.645771  3.022713  2.485229 
 Median  0.572500  2.264751  18.98892  4.881555  1.539016  3.000000  2.378330 
 Maximum  0.910000  5.034129  19.15922  10.74500  2.686250  4.000000  5.948480 
 Minimum  0.360000  0.128665  18.70436  2.696998  1.199541  1.833333  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.080125  1.543958  0.132939  1.921231  0.309960  0.701069  2.376973 
 Skewness  0.441087  0.060498 -0.341293  1.012505  1.255151  0.061355  0.126492 
 Kurtosis  5.734770  1.572569  1.894862  3.585622  4.322237  1.806923  1.297908 
 Jarque-Bera  45.75863  11.37260  9.350195  24.62506  44.61001  7.971640  16.40952 
 Probability  0.000000  0.003392  0.009325  0.000004  0.000000  0.018577  0.000273 
 Sum  76.69500  297.9263  2522.844  675.8546  218.8875  402.0208  330.5355 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.847449  314.6625  2.332807  487.2289  12.68189  64.87770  745.8000 
 Observations  133  133  133  133  133  133  133 
 
 
Results of correlation matrix  
 IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI  1.000000  0.321032  0.354209 -0.187743 -0.005136 -0.313031 -0.067761 
INV  0.321032  1.000000  0.784617 -0.641635 -0.424080 -0.686036  0.612212 
LNPOP  0.354209  0.784617  1.000000 -0.741853 -0.482648 -0.840603  0.670091 
MCP -0.187743 -0.641635 -0.741853  1.000000  0.868346  0.857315 -0.562395 
ME -0.005136 -0.424080 -0.482648  0.868346  1.000000  0.502901 -0.355526 
COR -0.313031 -0.686036 -0.840603  0.857315  0.502901  1.000000 -0.608105 
EDU -0.067761  0.612212  0.670091 -0.562395 -0.355526 -0.608105  1.000000 
 
Chow Break point test/ Test for structural Breaks  
 
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 1989Q3  2017Q4  
     
     F-statistic 110.6488  Prob. F(2,132) 0.0000 
Log likelihood ratio 133.8932  Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic  221.2976  Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
     
     
From the f-test, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. There appears to be  
breaks in Brazil in the years highlighted and they are significant 
The  ARDL lag Determination 
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VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME EDU     
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 04/05/20   Time: 14:10     
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -357.9879 NA   1.19e-05  5.687311  5.820999  5.741629 
1  508.2990  1637.824  2.76e-11 -7.285922 -6.350099 -6.905692 
2  518.9373  19.11564  4.12e-11 -6.889645 -5.151689 -6.183504 
3  541.6430  38.67079  5.12e-11 -6.681923 -4.141833 -5.649871 
4  920.9163  610.3929  2.44e-13 -12.04557 -8.703344 -10.68760 
5  1140.824  333.2972   1.42e-14*  -14.91912*  -10.77476*  -13.23525* 
6  1149.557  12.41779  2.27e-14 -14.49308 -9.546590 -12.48330 
7  1165.565  21.26064  3.29e-14 -14.18071 -8.432082 -11.84501 
8  1214.571   60.49148*  2.92e-14 -14.38392 -7.833163 -11.72231 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  SR AND LR 
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 5, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1)  
Date: 04/05/20   Time: 14:15   
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(ME) 0.166123 0.032502 5.111117 0.0000 
D(ME(-1)) -0.000000 0.035851 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(ME(-2)) 0.000000 0.035851 0.000000 1.0000 
D(ME(-3)) 0.189104 0.036576 5.170109 0.0000 
D(ME(-4)) -0.172915 0.028887 -5.986009 0.0000 
D(MCP) -0.003221 0.004457 -0.722754 0.4713 
D(LNPOP) 1.010240 0.509522 1.982719 0.0498 
D(INV) -0.013601 0.008067 -1.685884 0.0946 
D(EDU) -0.004756 0.001910 -2.490275 0.0142 
D(COR) 0.113191 0.031949 3.542905 0.0006 
D(COR(-1)) -0.000000 0.039266 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-2)) 0.000000 0.039266 0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-3)) -0.232517 0.040936 -5.680033 0.0000 
D(IGI) 0.150198 0.090309 1.663154 0.0989 
D(DM1) -0.347533 0.071821 -4.838898 0.0000 
D(DM2) -0.660614 0.072006 -9.174477 0.0000 
D(DM3) -0.347533 0.071821 -4.838898 0.0000 
CointEq(-1) -0.117214 0.047458 -2.469821 0.0150 
     
     
    Cointeq = IGI - (0.1903*ME  -0.0275*MCP + 1.0650*LNPOP  -0.0139*INV   
        -0.0406*EDU + 0.0140*DM5  -0.0357*DM4  -19.6558 ) 
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
ME 0.190274 0.208727 0.911596 0.3639 
MCP -0.027483 0.038615 -0.711704 0.4781 
LNPOP 1.065010 0.660307 1.612903 0.1096 
INV -0.013906 0.032429 -0.428804 0.6689 
EDU -0.040579 0.019199 -2.113571 0.0368 
COR 0.419042 0.426866 0.981672 0.3283 
IGI 3.956620 3.024825 1.308049 0.1934 
DM1 -0.009414 0.745715 -0.012623 0.9899 
DM2 0.204407 0.698012 0.292842 0.7702 
DM3 -0.035748 0.130967 -0.272951 0.7854 
C -19.655779 12.387212 -1.586780 0.1154 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 2.907085    Prob. F(2,13) 0.0905 
Obs*R-squared 9.889005    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0071 
     
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 0.577655    Prob. F(16,15) 0.8565 
Obs*R-squared 12.20005    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 0.7301 
Scaled explained SS 2.112079    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 1.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 12:09   
Sample: 3 34    
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06
Series: Residuals
Sample 3 34
Observations 32
Mean       5.38e-16
Median   0.003088
Maximum  0.054570
Minimum -0.067060
Std. Dev.   0.029824
Skewness  -0.355630
Kurtosis   2.575782
Jarque-Bera  0.914470
Probability  0.633032
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C 0.004525 0.008546 0.529488 0.6042 
GROWTH(-1) 0.002939 0.005244 0.560486 0.5834 
GROWTH(-2) -0.001485 0.004621 -0.321358 0.7524 
INV 0.000419 0.000412 1.015769 0.3258 
MCP 0.001047 0.001902 0.550791 0.5899 
MCP(-1) -7.53E-05 0.000370 -0.203725 0.8413 
MCP(-2) 0.000269 0.000364 0.739299 0.4711 
ME -0.004544 0.007907 -0.574679 0.5740 
ME(-1) 0.000979 0.002216 0.441725 0.6650 
ME(-2) -0.001384 0.001750 -0.791176 0.4412 
POP 0.007804 0.060169 0.129693 0.8985 
POP(-1) -0.008745 0.119683 -0.073067 0.9427 
POP(-2) 0.001558 0.062844 0.024790 0.9805 
COR -0.001425 0.003165 -0.450217 0.6590 
EDU 0.000232 0.000135 1.726387 0.1048 
EDU(-1) -8.90E-05 0.000161 -0.551810 0.5892 
EDU(-2) -0.000120 0.000166 -0.725360 0.4794 
     
     
R-squared 0.381252    Mean dependent var 0.000862 
Adjusted R-squared -0.278747    S.D. dependent var 0.001099 
S.E. of regression 0.001243    Akaike info criterion -10.23815 
Sum squared resid 2.32E-05    Schwarz criterion -9.459478 
Log likelihood 180.8104    Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.980042 
F-statistic 0.577655    Durbin-Watson stat 2.869114 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.856462    
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b. Brazil GDP annual 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:33   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  3.846919 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
     
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance
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Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(GDP_ANNUAL)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:33   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(GDP_ANNUAL(-1)) 0.356256 0.241533 1.474977 0.1596 
D(MCP) 3.988336 5.496945 0.725555 0.4786 
D(MCP(-1)) 0.630954 0.460388 1.370484 0.1895 
D(ME) -19.67963 22.57260 -0.871837 0.3962 
D(POP) 257.4628 148.1240 1.738158 0.1014 
D(POP(-1)) -247.8078 128.3610 -1.930553 0.0715 
D(COR) -7.795414 9.557716 -0.815615 0.4267 
D(EDU) 0.870636 0.327048 2.662101 0.0170 
C -17.02060 21.07612 -0.807577 0.4312 
INV(-1) -0.347686 0.789087 -0.440618 0.6654 
MCP(-1) -3.985500 4.284476 -0.930219 0.3661 
ME(-1) 6.363113 17.34894 0.366773 0.7186 
POP(-1) 10.77002 7.412278 1.452997 0.1656 
COR(-1) 4.722173 7.613263 0.620256 0.5438 
EDU(-1) 1.186264 0.468613 2.531439 0.0222 
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) -1.827045 0.406039 -4.499683 0.0004 
     
     
R-squared 0.734315    Mean dependent var -0.217806 
Adjusted R-squared 0.485236    S.D. dependent var 3.406448 
S.E. of regression 2.444027    Akaike info criterion 4.932024 
Sum squared resid 95.57229    Schwarz criterion 5.664892 
Log likelihood -62.91239    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.174949 
F-statistic 2.948115    Durbin-Watson stat 2.581034 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.019568    
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ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: GDP_ANNUAL  
Selected Model: ARDL(2, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:33   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(GDP_ANNUAL(-1)) 0.432578 0.246313 1.756211 0.0982 
D(INV) -0.884247 0.818146 -1.080793 0.2958 
D(MCP) 4.032027 4.487563 0.898489 0.3822 
D(MCP(-1)) 0.920353 0.526001 1.749719 0.0993 
D(ME) -19.530754 17.867877 -1.093065 0.2906 
D(POP) 226.219923 120.665019 1.874776 0.0792 
D(POP(-1)) -203.063223 116.688142 -1.740222 0.1010 
D(COR) -8.051508 7.718853 -1.043096 0.3124 
D(EDU) 0.976612 0.305720 3.194470 0.0056 
CointEq(-1) -2.010631 0.414221 -4.854007 0.0002 
     
     
    Cointeq = GDP_ANNUAL - (-0.4398*INV  -2.3132*MCP + 3.9190*ME + 
        5.6536*POP + 2.7016*COR + 0.6868*EDU  -8.5415 ) 
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
INV 0.439786 0.385249 -1.141563 0.2704 
MCP -2.313193 1.798294 -1.286327 0.2166 
ME 3.919048 6.859501 0.571331 0.5757 
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POP 5.653634 2.188610 2.583207 0.0200 
COR 2.701590 3.121041 0.865605 0.3995 
EDU 0.686818 0.144785 4.743725 0.0002 
C -8.541479 8.959505 -0.953343 0.3546 
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 6.511506    Prob. F(2,14) 0.0100 
Obs*R-squared 15.42154    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0004 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:35   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Series: Residuals
Sample 1986 2017
Observations 32
Mean      -1.58e-14
Median   0.066964
Maximum  3.038486
Minimum -3.654107
Std. Dev.   1.705308
Skewness  -0.237133
Kurtosis   2.351792
Jarque-Bera  0.860135
Probability  0.650465
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GDP_ANNUAL(-1) 0.213282 0.336529 0.633772 0.5364 
GDP_ANNUAL(-2) 0.355862 0.221132 1.609271 0.1299 
INV -0.068282 0.655422 -0.104180 0.9185 
MCP -2.332969 3.525978 -0.661652 0.5189 
MCP(-1) 2.877637 3.105968 0.926486 0.3699 
MCP(-2) 0.503537 0.428327 1.175592 0.2594 
ME 7.736816 13.97660 0.553555 0.5886 
ME(-1) -10.64286 11.66559 -0.912329 0.3770 
POP -59.67536 97.61598 -0.611328 0.5508 
POP(-1) 99.05510 185.5462 0.533857 0.6018 
POP(-2) -41.75276 92.78235 -0.450008 0.6596 
COR 4.273732 6.073064 0.703719 0.4931 
COR(-1) -5.049763 5.196658 -0.971733 0.3477 
EDU 0.205085 0.248240 0.826155 0.4226 
EDU(-1) -0.153593 0.351709 -0.436706 0.6690 
C 2.820370 13.40258 0.210435 0.8364 
RESID(-1) -0.987576 0.322409 -3.063117 0.0084 
RESID(-2) -0.759827 0.388213 -1.957242 0.0706 
     
     
R-squared 0.481923    Mean dependent var -1.58E-14 
Adjusted R-squared -0.147170    S.D. dependent var 1.705308 
S.E. of regression 1.826488    Akaike info criterion 4.340989 
Sum squared resid 46.70482    Schwarz criterion 5.165465 
Log likelihood -51.45582    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.614279 
F-statistic 0.766060    Durbin-Watson stat 2.106801 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.702573    
     
     
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 0.846575    Prob. F(15,16) 0.6242 
Obs*R-squared 14.15942    Prob. Chi-Square(15) 0.5135 
Scaled explained SS 2.392575    Prob. Chi-Square(15) 0.9999 
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Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:35   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 24.09748 25.29763 0.952559 0.3550 
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) -0.211587 0.376070 -0.562627 0.5815 
GDP_ANNUAL(-2) 0.450132 0.358906 1.254180 0.2278 
INV 0.444831 1.192131 0.373139 0.7139 
MCP -9.757700 6.538887 -1.492257 0.1551 
MCP(-1) 14.20585 5.603579 2.535138 0.0221 
MCP(-2) 0.371098 0.766443 0.484183 0.6348 
ME 29.90713 26.03551 1.148705 0.2676 
ME(-1) -49.53277 21.31808 -2.323510 0.0337 
POP 70.45337 175.8226 0.400707 0.6939 
POP(-1) -130.4337 337.5437 -0.386420 0.7043 
POP(-2) 61.22343 170.0278 0.360079 0.7235 
COR 18.36910 11.24724 1.633210 0.1219 
COR(-1) -23.75244 9.410134 -2.524134 0.0226 
EDU 0.066945 0.445468 0.150281 0.8824 
EDU(-1) -0.135372 0.500664 -0.270385 0.7903 
     
     
R-squared 0.442482    Mean dependent var 2.817199 
Adjusted R-squared -0.080191    S.D. dependent var 3.327872 
S.E. of regression 3.458732    Akaike info criterion 5.626534 
Sum squared resid 191.4053    Schwarz criterion 6.359402 
Log likelihood -74.02455    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.869459 
F-statistic 0.846575    Durbin-Watson stat 2.404958 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.624178    
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c.  Brazil Per Captia income PCI  
 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:41   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  3.848883 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(PCI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:41   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(PCI(-1)) 0.358557 0.241777 1.483010 0.1575 
D(POP) 252.6081 146.0964 1.729051 0.1030 
D(POP(-1)) -243.8055 126.5398 -1.926711 0.0720 
D(COR) -7.706164 9.427685 -0.817397 0.4257 
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D(EDU) 0.863730 0.323077 2.673450 0.0167 
D(MCP) 3.946952 5.422164 0.727929 0.4772 
D(MCP(-1)) 0.621271 0.453669 1.369435 0.1898 
D(ME) -19.43708 22.26528 -0.872977 0.3956 
C -16.84159 20.78730 -0.810187 0.4297 
POP(-1) 8.751496 7.039238 1.243245 0.2317 
COR(-1) 4.672493 7.509553 0.622207 0.5426 
EDU(-1) 1.178087 0.463736 2.540428 0.0218 
INV(-1) -0.349758 0.778186 -0.449453 0.6591 
MCP(-1) -3.935905 4.226480 -0.931249 0.3656 
ME(-1) 6.339904 17.11107 0.370515 0.7159 
PCI(-1) -1.829480 0.406520 -4.500345 0.0004 
     
     
R-squared 0.734380    Mean dependent var -0.170967 
Adjusted R-squared 0.485362    S.D. dependent var 3.360018 
S.E. of regression 2.410419    Akaike info criterion 4.904331 
Sum squared resid 92.96194    Schwarz criterion 5.637199 
Log likelihood -62.46930    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.147256 
F-statistic 2.949100    Durbin-Watson stat 2.580905 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.019539    
     
     
     
     
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 6.503902    Prob. F(2,14) 0.0101 
Obs*R-squared 15.41220    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0005 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:43   
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Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
PCI(-1) 0.211178 0.336578 0.627427 0.5405 
PCI(-2) 0.353396 0.220951 1.599429 0.1320 
POP -58.39689 96.35842 -0.606038 0.5542 
POP(-1) 97.13377 183.2751 0.529989 0.6044 
POP(-2) -40.45649 91.56428 -0.441837 0.6654 
COR 4.207308 5.994303 0.701884 0.4943 
COR(-1) -4.984720 5.129140 -0.971843 0.3476 
EDU 0.208455 0.245911 0.847685 0.4109 
EDU(-1) -0.150761 0.348555 -0.432531 0.6719 
INV -0.070442 0.646953 -0.108882 0.9148 
MCP -2.293618 3.480083 -0.659070 0.5205 
MCP(-1) 2.837332 3.065224 0.925652 0.3703 
MCP(-2) 0.492379 0.422013 1.166739 0.2628 
ME 7.604169 13.79566 0.551200 0.5902 
ME(-1) -10.50633 11.51437 -0.912453 0.3770 
C 2.789428 13.22657 0.210896 0.8360 
RESID(-1) -0.987896 0.322739 -3.060971 0.0085 
RESID(-2) -0.760815 0.388084 -1.960440 0.0702 
     
     
R-squared 0.481631    Mean dependent var -9.06E-14 
Adjusted R-squared -0.147816    S.D. dependent var 1.682420 
S.E. of regression 1.802481    Akaike info criterion 4.314526 
Sum squared resid 45.48511    Schwarz criterion 5.139003 
Log likelihood -51.03242    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.587817 
F-statistic 0.765165    Durbin-Watson stat 2.109200 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.703356    
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ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: PCI   
Selected Model: ARDL(2, 2, 1, 1, 0, 2, 1)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 14:40   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(PCI(-1)) 0.434952 0.246709 1.763017 0.0970 
D(POP) 222.896702 119.052399 1.872257 0.0796 
D(POP(-1)) -200.534720 115.101158 -1.742248 0.1007 
D(COR) -8.015789 7.616042 -1.052487 0.3082 
D(EDU) 0.969672 0.302205 3.208658 0.0055 
D(INV) -0.871493 0.807426 -1.079347 0.2964 
D(MCP) 4.022663 4.427623 0.908538 0.3771 
D(MCP(-1)) 0.905854 0.518536 1.746944 0.0998 
D(ME) -19.433362 17.630208 -1.102276 0.2866 
CointEq(-1) -2.014027 0.415035 -4.852672 0.0002 
     
     
    Cointeq = PCI - (4.5694*POP + 2.6423*COR + 0.6812*EDU  -0.4327*INV   
        -2.2653*MCP + 3.8319*ME  -8.3783 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
POP 4.569425 2.155026 2.120357 0.0500 
COR 2.642287 3.073351 0.859741 0.4026 
EDU 0.681247 0.142632 4.776271 0.0002 
INV 0.432712 0.379494 -1.140233 0.2710 
MCP -2.265329 1.770904 -1.279194 0.2191 
ME 3.831907 6.755082 0.567263 0.5784 
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C -8.378257 8.823500 -0.949539 0.3565 
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2. RUSSIA 
a. RUSSIA INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
 
RUSSIA  
 
 
Descriptive stats 
 
 IGI INV_GDP LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean  0.528722  1.410135  18.79536  5.927907  3.177122  1.491228  0.981682 
 Median  0.470000  1.064660  18.79151  6.469227  3.676790  1.541667  0.000000 
 Maximum  0.850000  4.502704  18.81737  18.13993  5.503756  3.916667  4.101750 
 Minimum  0.000000  0.000000  18.77655  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.160974  1.303096  0.014779  4.206297  1.630899  0.977349  1.496762 
 Skewness  0.675087  0.672921  0.198094  0.448618 -1.184579 -0.071159  1.030929 
 Kurtosis  3.274095  2.425089  1.448164  3.322691  2.997355  2.515723  2.268296 
 Jarque-Bera  10.51862  11.86921  14.21526  5.038278  31.10491  1.411900  26.52600 
 Probability  0.005199  0.002646  0.000819  0.080529  0.000000  0.493639  0.000002 
 Sum  70.32000  187.5479  2499.783  788.4116  422.5572  198.3333  130.5637 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  3.420458  224.1438  0.028831  2335.467  351.0978  126.0878  295.7193 
 Observations  133  133  133  133  133  133  133 
 
 
Results of Correlation matrix 
 
 IGI INV_GDP LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI  1.000000 -0.501608  0.061120 -0.606986 -0.763090 -0.696253 -0.358124 
INV -0.501608  1.000000 -0.718095  0.230366  0.402040  0.355910  0.457586 
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LNPOP  0.061120 -0.718095  1.000000  0.146906 -0.038557  0.085860 -0.373936 
MCP -0.606986  0.230366  0.146906  1.000000  0.762015  0.974468 -0.014894 
ME -0.763090  0.402040 -0.038557  0.762015  1.000000  0.756198  0.223231 
COR -0.696253  0.355910  0.085860  0.974468  0.756198  1.000000  0.058479 
EDU -0.358124  0.457586 -0.373936 -0.014894  0.223231  0.058479  1.000000 
 
 
Test of seasonal dummy variable effects/ Test for structural breaks /Dummy test 
 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1999Q1 2005Q1 2011Q1   
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4  
     
     F-statistic 39.44823  Prob. F(9,124) 0.0000 
Log likelihood ratio 183.8027  Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic  355.0341  Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
 
 
LAG ORDER DETERMINATION 
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI INV LNPOP MCP ME EDU 
COR     
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 04/05/20   Time: 14:55     
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -436.1795 NA   2.40e-06  6.924680  7.080650  6.988051 
1  439.1586  1641.259  5.93e-12 -5.986853  -4.739090* -5.479880 
2  453.1580  24.71774  1.03e-11 -5.439969 -3.100413 -4.489395 
3  481.1258  46.32157  1.46e-11 -5.111340 -1.679991 -3.717165 
4  604.3637  190.6337  4.71e-12 -6.271308 -1.748166 -4.433532 
5  906.0239  433.6366   9.59e-14*  -10.21912* -4.604189  -7.937747* 
6  921.7713  20.91447  1.75e-13 -9.699552 -2.992824 -6.974574 
7  949.8227  34.18762  2.73e-13 -9.372229 -1.573709 -6.203651 
8  1025.619   84.08645*  2.11e-13 -9.790921 -0.900607 -6.178741 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
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 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
 
LR AND SR ESTIMATE 
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 0, 5)  
Date: 04/05/20   Time: 14:56   
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(IGI(-1)) 0.373180 0.119693 3.117818 0.0024 
D(IGI(-2)) 0.373180 0.119693 3.117818 0.0024 
D(IGI(-3)) 0.373180 0.119693 3.117818 0.0024 
D(IGI(-4)) -0.280231 0.204974 -1.367155 0.1748 
D(INV) 0.034985 0.012404 2.820486 0.0058 
D(INV(-1)) -0.000000 0.016192 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(INV(-2)) -0.000000 0.016192 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(INV(-3)) 0.077331 0.016760 4.614020 0.0000 
D(INV(-4)) -0.061977 0.012978 -4.775669 0.0000 
D(LNPOP) 51.919968 11.341330 4.577944 0.0000 
D(LNPOP(-1)) -0.000001 3.161646 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(LNPOP(-2)) -0.000000 3.161646 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(LNPOP(-3)) 54.222369 10.795661 5.022607 0.0000 
D(LNPOP(-4)) -49.983913 10.888990 -4.590317 0.0000 
D(MCP) 0.015089 0.011131 1.355612 0.1784 
D(MCP(-1)) -0.000000 0.013446 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(MCP(-2)) -0.000000 0.013446 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(MCP(-3)) -0.065386 0.014305 -4.570892 0.0000 
D(MCP(-4)) 0.043752 0.010786 4.056340 0.0001 
D(ME) 0.009286 0.010435 0.889838 0.3758 
D(ME(-1)) 0.000000 0.012892 0.000000 1.0000 
D(ME(-2)) 0.000000 0.012892 0.000000 1.0000 
D(ME(-3)) 0.033499 0.013047 2.567591 0.0118 
D(EDU) -0.004032 0.004233 -0.952500 0.3433 
D(COR) -0.072505 0.052201 -1.388968 0.1681 
D(COR(-1)) 0.000000 0.064543 0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-2)) 0.000000 0.064543 0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-3)) 0.310759 0.066639 4.663350 0.0000 
D(COR(-4)) -0.198464 0.048472 -4.094399 0.0001 
D(DM1) -0.025305 0.020074 -1.260617 0.2099 
D(DM3) -0.001348 0.021881 -0.061620 0.9510 
D(DM2) -0.006156 0.021657 -0.284242 0.7767 
CointEq(-1) -0.562617 0.147892 -3.804232 0.0003 
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    Cointeq = IGI - (-0.0133*INV  -1.4847*LNPOP + 0.0466*MCP  -0.0758*ME   
        -0.0072*EDU  -0.1836*COR + 28.6939 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
INV -0.013326 0.016310 -0.817070 0.4159 
LNPOP -1.484741 1.370484 -1.083370 0.2814 
MCP 0.046611 0.016168 2.882923 0.0049 
ME -0.075768 0.014771 -5.129629 0.0000 
EDU -0.007166 0.007635 -0.938499 0.3504 
COR -0.183616 0.067333 -2.726995 0.0076 
DM3 -0.028388 0.442514 -0.064152 0.9490 
DM2 -0.129605 0.407196 -0.318287 0.7508 
DM1 -0.532788 0.826167 -0.644892 0.5202 
     
C 28.693929 25.788013 1.112685 0.2687 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 4.703732    Prob. F(2,11) 0.0334 
Obs*R-squared 14.75141    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0006 
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Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 4.642078    Prob. F(18,13) 0.0036 
Obs*R-squared 27.69168    Prob. Chi-Square(18) 0.0669 
Scaled explained SS 5.994433    Prob. Chi-Square(18) 0.9962 
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b. RUSSIA GDP growth annual 
 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:21   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  6.868184 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
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Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(GDP_ANNUAL)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:21   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(GDP_ANNUAL(-1)) 0.833257 0.237771 3.504454 0.0035 
D(MCP) -1.446846 1.057755 -1.367846 0.1929 
D(ME) -0.659680 0.692759 -0.952250 0.3571 
D(ME(-1)) 3.496989 1.270741 2.751929 0.0156 
D(POP) 29.63277 10.10606 2.932178 0.0109 
D(POP(-1)) -11.49768 11.59510 -0.991598 0.3382 
D(COR) -7.076233 4.584790 -1.543415 0.1450 
D(COR(-1)) 4.070962 1.467909 2.773307 0.0149 
D(EDU) 1.161892 0.619187 1.876479 0.0816 
D(EDU(-1)) -1.925267 0.509229 -3.780747 0.0020 
C -1.911578 4.806156 -0.397735 0.6968 
INV(-1) 0.368640 0.902448 0.408489 0.6891 
MCP(-1) -6.552577 1.346268 -4.867217 0.0002 
ME(-1) 4.622229 1.098158 4.209076 0.0009 
POP(-1) 4.706717 6.095185 0.772203 0.4528 
COR(-1) 15.57460 5.390331 2.889359 0.0119 
EDU(-1) 3.901356 1.357031 2.874919 0.0122 
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) -2.105490 0.399804 -5.266304 0.0001 
     
     
R-squared 0.895271    Mean dependent var 0.048301 
Adjusted R-squared 0.768100    S.D. dependent var 5.212764 
S.E. of regression 2.510257    Akaike info criterion 4.976969 
Sum squared resid 88.21949    Schwarz criterion 5.801446 
Log likelihood -61.63151    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.250260 
F-statistic 7.039907    Durbin-Watson stat 2.686801 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000319    
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ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: GDP_ANNUAL  
Selected Model: ARDL(2, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:20   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(GDP_ANNUAL(-1)) 0.820626 0.186406 4.402347 0.0006 
D(INV) 1.770927 0.695378 2.546710 0.0233 
D(MCP) -0.203676 0.985261 -0.206723 0.8392 
D(ME) -1.032801 0.572253 -1.804796 0.0927 
D(ME(-1)) 2.642862 1.110528 2.379824 0.0321 
D(POP) 23.427671 8.762484 2.673633 0.0182 
D(POP(-1)) -17.072167 9.809502 -1.740370 0.1037 
D(COR) -11.642660 4.023390 -2.893744 0.0118 
D(COR(-1)) 3.065264 1.284514 2.386322 0.0317 
D(EDU) 1.162927 0.482424 2.410592 0.0302 
D(EDU(-1)) -1.748538 0.420891 -4.154375 0.0010 
CointEq(-1) -2.161112 0.272238 -7.938309 0.0000 
     
     
    Cointeq = GDP_ANNUAL - (0.8195*INV  -2.4073*MCP + 1.8337*ME + 
        1.5914*POP + 4.7348*COR + 1.7433*EDU  -0.8069 ) 
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
INV 0.819451 0.315339 2.598637 0.0210 
MCP -2.407256 0.523994 -4.594048 0.0004 
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ME 1.833696 0.373000 4.916073 0.0002 
POP 1.591407 2.316045 0.687123 0.5032 
COR 4.734802 2.196525 2.155587 0.0490 
EDU 1.743321 0.441280 3.950597 0.0015 
C -0.806923 1.838800 -0.438831 0.6675 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 2.242888    Prob. F(2,12) 0.1487 
Obs*R-squared 8.707194    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0129 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:23   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) 0.083581 0.154870 0.539689 0.5993 
0
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1986 2017
Observations 32
Mean       1.25e-14
Median   0.068528
Maximum  2.533154
Minimum -3.740578
Std. Dev.   1.402854
Skewness  -0.588041
Kurtosis   3.501980
Jarque-Bera  2.180203
Probability  0.336182
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GDP_ANNUAL(-2) 0.059999 0.186156 0.322305 0.7528 
INV -0.271245 0.667088 -0.406610 0.6915 
MCP -0.310530 0.936671 -0.331525 0.7460 
MCP(-1) 0.085032 0.908301 0.093617 0.9270 
ME 0.107583 0.541398 0.198713 0.8458 
ME(-1) 0.048137 1.408048 0.034187 0.9733 
ME(-2) -0.050135 1.071218 -0.046802 0.9634 
POP -1.758562 8.245714 -0.213270 0.8347 
POP(-1) 2.030085 9.707795 0.209119 0.8379 
POP(-2) 2.125090 9.354134 0.227182 0.8241 
COR 1.559449 3.803103 0.410046 0.6890 
COR(-1) 0.095325 4.280545 0.022269 0.9826 
COR(-2) 0.187668 1.246257 0.150585 0.8828 
EDU 0.116812 0.447992 0.260745 0.7987 
EDU(-1) 0.067948 0.538625 0.126151 0.9017 
EDU(-2) 0.040001 0.396091 0.100988 0.9212 
C -1.907279 3.794750 -0.502610 0.6243 
RESID(-1) -0.596963 0.304548 -1.960158 0.0736 
RESID(-2) -0.399734 0.318231 -1.256113 0.2330 
     
     
R-squared 0.272100    Mean dependent var 1.25E-14 
Adjusted R-squared -0.880409    S.D. dependent var 1.402854 
S.E. of regression 1.923706    Akaike info criterion 4.415555 
Sum squared resid 44.40773    Schwarz criterion 5.331640 
Log likelihood -50.64888    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.719211 
F-statistic 0.236094    Durbin-Watson stat 2.219801 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.997418    
     
     
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 1.482117    Prob. F(17,14) 0.2312 
Obs*R-squared 20.57026    Prob. Chi-Square(17) 0.2461 
Scaled explained SS 4.925493    Prob. Chi-Square(17) 0.9980 
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Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:23   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 7.171427 5.188115 1.382280 0.1885 
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) 0.186146 0.201302 0.924712 0.3708 
GDP_ANNUAL(-2) 0.341752 0.243313 1.404579 0.1819 
INV -1.319108 0.907663 -1.453302 0.1682 
MCP 0.228501 1.286041 0.177678 0.8615 
MCP(-1) 0.738391 1.278957 0.577339 0.5729 
ME -0.291121 0.746951 -0.389746 0.7026 
ME(-1) -3.495772 1.957316 -1.786003 0.0958 
ME(-2) 3.503432 1.449550 2.416911 0.0299 
POP -1.307752 11.43749 -0.114339 0.9106 
POP(-1) -0.314174 13.67071 -0.022982 0.9820 
POP(-2) -7.919458 12.80414 -0.618507 0.5462 
COR 3.279967 5.251649 0.624559 0.5423 
COR(-1) -7.117062 6.062283 -1.173990 0.2600 
COR(-2) 0.227783 1.676650 0.135856 0.8939 
EDU -0.844471 0.629698 -1.341074 0.2012 
EDU(-1) -0.517014 0.750031 -0.689324 0.5019 
EDU(-2) -0.904061 0.549380 -1.645602 0.1221 
     
     
R-squared 0.642821    Mean dependent var 1.906500 
Adjusted R-squared 0.209103    S.D. dependent var 3.063888 
S.E. of regression 2.724789    Akaike info criterion 5.140981 
Sum squared resid 103.9427    Schwarz criterion 5.965457 
Log likelihood -64.25569    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.414271 
F-statistic 1.482117    Durbin-Watson stat 2.271630 
285 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.231209    
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c. Russia Per capita Income 
 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:26   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  6.817248 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(PCI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:26   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(PCI(-1)) 0.866642 0.246449 3.516515 0.0034 
D(POP) 29.66817 10.24586 2.895625 0.0117 
D(POP(-1)) -10.06354 11.94381 -0.842574 0.4136 
D(COR) -7.139349 4.747075 -1.503947 0.1548 
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D(COR(-1)) 4.184441 1.473111 2.840547 0.0131 
D(EDU) 1.314897 0.654523 2.008938 0.0642 
D(EDU(-1)) -1.781666 0.525372 -3.391245 0.0044 
D(MCP) -1.436182 1.077383 -1.333028 0.2038 
D(ME) -0.861578 0.720307 -1.196127 0.2515 
D(ME(-1)) 3.627451 1.294033 2.803213 0.0141 
C -0.090041 4.964918 -0.018135 0.9858 
POP(-1) 2.017327 6.284292 0.321011 0.7529 
COR(-1) 15.42213 5.548573 2.779477 0.0148 
EDU(-1) 4.031059 1.441191 2.797034 0.0143 
INV(-1) 0.521039 0.959334 0.543125 0.5956 
MCP(-1) -6.559121 1.378837 -4.756995 0.0003 
ME(-1) 4.110294 1.085405 3.786876 0.0020 
PCI(-1) -2.201984 0.426861 -5.158554 0.0001 
     
     
R-squared 0.889065    Mean dependent var 0.044710 
Adjusted R-squared 0.754358    S.D. dependent var 5.224163 
S.E. of regression 2.589212    Akaike info criterion 5.038906 
Sum squared resid 93.85627    Schwarz criterion 5.863382 
Log likelihood -62.62249    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.312196 
F-statistic 6.600010    Durbin-Watson stat 2.797288 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000457    
     
     
     
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: PCI   
Selected Model: ARDL(2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 1, 2)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:26   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
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D(PCI(-1)) 0.819163 0.192395 4.257715 0.0008 
D(POP) 22.950359 9.122592 2.515772 0.0247 
D(POP(-1)) -15.477677 10.298075 -1.502968 0.1551 
D(COR) -11.361229 4.212626 -2.696947 0.0174 
D(COR(-1)) 3.118404 1.327602 2.348899 0.0340 
D(EDU) 1.271823 0.511821 2.484899 0.0262 
D(EDU(-1)) -1.603120 0.445414 -3.599168 0.0029 
D(INV) 1.783435 0.732468 2.434830 0.0289 
D(MCP) -0.226833 1.029263 -0.220384 0.8288 
D(ME) -1.220102 0.601527 -2.028340 0.0620 
D(ME(-1)) 2.710276 1.160774 2.334886 0.0350 
CointEq(-1) -2.193846 0.283959 -7.725931 0.0000 
     
     
    Cointeq = PCI - (0.3823*POP + 4.7061*COR + 1.7288*EDU + 0.8129*INV   
        -2.3681*MCP + 1.5576*ME  -0.0055 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
POP 0.382257 2.402430 0.159112 0.8759 
COR 4.706125 2.267861 2.075139 0.0569 
EDU 1.728837 0.458239 3.772781 0.0021 
INV 0.812926 0.329111 2.470066 0.0270 
MCP -2.368111 0.541664 -4.371921 0.0006 
ME 1.557639 0.386908 4.025865 0.0013 
C -0.005504 1.900650 -0.002896 0.9977 
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Mean      -7.09e-15
Median   0.073887
Maximum  2.581962
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Kurtosis   3.355451
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 3.072865    Prob. F(2,12) 0.0836 
Obs*R-squared 10.83800    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0044 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:28   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
PCI(-1) 0.102074 0.156657 0.651577 0.5270 
PCI(-2) 0.055809 0.186167 0.299782 0.7695 
POP -0.348269 8.250766 -0.042211 0.9670 
POP(-1) 1.464804 9.711872 0.150826 0.8826 
POP(-2) 1.462910 9.286478 0.157531 0.8774 
COR 1.807573 3.780638 0.478113 0.6412 
COR(-1) 0.053496 4.332578 0.012347 0.9904 
COR(-2) 0.063837 1.238468 0.051545 0.9597 
EDU 0.141371 0.453459 0.311761 0.7606 
EDU(-1) 0.038230 0.548395 0.069712 0.9456 
EDU(-2) 0.027854 0.402256 0.069246 0.9459 
INV -0.370370 0.671012 -0.551957 0.5911 
MCP -0.386999 0.930607 -0.415856 0.6849 
MCP(-1) 0.140257 0.916543 0.153028 0.8809 
ME 0.081993 0.538547 0.152248 0.8815 
ME(-1) 0.169104 1.397555 0.121000 0.9057 
ME(-2) -0.131821 1.090080 -0.120927 0.9057 
C -1.783947 3.775705 -0.472480 0.6451 
RESID(-1) -0.706057 0.298298 -2.366948 0.0356 
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RESID(-2) -0.440365 0.321753 -1.368641 0.1962 
     
     
R-squared 0.338687    Mean dependent var -7.09E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.708391    S.D. dependent var 1.473691 
S.E. of regression 1.926194    Akaike info criterion 4.418140 
Sum squared resid 44.52269    Schwarz criterion 5.334225 
Log likelihood -50.69024    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.721796 
F-statistic 0.323459    Durbin-Watson stat 2.240637 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.986257    
     
     
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 1.253703    Prob. F(17,14) 0.3382 
Obs*R-squared 19.31344    Prob. Chi-Square(17) 0.3108 
Scaled explained SS 4.353713    Prob. Chi-Square(17) 0.9991 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:28   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 6.376878 5.844624 1.091067 0.2937 
PCI(-1) 0.240702 0.228732 1.052333 0.3105 
PCI(-2) 0.356783 0.269675 1.323011 0.2070 
POP -2.205338 12.78688 -0.172469 0.8655 
POP(-1) 2.202074 15.45117 0.142518 0.8887 
POP(-2) -8.523424 14.43452 -0.590489 0.5643 
COR 3.830290 5.904720 0.648683 0.5270 
COR(-1) -7.822247 6.910132 -1.131997 0.2767 
COR(-2) 0.034416 1.860863 0.018495 0.9855 
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EDU -1.054392 0.717405 -1.469730 0.1637 
EDU(-1) -0.705740 0.857598 -0.822926 0.4243 
EDU(-2) -0.896411 0.624324 -1.435810 0.1730 
INV -1.256082 1.026680 -1.223441 0.2414 
MCP 0.064256 1.442689 0.044539 0.9651 
MCP(-1) 0.865327 1.454799 0.594809 0.5615 
ME -0.161191 0.843144 -0.191178 0.8511 
ME(-1) -3.242868 2.160599 -1.500911 0.1556 
ME(-2) 3.724245 1.627025 2.288991 0.0381 
     
     
R-squared 0.603545    Mean dependent var 2.103898 
Adjusted R-squared 0.122135    S.D. dependent var 3.280619 
S.E. of regression 3.073758    Akaike info criterion 5.382000 
Sum squared resid 132.2718    Schwarz criterion 6.206477 
Log likelihood -68.11201    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.655291 
F-statistic 1.253703    Durbin-Watson stat 2.367758 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.338247    
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3. India 
a. India Inclusive growth  
b. INDIA 
c. Descriptive Stats 
 IGI INV_GDP LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean  0.327857  0.997913  20.76715  7.310887  2.827267  2.558271  1.433145 
 Median  0.337500  0.775558  20.78363  6.665849  2.754964  2.500000  0.000000 
 Maximum  0.650000  3.656951  21.01532  12.69395  4.231318  3.000000  4.475090 
 Minimum  0.200000  0.009191  20.45440  0.000000  0.000000  1.500000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.061860  0.881540  0.165300  2.253869  0.570503  0.413047  1.702982 
 Skewness  1.162190  0.795619 -0.236739  0.395867 -0.650211 -0.683279  0.503875 
 Kurtosis  8.694947  2.925656  1.829448  3.665048  8.880433  2.874480  1.455885 
 Jarque-Bera  209.6698  14.06233  8.835490  5.924773  200.9995  10.43628  18.84083 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000884  0.012061  0.051695  0.000000  0.005417  0.000081 
 Sum  43.60500  132.7224  2762.032  972.3479  376.0265  340.2500  190.6083 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.505127  102.5790  3.606795  670.5500  42.96247  22.52019  382.8193 
 Observations  133  133  133  133  133  133  133 
d.  
 
e. Results of Correlation matrix  
 IGI INV_GDP LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI  1.000000 -0.317876 -0.487934  0.249932  0.375010 -0.011816 -0.253453 
INV_GDP -0.317876  1.000000  0.839588 -0.481180 -0.525300 -0.227330  0.243565 
LNPOP -0.487934  0.839588  1.000000 -0.723062 -0.762580 -0.374679  0.438801 
MCP  0.249932 -0.481180 -0.723062  1.000000  0.865781  0.755142 -0.162477 
ME  0.375010 -0.525300 -0.762580  0.865781  1.000000  0.329932 -0.167215 
COR -0.011816 -0.227330 -0.374679  0.755142  0.329932  1.000000 -0.079843 
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance
293 
 
EDU -0.253453  0.243565  0.438801 -0.162477 -0.167215 -0.079843  1.000000 
f.  
 
g. Test of Seasonal Dummy variable effects/test for structural Breaks /Dummy test  
h.  
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1991Q1 1999Q3 2012Q1   
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4  
     
     F-statistic 6.188124  Prob. F(6,128) 0.0000 
Log likelihood ratio 34.63854  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic  37.12875  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
     
     
i.  
 
j.  
k.  
l.  
m.  
n. The ARDL lag Determinants 
o.  
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI MCP POP ME INV EDU COR     
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 04/07/20   Time: 18:20     
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -2792.276 NA   2.33e+10  43.73869  43.89466  43.80206 
1 -1781.575  1895.064  6961.263  28.71211  29.95988  29.21909 
2 -1770.603  19.37254  12692.08  29.30630  31.64586  30.25687 
3 -1747.299  38.59736  19279.22  29.70780  33.13915  31.10197 
4 -1360.907  597.6998  102.1987  24.43605  28.95919  26.27383 
5 -1057.344  436.3729  2.018589  20.45849   26.07343*   22.73987* 
6 -1041.490  21.05549  3.673806  20.97641  27.68313  23.70138 
7 -1011.155  36.97128  5.527162  21.26804  29.06656  24.43662 
8 -869.8954   156.7094*   1.538346*   19.82649*  28.71680  23.43867 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
p.  
 
q.  
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r.  
s.  
t.  
u.  
v.  
w.  
x. LR AND SR 
y.  
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(5, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1)  
Date: 04/05/20   Time: 15:10   
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(IGI(-1)) 0.036259 0.057597 0.629516 0.5302 
D(IGI(-2)) 0.036259 0.057597 0.629516 0.5302 
D(IGI(-3)) 0.036259 0.057597 0.629516 0.5302 
D(IGI(-4)) -0.188358 0.061914 -3.042252 0.0029 
D(INV) 0.029243 0.009906 2.952070 0.0038 
D(LNPOP) -0.015581 0.043720 -0.356381 0.7222 
D(MCP) -0.000743 0.019287 -0.038509 0.9693 
D(ME) 0.037472 0.047722 0.785211 0.4339 
D(EDU) -0.000346 0.001492 -0.232081 0.8169 
D(COR) -0.027625 0.056534 -0.488640 0.6260 
D(DM5) -0.235407 0.057293 -4.108809 0.0001 
D(DM4) -0.172970 0.050908 -3.397678 0.0009 
D(DM2) -0.048646 0.036220 -1.343059 0.1820 
D(DM1) -0.068156 0.025935 -2.627990 0.0098 
D(DM3) -0.128165 0.044444 -2.883756 0.0047 
CointEq(-1) -0.167315 0.056114 -2.981671 0.0035 
     
     
    Cointeq = IGI - (-0.0112*INV  -0.0931*LNPOP  -0.0781*MCP + 0.2240*ME   
        -0.0021*EDU + 0.1625*COR + 1.7904 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
INV -0.011186 0.032673 -0.342366 0.7327 
LNPOP -0.093123 0.249701 -0.372939 0.7099 
MCP -0.078073 0.108468 -0.719780 0.4731 
ME 0.223959 0.296122 0.756307 0.4510 
EDU -0.002070 0.008993 -0.230191 0.8183 
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COR 0.162477 0.309549 0.524885 0.6007 
DM5 -0.075672 0.036911 -2.050098 0.0427 
DM4 -0.020533 0.036073 -0.569207 0.5704 
DM2 0.002129 0.038083 0.055901 0.9555 
DM1 0.022602 0.041461 0.545138 0.5868 
DM3 0.055039 0.041830 1.315765 0.1910 
C 1.790409 5.415044 0.330636 0.7415 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 3 34
Observations 32
Mean      -1.24e-16
Median   6.22e-05
Maximum  0.065167
Minimum -0.089360
Std. Dev.   0.035084
Skewness  -0.336641
Kurtosis   2.858733
Jarque-Bera  0.631021
Probability  0.729416
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.183257    Prob. F(2,18) 0.8341 
Obs*R-squared 0.638578    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7267 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 01/04/20   Time: 12:24   
Sample: 3 34    
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
GROWTH(-1) -0.045776 0.308345 -0.148457 0.8836 
INV -0.000985 0.023292 -0.042310 0.9667 
INV(-1) 0.004369 0.026466 0.165065 0.8707 
INV(-2) -0.003549 0.024792 -0.143153 0.8878 
MCP -0.000703 0.067067 -0.010475 0.9918 
ME 0.002083 0.179797 0.011585 0.9909 
POP 0.005031 0.083822 0.060016 0.9528 
COR 0.001946 0.195753 0.009940 0.9922 
EDU 0.001434 0.006978 0.205560 0.8394 
EDU(-1) -0.000962 0.008261 -0.116463 0.9086 
EDU(-2) 0.000618 0.008318 0.074318 0.9416 
C -0.001187 0.527051 -0.002253 0.9982 
RESID(-1) 0.114707 0.372968 0.307553 0.7620 
RESID(-2) -0.136366 0.281069 -0.485168 0.6334 
     
     
R-squared 0.019956    Mean dependent var -1.24E-16 
Adjusted R-squared -0.687854    S.D. dependent var 0.035084 
S.E. of regression 0.045581    Akaike info criterion -3.039033 
Sum squared resid 0.037397    Schwarz criterion -2.397774 
Log likelihood 62.62453    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.826474 
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Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 0.522786    Prob. F(11,20) 0.8654 
Obs*R-squared 7.146255    Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.7871 
Scaled explained SS 2.594332    Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.9951 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 12:25   
Sample: 3 34    
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.005655 0.020799 -0.271896 0.7885 
GROWTH(-1) -0.012712 0.008191 -1.551943 0.1364 
INV 0.000339 0.000923 0.366866 0.7176 
INV(-1) -0.000115 0.000981 -0.116946 0.9081 
INV(-2) -0.000646 0.000942 -0.685197 0.5011 
MCP -0.001445 0.002595 -0.556720 0.5839 
ME 0.003520 0.006966 0.505296 0.6189 
POP 0.000666 0.003235 0.206017 0.8389 
COR 0.004223 0.007623 0.553944 0.5858 
EDU -0.000132 0.000253 -0.520733 0.6083 
EDU(-1) 0.000236 0.000317 0.745291 0.4648 
EDU(-2) -0.000115 0.000325 -0.355345 0.7261 
     
     
R-squared 0.223320    Mean dependent var 0.001192 
Adjusted R-squared -0.203853    S.D. dependent var 0.001652 
S.E. of regression 0.001812    Akaike info criterion -9.508461 
Sum squared resid 6.57E-05    Schwarz criterion -8.958810 
F-statistic 0.028193    Durbin-Watson stat 1.989821 
Prob(F-statistic) 1.000000    
     
     
298 
 
Log likelihood 164.1354    Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.326267 
F-statistic 0.522786    Durbin-Watson stat 2.751445 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.865439    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
z. India GDP growth 
 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:33   
Sample: 1986 2017   
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
CUSUM 5% Significance
299 
 
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  3.924320 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(GDP_ANNUAL)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:33   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(GDP_ANNUAL(-1)) 0.353649 0.196850 1.796543 0.0926 
D(INV) -0.332619 1.000347 -0.332504 0.7441 
D(MCP) 2.199832 4.373088 0.503039 0.6222 
D(MCP(-1)) -1.944421 0.770012 -2.525181 0.0233 
D(ME) -5.257037 11.01599 -0.477219 0.6401 
D(POP) 173.0407 73.80836 2.344459 0.0332 
D(COR) -7.397200 12.35117 -0.598907 0.5582 
D(COR(-1)) 8.880031 2.464880 3.602622 0.0026 
D(EDU) 0.384441 0.259224 1.483048 0.1588 
C 81.42053 40.18919 2.025931 0.0609 
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INV(-1) 3.340151 1.158284 2.883708 0.0114 
MCP(-1) 9.912529 5.065102 1.957024 0.0692 
ME(-1) -27.78067 15.19078 -1.828785 0.0874 
POP(-1) 6.645485 3.458770 1.921343 0.0739 
COR(-1) -30.09819 14.58961 -2.062989 0.0569 
EDU(-1) 0.762788 0.334396 2.281094 0.0376 
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) -1.243786 0.289324 -4.298930 0.0006 
     
     
R-squared 0.811721    Mean dependent var 0.044590 
Adjusted R-squared 0.610890    S.D. dependent var 2.771969 
S.E. of regression 1.729118    Akaike info criterion 4.237915 
Sum squared resid 44.84775    Schwarz criterion 5.016587 
Log likelihood -50.80663    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.496022 
F-statistic 4.041807    Durbin-Watson stat 2.907862 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004890    
     
     
 
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: GDP_ANNUAL  
Selected Model: ARDL(2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:33   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(GDP_ANNUAL(-1)) 0.353649 0.196850 1.796543 0.0926 
D(INV) -0.332619 1.000347 -0.332504 0.7441 
D(MCP) 2.199832 4.373088 0.503039 0.6222 
D(MCP(-1)) -1.944421 0.770012 -2.525181 0.0233 
D(ME) -5.257037 11.015992 -0.477219 0.6401 
D(POP) 173.040679 73.808361 2.344459 0.0332 
D(COR) -7.397200 12.351172 -0.598907 0.5582 
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D(COR(-1)) 8.880031 2.464880 3.602622 0.0026 
D(EDU) 0.384441 0.259224 1.483048 0.1588 
CointEq(-1) -1.243786 0.289324 -4.298930 0.0006 
     
     
    Cointeq = GDP_ANNUAL - (2.6855*INV + 7.9696*MCP  -22.3356*ME + 
        5.3430*POP  -24.1989*COR + 0.6133*EDU + 65.4619 ) 
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
INV 2.685472 0.915955 2.931882 0.0103 
MCP 7.969644 4.457542 1.787901 0.0940 
ME -22.335575 13.154600 -1.697929 0.1102 
POP 5.342951 2.920733 1.829318 0.0873 
COR -24.198858 13.054565 -1.853670 0.0836 
EDU 0.613279 0.268873 2.280923 0.0376 
C 65.461868 35.369608 1.850794 0.0840 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1986 2017
Observations 32
Mean      -8.88e-16
Median   0.092536
Maximum  2.308128
Minimum -2.408236
Std. Dev.   1.202789
Skewness  -0.057921
Kurtosis   2.248025
Jarque-Bera  0.771847
Probability  0.679823
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 12.17440    Prob. F(2,13) 0.0010 
Obs*R-squared 20.86176    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 01/04/20   Time: 15:35   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) 0.484270 0.163768 2.957053 0.0111 
GDP_ANNUAL(-2) 0.432220 0.172805 2.501192 0.0265 
INV -1.155400 0.682497 -1.692900 0.1143 
INV(-1) 0.109809 0.672672 0.163242 0.8728 
MCP 3.217268 2.847620 1.129809 0.2790 
MCP(-1) -1.495277 3.397187 -0.440152 0.6671 
MCP(-2) 0.387204 0.494253 0.783414 0.4474 
ME -7.318436 7.139046 -1.025128 0.3240 
ME(-1) 1.943986 9.404070 0.206718 0.8394 
POP -4.496768 46.78379 -0.096118 0.9249 
POP(-1) 3.766170 45.91888 0.082018 0.9359 
COR -7.874757 7.994838 -0.984980 0.3426 
COR(-1) 3.594649 9.370025 0.383633 0.7075 
COR(-2) -1.540561 1.612115 -0.955615 0.3567 
EDU 0.094044 0.165739 0.567422 0.5801 
EDU(-1) -0.267278 0.193808 -1.379089 0.1911 
C 11.40336 26.22868 0.434767 0.6709 
RESID(-1) -1.415150 0.286790 -4.934444 0.0003 
RESID(-2) -0.737240 0.296585 -2.485767 0.0273 
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Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 1.245096    Prob. F(16,15) 0.3380 
Obs*R-squared 18.25490    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 0.3092 
Scaled explained SS 2.502969    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 1.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:36   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -66.17885 34.83496 -1.899783 0.0769 
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) 0.035772 0.163625 0.218624 0.8299 
GDP_ANNUAL(-2) 0.003594 0.170625 0.021065 0.9835 
INV 0.133032 0.867075 0.153427 0.8801 
INV(-1) -1.165917 0.899325 -1.296437 0.2144 
MCP -1.308239 3.790480 -0.345138 0.7348 
MCP(-1) -7.040080 4.532550 -1.553227 0.1412 
MCP(-2) 0.225542 0.667427 0.337928 0.7401 
ME 3.413382 9.548379 0.357483 0.7257 
ME(-1) 20.23877 12.54369 1.613462 0.1275 
POP -8.702638 63.97519 -0.136031 0.8936 
POP(-1) 6.217659 62.79542 0.099015 0.9224 
R-squared 0.651930    Mean dependent var -8.88E-16 
Adjusted R-squared 0.169987    S.D. dependent var 1.202789 
S.E. of regression 1.095802    Akaike info criterion 3.307563 
Sum squared resid 15.61016    Schwarz criterion 4.177844 
Log likelihood -33.92101    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.596037 
F-statistic 1.352711    Durbin-Watson stat 2.425682 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.293264    
     
     
304 
 
COR 3.954150 10.70568 0.369351 0.7170 
COR(-1) 20.42034 12.60126 1.620500 0.1260 
COR(-2) 0.734392 2.136495 0.343737 0.7358 
EDU 0.352026 0.224688 1.566733 0.1380 
EDU(-1) -0.084754 0.254462 -0.333072 0.7437 
     
     
R-squared 0.570466    Mean dependent var 1.401492 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112296    S.D. dependent var 1.590730 
S.E. of regression 1.498755    Akaike info criterion 3.951961 
Sum squared resid 33.69402    Schwarz criterion 4.730634 
Log likelihood -46.23138    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.210069 
F-statistic 1.245096    Durbin-Watson stat 1.984760 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.337984    
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aa. India Per capita Income 
 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 01/04/20   Time: 18:06   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  3.928960 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(PCI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/04/20   Time: 18:06   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(PCI(-1)) 0.353662 0.196548 1.799365 0.0921 
D(COR) -7.288249 12.12100 -0.601291 0.5566 
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D(COR(-1)) 8.719758 2.419487 3.603969 0.0026 
D(EDU) 0.376975 0.254430 1.481646 0.1591 
D(INV) -0.331696 0.982099 -0.337742 0.7402 
D(MCP) 2.167648 4.291553 0.505096 0.6208 
D(MCP(-1)) -1.907347 0.755891 -2.523308 0.0234 
D(ME) -5.181848 10.81077 -0.479323 0.6386 
D(POP) 169.4815 72.46298 2.338870 0.0336 
C 80.08193 39.45254 2.029829 0.0605 
COR(-1) -29.57210 14.32144 -2.064882 0.0567 
EDU(-1) 0.749136 0.328147 2.282928 0.0374 
INV(-1) 3.285193 1.137168 2.888925 0.0112 
MCP(-1) 9.736591 4.972165 1.958220 0.0691 
ME(-1) -27.28167 14.91253 -1.829447 0.0873 
POP(-1) 5.237954 3.376864 1.551130 0.1417 
PCI(-1) -1.242356 0.288856 -4.300952 0.0006 
     
     
R-squared 0.811955    Mean dependent var 0.080535 
Adjusted R-squared 0.611373    S.D. dependent var 2.722695 
S.E. of regression 1.697326    Akaike info criterion 4.200799 
Sum squared resid 43.21372    Schwarz criterion 4.979471 
Log likelihood -50.21279    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.458907 
F-statistic 4.048006    Durbin-Watson stat 2.907631 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004852    
     
     
 
 
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: PCI   
Selected Model: ARDL(2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1)  
Date: 01/04/20   Time: 18:06   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(PCI(-1)) 0.353662 0.196548 1.799365 0.0921 
D(COR) -7.288249 12.120998 -0.601291 0.5566 
D(COR(-1)) 8.719758 2.419487 3.603969 0.0026 
D(EDU) 0.376975 0.254430 1.481646 0.1591 
D(INV) -0.331696 0.982099 -0.337742 0.7402 
D(MCP) 2.167648 4.291553 0.505096 0.6208 
D(MCP(-1)) -1.907347 0.755891 -2.523308 0.0234 
D(ME) -5.181848 10.810768 -0.479323 0.6386 
D(POP) 169.481480 72.462983 2.338870 0.0336 
CointEq(-1) -1.242356 0.288856 -4.300952 0.0006 
     
     
    Cointeq = PCI - (-23.8032*COR + 0.6030*EDU + 2.6443*INV + 7.8372*MCP  
        -21.9596*ME + 4.2161*POP + 64.4597 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
COR -23.803245 12.823083 -1.856281 0.0832 
EDU 0.602996 0.264320 2.281309 0.0376 
INV 2.644325 0.900498 2.936513 0.0102 
MCP 7.837201 4.378322 1.790001 0.0937 
ME -21.959629 12.921385 -1.699480 0.1099 
POP 4.216146 2.871146 1.468454 0.1626 
C 64.459739 34.741906 1.855389 0.0833 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 12.11840    Prob. F(2,13) 0.0011 
Obs*R-squared 20.82826    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 18:07   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
PCI(-1) 0.482162 0.163712 2.945185 0.0114 
PCI(-2) 0.430487 0.172710 2.492548 0.0270 
COR -7.680988 7.855737 -0.977755 0.3460 
COR(-1) 3.501097 9.212964 0.380019 0.7101 
COR(-2) -1.508997 1.584564 -0.952311 0.3583 
EDU 0.090224 0.162857 0.554007 0.5890 
EDU(-1) -0.261508 0.190464 -1.373004 0.1930 
INV -1.131904 0.670934 -1.687058 0.1154 
INV(-1) 0.105138 0.661628 0.158909 0.8762 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1986 2017
Observations 32
Mean       1.55e-14
Median   0.092179
Maximum  2.265874
Minimum -2.365795
Std. Dev.   1.180674
Skewness  -0.057815
Kurtosis   2.245170
Jarque-Bera  0.777519
Probability  0.677897
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MCP 3.141310 2.798063 1.122673 0.2819 
MCP(-1) -1.457364 3.340265 -0.436302 0.6698 
MCP(-2) 0.379825 0.485919 0.781664 0.4484 
ME -7.139728 7.014922 -1.017791 0.3273 
ME(-1) 1.875083 9.246450 0.202790 0.8424 
POP -4.999603 46.00269 -0.108681 0.9151 
POP(-1) 5.229001 45.15961 0.115789 0.9096 
C 11.08737 25.78398 0.430010 0.6742 
RESID(-1) -1.412663 0.286946 -4.923087 0.0003 
RESID(-2) -0.736841 0.296861 -2.482112 0.0275 
     
     
R-squared 0.650883    Mean dependent var 1.55E-14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.167490    S.D. dependent var 1.180674 
S.E. of regression 1.077270    Akaike info criterion 3.273451 
Sum squared resid 15.08664    Schwarz criterion 4.143731 
Log likelihood -33.37521    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.561924 
F-statistic 1.346489    Durbin-Watson stat 2.426106 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.296239    
     
     
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 1.243982    Prob. F(16,15) 0.3386 
Obs*R-squared 18.24788    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 0.3096 
Scaled explained SS 2.496282    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 1.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 18:08   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
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C -63.46359 33.53782 -1.892299 0.0779 
PCI(-1) 0.034780 0.160340 0.216911 0.8312 
PCI(-2) 0.001513 0.167082 0.009055 0.9929 
COR 3.865326 10.30382 0.375135 0.7128 
COR(-1) 19.50935 12.13292 1.607969 0.1287 
COR(-2) 0.722284 2.056758 0.351176 0.7303 
EDU 0.340079 0.216286 1.572359 0.1367 
EDU(-1) -0.081970 0.244939 -0.334653 0.7425 
INV 0.134595 0.834863 0.161218 0.8741 
INV(-1) -1.124987 0.865957 -1.299126 0.2135 
MCP -1.284889 3.648164 -0.352202 0.7296 
MCP(-1) -6.716734 4.364086 -1.539093 0.1446 
MCP(-2) 0.209673 0.642568 0.326305 0.7487 
ME 3.347276 9.190019 0.364229 0.7208 
ME(-1) 19.32467 12.07722 1.600092 0.1304 
POP -8.399055 61.59934 -0.136350 0.8934 
POP(-1) 6.060024 60.46710 0.100220 0.9215 
     
     
R-squared 0.570246    Mean dependent var 1.350429 
Adjusted R-squared 0.111842    S.D. dependent var 1.531017 
S.E. of regression 1.442863    Akaike info criterion 3.875950 
Sum squared resid 31.22780    Schwarz criterion 4.654622 
Log likelihood -45.01520    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.134058 
F-statistic 1.243982    Durbin-Watson stat 1.984726 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.338614    
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4. China 
a. China Inclusive growth  
CHINA 
Descriptive stats 
 IGI INV_GDP LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean  0.540263  3.042429  20.93908  4.665568  1.846692  2.619048  0.650017 
 Median  0.480000  3.484582  20.96011  3.925372  1.925132  2.000000  0.000000 
 Maximum  0.880000  6.186882  21.04997  9.973033  2.493258  4.500000  2.061550 
 Minimum  0.270000  0.483946  20.75943  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.156623  1.525980  0.082589  2.450955  0.560644  1.031335  0.848356 
 Skewness  1.014274 -0.141696 -0.593894  0.461273 -2.351036  0.464315  0.659472 
 Kurtosis  2.738695  2.089655  2.192380  2.924262  8.458567  1.860938  1.571700 
 Jarque-Bera  23.18239  5.037596  11.43297  4.748247  287.6425  11.96898  20.94559 
 Probability  0.000009  0.080556  0.003291  0.093096  0.000000  0.002517  0.000028 
 Sum  71.85500  404.6430  2784.898  620.5205  245.6101  348.3333  86.45225 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  3.238053  307.3771  0.900356  792.9476  41.49040  140.4020  95.00152 
 Observations  133  133  133  133  133  133  133 
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Results of Correlation matrix  
 IGI INV_GDP LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI  1.000000 -0.605898 -0.460669 -0.023652 -0.476540  0.493284  0.270635 
INV_GDP -0.605898  1.000000  0.437513 -0.069113  0.187840 -0.285034 -0.027551 
LNPOP -0.460669  0.437513  1.000000 -0.231062  0.466943 -0.745218 -0.717743 
MCP -0.023652 -0.069113 -0.231062  1.000000  0.590510  0.588506  0.048351 
ME -0.476540  0.187840  0.466943  0.590510  1.000000 -0.295456 -0.516468 
COR  0.493284 -0.285034 -0.745218  0.588506 -0.295456  1.000000  0.580178 
EDU  0.270635 -0.027551 -0.717743  0.048351 -0.516468  0.580178  1.000000 
 
 
 Test of Seasonal Dummy variable effects/ Test for structural Breaks /Dummy test  
  
Chow Breakpoint Test: 2005Q1 1999Q2 2005Q3 2016Q4  
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4  
     
     F-statistic 3.120839  Prob. F(1,134) 0.0796 
Log likelihood ratio 3.131097  Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0768 
Wald Statistic  3.120839  Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0773 
     
     
 
 
 The ARDL lag Determinants 
  
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI LNPOP INV MCP ME EDU 
COR     
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 04/07/20   Time: 18:14     
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -269.7754 NA   1.78e-07  4.324615  4.480586  4.387987 
1  711.7352  1840.332  8.38e-14 -10.24586 -8.998100 -9.738890 
2  727.6989  28.18588  1.41e-13 -9.729670 -7.390114 -8.779097 
3  759.5471  52.74851  1.88e-13 -9.461673 -6.030324 -8.067498 
4  1070.958  481.7136  3.21e-15 -13.56184 -9.038700 -11.72407 
5  1364.223  421.5686  7.46e-17 -17.37848  -11.76355* -15.09711 
6  1387.694  31.17256  1.21e-16 -16.97960 -10.27287 -14.25462 
7  1432.759  54.92230  1.44e-16 -16.91810 -9.119582 -13.74952 
8  1596.774   181.9542*   2.81e-17*  -18.71521* -9.824899  -15.10303* 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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  
 
SR AND LR ESTIMATES 
 
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 1, 5)  
Date: 04/05/20   Time: 15:18   
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(IGI(-1)) 0.086279 0.071172 1.212256 0.2284 
D(IGI(-2)) 0.086279 0.071172 1.212256 0.2284 
D(IGI(-3)) 0.086279 0.071172 1.212256 0.2284 
D(IGI(-4)) -0.293967 0.072405 -4.060053 0.0001 
D(INV) -0.025529 0.010943 -2.332806 0.0217 
D(INV(-1)) -0.000000 0.014136 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(INV(-2)) 0.000000 0.014136 0.000000 1.0000 
D(INV(-3)) 0.067580 0.014517 4.655144 0.0000 
D(INV(-4)) -0.055895 0.011348 -4.925641 0.0000 
D(LNPOP) 151.117585 35.111552 4.303928 0.0000 
D(LNPOP(-1)) 0.000001 1.276404 0.000001 1.0000 
D(LNPOP(-2)) -0.000001 1.276404 -0.000001 1.0000 
D(LNPOP(-3)) 141.493250 33.672288 4.202068 0.0001 
D(LNPOP(-4)) -115.339613 35.410948 -3.257174 0.0016 
D(MCP) -0.195453 0.043190 -4.525457 0.0000 
D(MCP(-1)) -0.000000 0.009109 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(MCP(-2)) 0.000000 0.009109 0.000000 1.0000 
D(MCP(-3)) 0.058007 0.009952 5.828564 0.0000 
D(MCP(-4)) -0.055996 0.008131 -6.886591 0.0000 
D(ME) 0.432158 0.121325 3.561976 0.0006 
D(EDU) -0.050600 0.014739 -3.433139 0.0009 
D(COR) 0.405908 0.079956 5.076633 0.0000 
D(COR(-1)) 0.000000 0.028288 0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-2)) -0.000000 0.028288 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(COR(-3)) -0.189906 0.031029 -6.120317 0.0000 
D(COR(-4)) 0.178090 0.025309 7.036665 0.0000 
D(DM1) 0.487734 0.062681 7.781165 0.0000 
D(DM2) 0.279396 0.087823 3.181352 0.0019 
D(DM3) 0.395354 0.107101 3.691419 0.0003 
D(DM4) 0.428172 0.123022 3.480443 0.0007 
CointEq(-1) -0.220903 0.072651 -3.040611 0.0030 
     
     
    Cointeq = IGI - (-0.0449*INV + 5.4422*LNPOP  -0.2260*MCP + 0.5567*ME   
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        -0.0265*EDU + 0.4439*COR  -115.4675 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
INV -0.044914 0.021671 -2.072562 0.0409 
LNPOP 5.442216 1.931829 2.817131 0.0059 
MCP -0.226026 0.070205 -3.219494 0.0017 
ME 0.556727 0.240942 2.310628 0.0230 
EDU -0.026490 0.046787 -0.566176 0.5726 
COR 0.443946 0.143390 3.096083 0.0026 
DM1 0.447522 0.460345 0.972145 0.3329 
DM2 0.338531 0.528361 0.640718 0.5229 
DM3 0.227042 0.472913 0.480093 0.6320 
DM4 0.291612 0.504754 0.577731 0.5645 
C -115.467539 40.793644 -2.830528 0.0056 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.228031    Prob. F(2,11) 0.7998 
Obs*R-squared 1.273909    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5289 
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Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 0.563749    Prob. F(18,13) 0.8714 
Obs*R-squared 14.02828    Prob. Chi-Square(18) 0.7272 
Scaled explained SS 3.604029    Prob. Chi-Square(18) 0.9999 
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b. China GDP annual  
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:47   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  6.339673 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(GDP_ANNUAL)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:47   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(MCP) 1.018077 0.411023 2.476934 0.0248 
D(MCP(-1)) 1.898333 0.456875 4.155037 0.0007 
D(POP) -71.55272 20.86993 -3.428508 0.0034 
D(POP(-1)) -4.881567 12.67812 -0.385039 0.7053 
D(COR) -2.191357 1.276124 -1.717198 0.1052 
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D(COR(-1)) -5.179473 1.028829 -5.034338 0.0001 
D(EDU) -1.150796 0.773586 -1.487613 0.1563 
D(EDU(-1)) 1.569129 0.713752 2.198425 0.0430 
C -7.311407 11.62380 -0.629003 0.5382 
INV(-1) 0.386871 0.398508 0.970798 0.3461 
MCP(-1) -2.872911 1.590502 -1.806292 0.0897 
ME(-1) 4.034340 5.361980 0.752397 0.4627 
POP(-1) -3.247801 3.080182 -1.054419 0.3074 
COR(-1) 7.803183 3.602699 2.165927 0.0458 
EDU(-1) -4.380213 1.247573 -3.510987 0.0029 
GDP_ANNUAL(-1) -0.560104 0.189232 -2.959876 0.0092 
     
     
R-squared 0.819035    Mean dependent var -0.204481 
Adjusted R-squared 0.649380    S.D. dependent var 2.364383 
S.E. of regression 1.400026    Akaike info criterion 3.817711 
Sum squared resid 31.36114    Schwarz criterion 4.550579 
Log likelihood -45.08337    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.060636 
F-statistic 4.827662    Durbin-Watson stat 1.823434 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001647    
     
     
     
 
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: GDP_ANNUAL  
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 0, 2, 0, 2, 2, 2)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:46   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(INV) 1.086935 0.372239 2.919995 0.0100 
D(MCP) -2.383861 1.120222 -2.128025 0.0492 
D(MCP(-1)) 1.795606 0.344410 5.213574 0.0001 
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D(ME) 9.230651 3.386153 2.725999 0.0150 
D(POP) -64.977711 15.197461 -4.275564 0.0006 
D(POP(-1)) 14.167860 11.027533 1.284771 0.2172 
D(COR) 4.400076 2.200659 1.999436 0.0628 
D(COR(-1)) -4.143502 0.867431 -4.776750 0.0002 
D(EDU) -1.545214 0.553460 -2.791918 0.0131 
D(EDU(-1)) 1.177659 0.501321 2.349113 0.0320 
CointEq(-1) -0.724131 0.176870 -4.094145 0.0008 
     
     
    Cointeq = GDP_ANNUAL - (1.5010*INV  -6.5919*MCP + 12.7472*ME   
        -0.9897*POP + 15.4620*COR  -6.4421*EDU  -25.7700 ) 
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
INV 1.501020 0.389399 3.854709 0.0014 
MCP -6.591925 2.080233 -3.168840 0.0060 
ME 12.747205 5.775693 2.207043 0.0423 
POP -0.989676 3.251947 -0.304333 0.7648 
COR 15.462032 4.442594 3.480406 0.0031 
EDU -6.442079 2.059029 -3.128697 0.0065 
C -25.769992 12.932105 -1.992714 0.0636 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 2.139876    Prob. F(2,14) 0.1546 
Obs*R-squared 7.492009    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0236 
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 2.641532    Prob. F(15,16) 0.0314 
Obs*R-squared 22.79517    Prob. Chi-Square(15) 0.0886 
Scaled explained SS 3.615737    Prob. Chi-Square(15) 0.9987 
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c. China Per Capita Income  
 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:40   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  6.294887 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
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Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(PCI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:40   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(POP) -71.95729 20.68289 -3.479073 0.0031 
D(POP(-1)) -4.714207 12.55990 -0.375338 0.7123 
D(COR) -2.167571 1.263637 -1.715343 0.1056 
D(COR(-1)) -5.112261 1.019409 -5.014925 0.0001 
D(EDU) -1.148172 0.767246 -1.496485 0.1540 
D(EDU(-1)) 1.550992 0.706995 2.193783 0.0434 
D(MCP) 1.006882 0.407193 2.472738 0.0250 
D(MCP(-1)) 1.875768 0.453029 4.140499 0.0008 
C -7.233937 11.51441 -0.628251 0.5387 
POP(-1) -3.801017 3.116886 -1.219492 0.2403 
COR(-1) 7.730858 3.569567 2.165769 0.0458 
EDU(-1) -4.340494 1.236141 -3.511327 0.0029 
INV(-1) 0.385465 0.395357 0.974980 0.3441 
MCP(-1) -2.848334 1.575718 -1.807642 0.0895 
ME(-1) 4.007298 5.311578 0.754446 0.4615 
PCI(-1) -0.559538 0.189459 -2.953348 0.0093 
     
     
R-squared 0.820342    Mean dependent var -0.175161 
Adjusted R-squared 0.651912    S.D. dependent var 2.350984 
S.E. of regression 1.387057    Akaike info criterion 3.799098 
Sum squared resid 30.78282    Schwarz criterion 4.531966 
Log likelihood -44.78557    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.042023 
F-statistic 4.870528    Durbin-Watson stat 1.823588 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001568    
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ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: PCI   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2, 0)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:40   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(POP) -65.410572 15.066226 -4.341537 0.0005 
D(POP(-1)) 14.137805 10.922106 1.294421 0.2139 
D(COR) 4.339033 2.178985 1.991309 0.0638 
D(COR(-1)) -4.085241 0.859164 -4.754900 0.0002 
D(EDU) -1.538042 0.548854 -2.802279 0.0128 
D(EDU(-1)) 1.163411 0.496724 2.342169 0.0324 
D(INV) 1.078854 0.368659 2.926427 0.0099 
D(MCP) -2.351941 1.110047 -2.118777 0.0501 
D(MCP(-1)) 1.773031 0.341464 5.192444 0.0001 
D(ME) 9.108357 3.356482 2.713661 0.0153 
CointEq(-1) -0.723104 0.176884 -4.088000 0.0009 
     
     
    Cointeq = PCI - (-2.0286*POP + 15.2956*COR  -6.3928*EDU + 1.4920*INV   
        -6.5216*MCP + 12.5962*ME  -25.4077 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
POP -2.028573 3.228987 -0.628238 0.5387 
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COR 15.295601 4.408808 3.469328 0.0032 
EDU -6.392787 2.042192 -3.130356 0.0065 
INV 1.491976 0.386590 3.859324 0.0014 
MCP -6.521597 2.065325 -3.157661 0.0061 
ME 12.596196 5.735140 2.196319 0.0432 
C -25.407715 12.843628 -1.978235 0.0654 
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 2.180429    Prob. F(2,14) 0.1498 
Obs*R-squared 7.600270    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0224 
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Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 2.668204    Prob. F(15,16) 0.0301 
Obs*R-squared 22.86091    Prob. Chi-Square(15) 0.0871 
Scaled explained SS 3.620437    Prob. Chi-Square(15) 0.9987 
     
     
     
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
CUSUM 5% Significance
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance
326 
 
 
SOUTH AFRICA  
a. Inclusive growth  
 
 Descriptive Stats 
 IGI INV_GDP LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
 Mean  0.357083  1.007243  17.62070  7.358225  1.741681  3.669823  4.127302 
 Median  0.373750  0.744786  17.64714  4.159098  1.383167  2.973958  5.035659 
 Maximum  0.530000  5.978862  17.85359  27.74255  4.623759  6.000000  6.371640 
 Minimum  0.090000 -0.654029  17.31621  0.000000  0.000000  2.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.087459  1.140252  0.153225  7.166948  1.122477  1.315856  2.012530 
 Skewness -0.334286  1.496955 -0.365061  1.514257  1.158030  0.381749 -1.102299 
 Kurtosis  2.826636  5.884437  1.979953  4.394859  3.758613  1.461568  2.757759 
 Jarque-Bera  2.623744  95.05911  8.654666  61.14642  32.66796  16.22336  27.05413 
 Probability  0.269315  0.000000  0.013203  0.000000  0.000000  0.000300  0.000001 
 Sum  47.13500  132.9560  2325.933  971.2856  229.9020  484.4167  544.8039 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.002040  170.3230  3.075591  6728.834  165.0542  226.8233  530.5862 
 Observations  132  132  132  132  132  132  132 
 
 
 
Results of Correlation matrix  
 
 IGI INV_GDP LNPOP MCP ME COR EDU 
IGI  1.000000  0.512561  0.384919 -0.474217 -0.376637 -0.438434  0.524413 
INV_GDP  0.512561  1.000000  0.525872 -0.532869 -0.484340 -0.555637  0.281283 
LNPOP  0.384919  0.525872  1.000000 -0.915638 -0.914332 -0.912755  0.343184 
MCP -0.474217 -0.532869 -0.915638  1.000000  0.974136  0.859316 -0.412702 
ME -0.376637 -0.484340 -0.914332  0.974136  1.000000  0.793938 -0.292744 
COR -0.438434 -0.555637 -0.912755  0.859316  0.793938  1.000000 -0.461120 
EDU  0.524413  0.281283  0.343184 -0.412702 -0.292744 -0.461120  1.000000 
 
 Test of Seasonal Dummy variable effects/dummy test  
  
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1989Q1 1994Q1 1999Q1 2005Q1 2011Q1  
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4  
     
     F-statistic 7.449654  Prob. F(10,124) 0.0000 
Log likelihood ratio 63.98665  Prob. Chi-Square(10) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic  74.49654  Prob. Chi-Square(10) 0.0000 
     
     
  
 
 
 The ARDL lag Determinants 
  
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VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: IGI POP ME MCP INV COR EDU     
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 04/07/20   Time: 18:28     
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4     
Included observations: 128     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -2830.749 NA   4.26e+10  44.33983  44.49580  44.40321 
1 -1791.591  1948.422  8140.549  28.86861  30.11637  29.37558 
2 -1773.222  32.43260  13222.23  29.34722  31.68678  30.29779 
3 -1736.882  60.18893  16383.17  29.54503  32.97637  30.93920 
4 -1466.510  418.2317  532.1660  26.08609  30.60923  27.92386 
5 -1198.342  385.4913   18.27430*   22.66159*   28.27652*   24.94297* 
6 -1182.549  20.97454  33.29069  23.18046  29.88718  25.90543 
7 -1154.098  34.67488  51.58160  23.50153  31.30005  26.67011 
8 -1077.725   84.72680*  39.56869  23.07382  31.96413  26.68600 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
  
 
 
Test for structural Breaks 
 
Multiple breakpoint tests    
Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally determined breaks 
Date: 04/07/20   Time: 05:35    
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4    
Included observations: 132    
Breaking variables: INV_GDP LNPOP M__CORRUPTION ME CORRUPTION 
        EDUCATION    
Break test options: Trimming 0.15, Max. breaks 5  
      
      
Schwarz criterion selected breaks:  5  
LWZ criterion selected breaks:  1  
      
      
  Sum of  Schwarz* LWZ* 
Breaks # of Coefs. Sq. Resids. Log-L Criterion Criterion 
      
      
 0  6 0.517321 178.4650 -5.319947 -5.115661 
 1  13 0.267723 221.9400 -5.719722 -5.274217 
 2  20 0.170105 251.8736 -5.914325 -5.224136 
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 3  27 0.107197 282.3488 -6.117135 -5.178347 
 4  34 0.061619 318.8923 -6.411888 -5.220047 
 5  41 0.038412 350.0841 -6.625554 -5.175545 
      
      
* Minimum information criterion values displayed with shading 
      
Estimated break dates:    
1:  1994Q4     
2:  1999Q4,  2006Q4    
3:  1989Q2,  1999Q4,  2006Q4    
4:  1989Q2,  1999Q4,  2007Q1,  2012Q3   
5:  1989Q3,  1995Q3,  2000Q2,  2007Q1,  2012Q3  
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: IGI   
Selected Model: ARDL(5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 1)  
Date: 04/05/20   Time: 15:24   
Sample: 1984Q1 2017Q4   
Included observations: 131   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(IGI(-1)) 0.052673 0.089206 0.590466 0.5561 
D(IGI(-2)) 0.052673 0.089206 0.590466 0.5561 
D(IGI(-3)) 0.052673 0.089206 0.590466 0.5561 
D(IGI(-4)) -0.528956 0.085373 -6.195822 0.0000 
D(INV) -0.000580 0.003814 -0.152091 0.8794 
D(LNPOP) 0.111570 0.116968 0.953851 0.3422 
D(MCP) -0.015626 0.005826 -2.681943 0.0084 
D(ME) 0.087747 0.036155 2.426989 0.0168 
D(EDU) 0.014417 0.003025 4.766461 0.0000 
D(EDU(-1)) 0.000000 0.003259 0.000000 1.0000 
D(EDU(-2)) -0.000000 0.003259 -0.000000 1.0000 
D(EDU(-3)) -0.007774 0.003876 -2.005789 0.0473 
D(EDU(-4)) 0.008425 0.003070 2.744161 0.0071 
D(COR) 0.074138 0.025810 2.872519 0.0049 
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D(DM1) -0.127682 0.042624 -2.995553 0.0034 
D(DM2) -0.110190 0.062646 -1.758939 0.0816 
D(DM3) -0.051776 0.074290 -0.696947 0.4874 
D(DM4) -0.030734 0.088141 -0.348691 0.7280 
D(DM5) -0.075115 0.101554 -0.739652 0.4612 
CointEq(-1) -0.150152 0.082564 -1.818606 0.0716 
     
     
    Cointeq = IGI - (-0.0039*INV + 0.7430*LNPOP  -0.1041*MCP + 0.5844*ME   
        -0.0115*EDU + 0.1514*COR  -13.4661 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
INV -0.003863 0.026497 -0.145785 0.8844 
LNPOP 0.743047 0.717124 1.036148 0.3023 
MCP -0.104067 0.049354 -2.108611 0.0372 
ME 0.584392 0.285228 2.048860 0.0428 
EDU -0.011508 0.021213 -0.542515 0.5885 
COR 0.151391 0.086745 1.745255 0.0837 
DM1 0.007596 0.088441 0.085889 0.9317 
DM2 0.049426 0.096129 0.514169 0.6082 
DM3 0.031379 0.105171 0.298360 0.7660 
DM4 0.120996 0.089729 1.348459 0.1805 
DM5 -0.133898 0.135446 -0.988564 0.3252 
C -13.466066 12.969321 -1.038302 0.3013 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 3.152914    Prob. F(2,9) 0.0917 
Obs*R-squared 13.18364    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0014 
     
     
     
     
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 0.796417    Prob. F(20,11) 0.6836 
Obs*R-squared 18.92827    Prob. Chi-Square(20) 0.5265 
Scaled explained SS 3.120628    Prob. Chi-Square(20) 1.0000 
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b. South Africa GDP growth annual  
 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:53   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value K   
     
     
F-statistic  5.967575 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(REAL_GDP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:53   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(EDU) 0.555044 0.131570 4.218616 0.0005 
D(EDU(-1)) -0.207926 0.146705 -1.417302 0.1735 
D(INV) -0.462722 0.195219 -2.370276 0.0291 
D(INV(-1)) 0.365763 0.206178 1.774018 0.0930 
D(ME) -0.149235 1.092329 -0.136621 0.8928 
D(POP) -30.18237 5.832979 -5.174435 0.0001 
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C 1.645305 1.827071 0.900515 0.3797 
COR(-1) 2.019130 0.857375 2.355014 0.0301 
EDU(-1) 1.345695 0.394105 3.414562 0.0031 
INV(-1) -1.384692 0.435918 -3.176498 0.0052 
MCP(-1) -0.605627 0.271011 -2.234696 0.0384 
ME(-1) 3.587486 1.488547 2.410058 0.0269 
POP(-1) -7.816661 2.486690 -3.143400 0.0056 
REAL_GDP(-1) -1.333911 0.227197 -5.871152 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.805290    Mean dependent var 0.079007 
Adjusted R-squared 0.664666    S.D. dependent var 1.895986 
S.E. of regression 1.097928    Akaike info criterion 3.324362 
Sum squared resid 21.69802    Schwarz criterion 3.965621 
Log likelihood -39.18979    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.536921 
F-statistic 5.726554    Durbin-Watson stat 2.168287 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000449    
     
     
 
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: GDP_annual   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 0, 2, 2, 0, 1, 1)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:54   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(COR) 2.134764 0.725780 2.941338 0.0087 
D(EDU) 0.453432 0.113579 3.992222 0.0009 
D(EDU(-1)) -0.188272 0.124125 -1.516788 0.1467 
D(INV) -0.472791 0.185133 -2.553791 0.0199 
D(INV(-1)) 0.314619 0.186822 1.684063 0.1094 
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D(MCP) -0.764646 0.273911 -2.791583 0.0121 
D(ME) 2.599532 1.404026 1.851484 0.0806 
D(POP) -28.603988 4.906872 -5.829373 0.0000 
CointEq(-1) -1.275532 0.189187 -6.742171 0.0000 
     
     
    Cointeq = REAL_GDP - (1.6736*COR + 0.8779*EDU  -1.0061*INV  -0.5995 
        *MCP + 3.2385*ME  -5.9320*POP + 1.4032 ) 
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
COR 1.673626 0.495893 3.374975 0.0034 
EDU 0.877852 0.181566 4.834902 0.0001 
INV 1.006121 0.287987 -3.493633 0.0026 
MCP -0.599472 0.197147 -3.040741 0.0070 
ME 3.238539 0.964274 3.358526 0.0035 
POP -5.931991 1.190381 -4.983270 0.0001 
C 1.403190 1.347110 1.041630 0.3114 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 2.526772    Prob. F(2,16) 0.1113 
Obs*R-squared 7.681053    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0215 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:55   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
REAL_GDP(-1) 0.043017 0.280461 0.153378 0.8800 
COR -0.720316 0.942974 -0.763877 0.4561 
EDU 0.000355 0.105920 0.003351 0.9974 
EDU(-1) 0.073310 0.143880 0.509520 0.6173 
EDU(-2) 0.035127 0.134074 0.261995 0.7967 
INV 0.011504 0.175639 0.065498 0.9486 
INV(-1) -0.053911 0.208484 -0.258587 0.7993 
INV(-2) 0.031841 0.191478 0.166291 0.8700 
MCP 0.051027 0.299469 0.170391 0.8668 
ME 0.484481 1.339302 0.361741 0.7223 
ME(-1) -0.393649 1.070035 -0.367885 0.7178 
POP -1.658705 5.601253 -0.296131 0.7709 
POP(-1) 3.151683 4.241195 0.743112 0.4682 
C -0.931093 1.805926 -0.515577 0.6132 
RESID(-1) -0.315674 0.398892 -0.791376 0.4403 
RESID(-2) -0.577331 0.271442 -2.126905 0.0493 
     
     
R-squared 0.240033    Mean dependent var -2.77E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.472436    S.D. dependent var 0.793862 
S.E. of regression 0.963304    Akaike info criterion 3.069956 
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Sum squared resid 14.84726    Schwarz criterion 3.802824 
Log likelihood -33.11930    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.312881 
F-statistic 0.336903    Durbin-Watson stat 2.330472 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.979412    
     
     
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 0.843145    Prob. F(13,18) 0.6166 
Obs*R-squared 12.11110    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.5186 
Scaled explained SS 10.04935    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.6899 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 15:56   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.035648 2.455423 0.014518 0.9886 
REAL_GDP(-1) 0.173487 0.266896 0.650018 0.5239 
COR -0.067824 1.023896 -0.066241 0.9479 
EDU 0.034360 0.160231 0.214438 0.8326 
EDU(-1) -0.155125 0.195523 -0.793383 0.4379 
EDU(-2) -0.137538 0.175110 -0.785435 0.4424 
INV 0.200341 0.261177 0.767071 0.4530 
INV(-1) 0.694409 0.284522 2.440616 0.0252 
INV(-2) 0.139529 0.263559 0.529402 0.6030 
MCP 0.241712 0.386421 0.625516 0.5395 
ME -1.298807 1.980734 -0.655720 0.5203 
ME(-1) 0.025868 1.388375 0.018632 0.9853 
POP 9.265465 6.922383 1.338479 0.1974 
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POP(-1) -8.556429 5.720733 -1.495687 0.1521 
     
     
R-squared 0.378472    Mean dependent var 0.610522 
Adjusted R-squared -0.070409    S.D. dependent var 1.420579 
S.E. of regression 1.469739    Akaike info criterion 3.907683 
Sum squared resid 38.88241    Schwarz criterion 4.548943 
Log likelihood -48.52293    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.120242 
F-statistic 0.843145    Durbin-Watson stat 2.803516 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.616582    
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 South Africa Per capita  
 
ARDL Bounds Test   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 16:00   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
     
     
Test Statistic Value k   
     
     
F-statistic  5.949699 6   
     
     
     
Critical Value Bounds   
     
     
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound   
     
     
10% 2.12 3.23   
5% 2.45 3.61   
2.5% 2.75 3.99   
1% 3.15 4.43   
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: D(PCI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 16:00   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(POP) -30.63181 5.742508 -5.334222 0.0000 
D(EDU) 0.542524 0.129640 4.184842 0.0006 
D(EDU(-1)) -0.205134 0.144653 -1.418111 0.1732 
D(INV) -0.456409 0.192598 -2.369755 0.0292 
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D(INV(-1)) 0.362519 0.203540 1.781072 0.0918 
D(ME) -0.122294 1.077919 -0.113454 0.9109 
C 1.666953 1.803729 0.924171 0.3676 
POP(-1) -9.001552 2.623517 -3.431101 0.0030 
COR(-1) 1.972506 0.843653 2.338054 0.0311 
EDU(-1) 1.318340 0.387874 3.398883 0.0032 
INV(-1) -1.369008 0.430100 -3.183001 0.0052 
MCP(-1) -0.600047 0.267456 -2.243538 0.0377 
ME(-1) 3.562612 1.469565 2.424264 0.0261 
PCI(-1) -1.333372 0.227467 -5.861830 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.807981    Mean dependent var 0.111827 
Adjusted R-squared 0.669301    S.D. dependent var 1.883798 
S.E. of regression 1.083305    Akaike info criterion 3.297545 
Sum squared resid 21.12388    Schwarz criterion 3.938805 
Log likelihood -38.76072    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.510105 
F-statistic 5.826222    Durbin-Watson stat 2.165577 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000403    
     
     
     
     
 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Dependent Variable: PCI   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 0, 2, 2, 0, 1)  
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 16:00   
Sample: 1984 2017   
Included observations: 32   
     
     
Cointegrating Form 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
D(POP) -29.143394 4.837003 -6.025094 0.0000 
D(COR) 2.098068 0.715259 2.933300 0.0089 
D(EDU) 0.444085 0.112017 3.964423 0.0009 
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D(EDU(-1)) -0.187564 0.122499 -1.531146 0.1431 
D(INV) -0.466476 0.182608 -2.554524 0.0199 
D(INV(-1)) 0.311885 0.184368 1.691645 0.1080 
D(MCP) -0.755020 0.270149 -2.794823 0.0120 
D(ME) 2.588903 1.385173 1.869011 0.0780 
CointEq(-1) -1.277448 0.189705 -6.733860 0.0000 
     
     
    Cointeq = PCI - (-6.8370*POP + 1.6424*COR + 0.8631*EDU  -0.9948*INV   
        -0.5910*MCP + 3.1987*ME + 1.4136 )  
     
     
     
Long Run Coefficients 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     
POP -6.837041 1.172335 -5.831987 0.0000 
COR 1.642390 0.488388 3.362882 0.0035 
EDU 0.863060 0.178828 4.826190 0.0001 
INV 0.994755 0.283720 -3.506112 0.0025 
MCP -0.591037 0.194180 -3.043763 0.0070 
ME 3.198722 0.949724 3.368056 0.0034 
C 1.413599 1.326801 1.065419 0.3008 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 2.582216    Prob. F(2,16) 0.1067 
Obs*R-squared 7.808470    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0202 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 06/05/19   Time: 16:01   
Sample: 1986 2017   
Included observations: 32   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
PCI(-1) 0.040162 0.280891 0.142980 0.8881 
POP -1.705965 5.517589 -0.309187 0.7612 
POP(-1) 3.201163 4.029353 0.794461 0.4386 
COR -0.705249 0.925271 -0.762208 0.4570 
EDU 0.000487 0.104153 0.004672 0.9963 
EDU(-1) 0.073273 0.141557 0.517624 0.6118 
EDU(-2) 0.035681 0.132162 0.269976 0.7906 
INV 0.012465 0.172793 0.072136 0.9434 
INV(-1) -0.054173 0.205362 -0.263791 0.7953 
INV(-2) 0.030348 0.188604 0.160906 0.8742 
MCP 0.047696 0.294539 0.161935 0.8734 
ME 0.486969 1.318586 0.369311 0.7167 
ME(-1) -0.382594 1.052083 -0.363653 0.7209 
C -0.919114 1.779067 -0.516627 0.6125 
RESID(-1) -0.315790 0.397348 -0.794744 0.4384 
RESID(-2) -0.581836 0.270826 -2.148376 0.0473 
     
     
R-squared 0.244015    Mean dependent var -3.63E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.464722    S.D. dependent var 0.783068 
S.E. of regression 0.947714    Akaike info criterion 3.037324 
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Sum squared resid 14.37058    Schwarz criterion 3.770192 
Log likelihood -32.59718    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.280249 
F-statistic 0.344295    Durbin-Watson stat 2.341011 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.977402    
     
     
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 0.840386    Prob. F(13,18) 0.6189 
Obs*R-squared 12.08644    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.5206 
Scaled explained SS 10.11855    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.6842 
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